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1945 Declaration of independent Republic of Indonesia (August); 
after armed struggle against Dutch forces, sovereignty is 
transferred formally in December 1949
1945 Declaration of independent Democratic Republic of 
Vietnam (September); armed struggle against French forces 
pursued until 1954
1946 The Philippines independent from the US (July)
1948 Burma independent from Britain (January)
1953 Cambodia and Laos independent from France  
(October‒November)
1954 Geneva Accords end French involvement in Vietnam (July); 
the Democratic Republic of Vietnam governs north of the 
Demilitarised Zone and the State (later Republic) of Vietnam 
in the south
1954 Manila Treaty establishes the Southeast Asia Treaty 
Organization, SEATO (September)
1955 Asian–African Conference, Bandung (April)
1957 Malaya independent from Britain (August)
1959 Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman of Malaya proposes 
a Southeast Asian Friendship and Economic Treaty, 
SEAFET (February)
1961 Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) formed by Malaya, 
the Philippines and Thailand (July)
1963 Indonesia declares policy of Konfrontasi (Confrontation) 
of proposed Federation of Malaysia (January)
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1963 Indonesia, Malaya and the Philippines initiate dialogue 
under the banner of ‘Maphilindo’ (June); the effort 
is abandoned amid tensions over the formation of the 
Federation of Malaysia
1963 Federation of Malaysia incorporating Malaya, North Borneo 
(Sabah), Sarawak and Singapore inaugurated (September)
1965 Singapore expelled from Malaysia and becomes 
independent state (August)
1966 Konfrontasi ends formally between Indonesia and Malaysia 
(August)
1967 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
established by Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Singapore and Thailand, Bangkok (August)
1971 ASEAN members issue declaration on Southeast Asian Zone 
of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality, ZOPFAN (November)
1974 Australia and ASEAN initiate multilateral relations, 
Canberra (April)
1975 Communist forces assume control of southern Vietnam 
and Cambodia (April) and Laos (December)
1975 Indonesian forces invade East Timor (December)
1976 ASEAN holds first heads of government meeting, the ‘Bali 
Summit’; ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation signed 
(February)
1976 Vietnam reunified as Socialist Republic of Vietnam (July)
1977 SEATO dissolved (June)
1977 First meeting between Australian and ASEAN heads of 
government, Kuala Lumpur (August)
1978 Vietnam invades Cambodia; Khmer Rouge (Democratic 
Kampuchea) regime ejected (December)
1979 People’s Republic of Kampuchea inaugurated in Cambodia, 
aligned with Soviet Union and Vietnam (January)
1979 Chinese invasion of northern Vietnam (February‒March)
1980 Australia announces withdrawal of diplomatic recognition 
from ousted Democratic Kampuchea regime (October)
1984 Brunei independent from Britain; joins ASEAN (January)
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1989 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) group 
inaugurated in Canberra (November)
1990 Australia releases proposals to facilitate a peace agreement 
for Cambodia, the ‘Red Book’ (February)
1991 Paris Agreements on Cambodia concluded (October)
1992 ASEAN commitment to develop the ASEAN Free Trade 
Area (January)
1992 United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia, 
UNTAC, deployed (February)
1992 ASEAN joint declaration on the South China Sea (July)
1993 Elections in Cambodia followed by inauguration of Royal 
Government of Cambodia (May) 
1994 ASEAN Regional Forum established (July)
1995 Vietnam joins ASEAN (July)
1997 Laos and Myanmar join ASEAN (July)
1997 Asian financial crisis adversely affects a number of regional 
economies (from July)
1997 ASEAN Plus Three cooperation inaugurated by ASEAN 
and China, Japan and South Korea (December)
1999 Cambodia joins ASEAN (April)
1999 Ballot in East Timor results in vote for independence 
from Indonesia (August)
1999 International Force for East Timor, INTERFET, deployed 
after substantial violence in the territory (September)
2002 East Timor independent (May)
2002 ASEAN and China sign Declaration on the Conduct of 
Parties in the South China Sea (November)
2003 ASEAN Summit in Bali issues commitment to establish 
an ASEAN Community (October)
2004 Heads of government meeting between ASEAN, Australia 
and New Zealand, Vientiane (November)
2005 Australia accedes to ASEAN Treaty of Amity and 
Cooperation (December)
2005 East Asia Summit inaugurated in Kuala Lumpur with 
Australia as a member (December)
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Partnership, RCEP (November)
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Preface
In Australia’s foreign relations with Southeast Asia, the Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has been of significant interest 
since its inauguration in 1967. Australia was the first country to 
establish a formal multilateral relationship with ASEAN (in 1974) and 
interactions have since expanded to include a wide range of dialogues 
and cooperation. 
This monograph has arisen from interests I developed in ASEAN and 
Australian policies towards it in the aftermath of the wars in Indochina 
and my work as a PhD student on Australia’s involvement in the war in 
Vietnam. I first wrote about ASEAN and its significance for Australia 
in the late 1970s. The work that follows seeks to contribute to the 
subject by providing a concise history of the origins and evolution 
of Australia’s multilateral relations with ASEAN since 1974.
In preparing this work, I was fortunate to have been a Visiting 
Fellow in the Department of International Relations in the Coral Bell 
School of Asia Pacific Affairs in the College of Asia and the Pacific 
at The  Australian National University. I want to express my great 
appreciation to Bill Tow for supporting me as a Visiting Fellow and for 
welcoming me as a guest in the department. 
I would like to thank a number of people who have helped me greatly 
in my work on ASEAN and Australia and in the preparation of this 
manuscript. Anthony Milner and Graeme Dobell provided advice on 
the project overall and gave me most valuable comments on the full draft 
manuscript. I also benefited greatly from comments on the draft by 
Stephen Henningham and from Allan Gyngell, Stephen Sherlock and 
Carlyle Thayer on specific sections. For their help and advice during 
my work on this project, I would also like to express my appreciation 
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to Kavi Chongkittavorn, Ralf Emmers, Tim Huxley, Paul Kelly, Andrew 
MacIntyre, Christopher B. Roberts, Daljit Singh, Tan See Seng, Tang 
Siew Mun, the late Barry Wain and Sally Percival Wood.
I want to express my special thanks to Mary-Louise Hickey in the 
Department of International Relations for her extensive advice and 
outstanding editorial contribution to the preparation and completion 
of the manuscript. I also want to express my deep gratitude to my 
brother-in-law Peter van der Vlies and to my friends for their support 
and encouragement while I was preparing the project. I would 
especially like to thank Andrew Chin, Minh Davis, Gayle Deel, Peter 
and Umi Freeman, Susan Geason, Averil Ginn, Carol Kempner, Eleanor 
Lawson, Cathy Madden, John Mandryk, Stephen O’Neill, Michael 
Ong and Effi Tomaras.
I would like to dedicate this book to my late parents, Dr John Norbert 





AACM ASEAN–Australia Consultative Meeting 
AANZFTA ASEAN–Australia–New Zealand Free Trade 
Agreement 
ADMM ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting 
AEC ASEAN Economic Community 
AFP Australian Federal Police 
AFTA ASEAN Free Trade Agreement 
ALP Australian Labor Party
ANZ Australia and New Zealand 
ANZUS Australia, New Zealand, United States
APEC Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
ARF ASEAN Regional Forum
ASA Association of Southeast Asia  
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASEM Asia–Europe Meeting 
ASPAC Asian and Pacific Council
CER Closer Economic Relations
CGDK Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea
CSCA Conference on Security and Cooperation in Asia
CSCAP Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific
DFAT Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
DK Democratic Kampuchea
EAEG East Asian Economic Group
EAS East Asia Summit
EEC European Economic Community
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EPG Eminent Persons’ Group
EU European Union
FUNCINPEC National United Front for an Independent, 
Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia
G20 Group of Twenty
GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
ICAP International Civil Aviation Policy
IMF International Monetary Fund 
INTERFET International Force for East Timor
ISEAS Institute of Southeast Asian Studies
JSCOT Joint Standing Committee on Treaties
KPNLF Khmer People’s National Liberation Front
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development
PECC Pacific Economic Cooperation Council
PKI Partai Komunis Indonesia 
PMC Post-Ministerial Conference
PRK People’s Republic of Kampuchea 
RCEP Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership 
SEAFET Southeast Asian Friendship and Economic Treaty 
SEATO Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
SIA Singapore Airlines
TAC Treaty of Amity and Cooperation 
TPP Trans-Pacific Partnership
UN United Nations 
UNTAC United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
ZOPFAN Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality
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Introduction
On 8 August 1967, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore 
and Thailand formed the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN). The Australian Government and Opposition responded 
promptly. The  next day, Paul Hasluck, the Minister for External 
Affairs, endorsed  ASEAN’s aims of accelerating ‘the economic 
growth, social progress and cultural development of the region’, 
and of promoting ‘regional peace and stability’. These objectives, he 
said, ‘had Australia’s full support’.1 For his part, Opposition leader 
Gough Whitlam, speaking on 17 August, said that the formation of 
ASEAN was a ‘natural development’. In addition, it had historical 
significance because it ‘was the first occasion on which Indonesia has 
been associated with all her immediate neighbours’ and because it was 
‘the first occasion on which Singapore, a Chinese State … has been 
associated with Malay nations or other peoples in the region’.2 
Despite these favourable remarks, there was at that time good reason to 
doubt whether ASEAN would become a durable regional organisation. 
Its founding members, as Whitlam noted, were highly diverse. They 
were rivals and in some cases recent enemies. Previous efforts at 
indigenous regional cooperation and organisation in Southeast Asia 
had not succeeded. In the event, however, while ASEAN has gone 
through some difficult times, it has gained in profile and significance. 
It has developed traditions of and mechanisms for consultation 
and cooperation, which have helped it to maintain peace among its 
members. Its style of cooperation has been attractive to all the states 
in Southeast Asia and its membership has accordingly expanded from 
1  Paul Hasluck, ‘Statement’, in Current Notes on International Affairs, 38(8) August 1967: 
328–9.
2  Gough Whitlam, in Commonwealth of Australia Parliamentary Debates, House 
of Representatives, Official Hansard, No. 33, 17 August 1967, p. 220.
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the original five to 10. An additional neighbouring state, Timor-Leste, 
is interested to join. ASEAN has become essential to political and 
economic cooperation in Southeast Asia and has developed a broader 
regional and international significance. 
ASEAN has also become central to Australia’s relations with Southeast 
Asia. In 1974, Australia became the first external country to develop 
a formal multilateral relationship with ASEAN. Australia as a 
dialogue partner has, since 1980, taken part in consultations at the 
time of ASEAN’s annual foreign ministers’ meetings and has many 
other sectoral consultations. Australia has also participated in other 
ASEAN-sponsored institutions, including the ASEAN Regional Forum 
(ARF) (at foreign minister level) and the East Asia Summit (of heads 
of government), which provide dialogues that include the ASEAN 
members and the major powers, including the United States, China, 
Japan and India. 
Australia’s economic and people-to-people linkages with the ASEAN 
region are very extensive in many areas. The ASEAN countries, with a 
total population of over 620 million people and an estimated combined 
gross domestic product in 2014 of US$2.5 trillion, are important 
economic partners for Australia. Australia’s total merchandise trade 
with ASEAN in 2013–14 was over A$100 billion, about 15 per cent 
of Australia’s trade overall, making the ASEAN members collectively 
Australia’s second largest trade partner. Australia’s services trade 
with the ASEAN group was valued at over A$20 billion. The two-way 
investment relationship was, in 2014, valued at about A$140 billion, 
with ASEAN investment in Australia at A$111 billion and Australia’s 
investment in ASEAN members at A$29 billion.3 Economic 
relationships  are supported by the ASEAN–Australia–New Zealand 
Free Trade Agreement, which was inaugurated in 2010 and is Australia’s 
largest multilateral regional trade agreement. Development assistance 
has also been significant, with Australia in 2015‒16 providing over 
A$770 million in bilateral and multilateral contributions.4
3  Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and Austrade, ‘Why ASEAN and Why 
Now? Insights for Australian Business’, Canberra: Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and 
Trade and Austrade, August 2015, p. 7.
4  Australia’s bilateral aid in 2015‒16 was provided to Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, 
Myanmar,  the Philippines and Vietnam. See Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and 
Trade, ‘Where We Give Aid’, dfat.gov.au/aid/where-we-give-aid/Pages/where-we-give-aid.aspx 
(accessed 1 October 2015).
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People-to-people associations enmesh Australia and ASEAN. 
There were, in 2011, over 650,000 people in Australia who were born 
in ASEAN countries. Education has been a particularly important 
element in the relationship and constitutes Australia’s largest services 
export to ASEAN members. There were 614,327 enrolments by 
students from ASEAN countries in higher education in Australia in 
the decade from 2002 to 2012, and over 100,000 students from ASEAN 
members study in Australia each year.5 Australians are also gaining 
increased interactions with ASEAN members through education; the 
Australian Government’s ‘New Colombo Plan’ (inaugurated in 2013) 
will increase the number of Australians who will study for at least part 
of their degrees in ASEAN member (as well as other Asian) countries.
Australia’s ASEAN relationship has attracted some increased attention 
from analysts. Jiro Okamoto has provided a detailed account of the 
economic relationship between the two sides.6 Sally Percival Wood and 
Baogang He have edited a valuable collection of papers on a number 
of aspects of relations.7 The relationship has also been evaluated in a 
study edited by Anthony Milner and Percival Wood for Asialink at 
the University of Melbourne.8
This monograph seeks to contribute to the subject by providing 
a concise account of the origins and phases of development of 
Australia’s relations with ASEAN, the role ASEAN has played in 
Australian foreign relations since the 1970s, and the ways in which 
the two sides have collaborated, and at times disagreed, in the pursuit 
of regional security and stability. Chapter 1 begins with a review of 
Australia’s engagement with Southeast Asia in the years immediately 
before the formation of ASEAN and then discusses the origins of 
ASEAN and the first phase of Australian policies towards it with the 
inauguration of multilateral relations in April 1974. Chapter 2 covers 
relations between 1976 and 1983 under Malcolm Fraser’s government 
when interactions were dominated by trade and economic issues 
5  Bob Carr, ‘Southeast Asia: At the Crossroads of the Asian Century’, IISS-Fullerton Lecture, 
Singapore, 9 July 2013. 
6  Jiro Okamoto, Australia’s Foreign Economic Policy and ASEAN, Singapore: Institute of 
Southeast Asian Studies, 2010.
7  Sally Percival Wood and Baogang He, eds, The Australia–ASEAN Dialogue: Tracing 40 Years 
of Partnership, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014.
8  Anthony Milner and Sally Percival Wood, eds, ‘Our Place in the Asian Century: Southeast 
Asia as “The Third Way”’, Melbourne: Asialink, University of Melbourne, 2012.
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(which  involved considerable discord) and then after 1979 by the 
regional and international conflict over Cambodia. Chapter 3 assesses 
relations during the Bob Hawke and Paul Keating governments from 
1983 to 1996, when the initial focus was on efforts to alleviate conflict 
over Cambodia. From the late 1980s, in the context of the decline 
of Cold War confrontation, relations with ASEAN were central in 
Australia’s contributions to the Cambodian peace process and to the 
development of two new regional groups to enhance economic and 
security cooperation, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) 
grouping and the ARF. Chapter 4 reviews developments between 1996 
and 2007 under John Howard’s government, when ASEAN relations 
experienced strain in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis and 
the separation of East Timor from Indonesia. Relations were then 
redeveloped by both sides after 2001 with the advent of cooperation 
over multilateral economic relations and the inauguration of the East 
Asia Summit, which Australia joined as a founding member. Chapter 5 
considers relations from 2007 onwards, when Kevin Rudd’s government 
sought to advance proposals for a wider Asia Pacific Community but 
met with ASEAN resistance. The chapter discusses efforts to extend 
Australia’s institutional relations under Julia Gillard’s government 
amid rising major power tensions after 2009, especially in relation to 
the South China Sea; the chapter then considers the approaches of 
Tony Abbott’s government and the ASEAN–Australia Commemorative 
Summit in November 2014. Chapter 6 in conclusion reviews major 
issues and patterns in relations since 1974 and outlines key issues that 
are likely to affect the relationship in the future. 
In assessing the evolution of multilateral relations since 1974, the 
work  considers and explores four major themes that are especially 
relevant: 
• the impact of major power relations in East Asia and how they have 
influenced the context and course of Australia’s interactions with 
ASEAN;
• the interest which successive Australian governments have 
expressed since the 1970s in regional communication and détente 
between the original participants in ASEAN (from 1967) and the 
states of Indochina and Myanmar;
5
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• the diversity and pluralism in both Australia and Southeast Asia in 
relation to how to delineate and define an appropriate ‘region’ for 
cooperation and how this has impacted on the course of Australia’s 
multilateral relations with ASEAN; and
• the special significance for the multilateral ASEAN connection 
of relations between Australia and ASEAN’s largest member, 
Indonesia.
Three additional points should be noted about the monograph and 
its scope and coverage. In discussing the development of Australia’s 
ASEAN relations, the work refers at a number of points to major 
developments in ASEAN itself. This work, however, is not seeking to 
provide a comprehensive account of ASEAN’s evolution and character. 
Those issues have been addressed by many other studies, including 
a comprehensive account of ASEAN by Christopher B. Roberts, and 
a paper on these issues in 2013 by this author.9 
The focus in this monograph is on ASEAN as a grouping and on how 
Australia has interacted with ASEAN as an association of regional 
states. The work is accordingly not seeking to cover in detail each 
of the bilateral relationships that Australia has with the 10 ASEAN 
members. It will, however, discuss how major individual Australian 
relationships, particularly with Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore, 
have at times had particular significance for the course of the 
multilateral relationship with ASEAN overall.
A key issue in the discussion below on regional cooperation is that 
differing conceptions of how to delineate and define ‘region’ have 
been significant for Australia and for ASEAN members in the pursuit 
of regional cooperation. It is therefore important to note at the outset 
that ‘regions’ in international politics are often not only geographically 
defined but socially constructed entities, and appropriate definitions 
of them can be contested. For the purposes of this work, the term 
‘Southeast Asia’ refers to the 10 member countries of ASEAN and 
Timor-Leste. The term ‘East Asia’ refers to the states of Southeast Asia 
9  Christopher B. Roberts, ASEAN Regionalism: Cooperation, Values and Institutionalization, 
Abingdon: Routledge, 2012; Frank Frost, ‘ASEAN and Regional Cooperation: Recent 
Developments and Australia’s Interests’, Parliamentary Library Research Paper Series, 2013–14, 
Canberra: Department of Parliamentary Services, 8 November 2013, www.aph.gov.au/About_
Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/rp/rp1314/ASEAN 
(accessed 1 October 2015).
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along with China, Japan, the two Korean states and Taiwan. The term 
‘Asia-Pacific’ is a broad concept that refers to the East Asian states just 
mentioned, along with other interested countries including the United 
States, Russia, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the Pacific Islands and 
some states in Latin America that have declared significant identities 
in this wider region. A further regional term, ‘Indo-Pacific’, has been 
given increasing reference in discussions about regional cooperation in 
Australia in recent years; this associates the states of East Asia and the 
Western Pacific (including the US, Australia and New Zealand) with 
India and the other states of South Asia. The development of these 
multiple conceptions of ‘region’ reflects the diversity of the states 
and peoples involved in international relations in Asia and the Pacific 
and has been a significant part of the context in which Australia’s 
relationship with ASEAN has developed and evolved since 1974.
It is hoped that this monograph (which was completed in October 
2015) will be informative for the reader and that it can contribute to 
further debate and research on Australia’s interactions with ASEAN 
and on the long-term significance of ASEAN in Australia’s policies 
towards Southeast Asia overall.
7
1
Australia and the origins 
of ASEAN (1967–1975)
The origins of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
and of Australia’s relations with it are bound up in the period of the 
Cold War in East Asia from the late 1940s, and the serious internal 
and inter-state conflicts that developed in Southeast Asia in the 
1950s and early 1960s. Vietnam and Laos were engulfed in internal 
wars with external involvement, and conflict ultimately spread to 
Cambodia. Further conflicts revolved around Indonesia’s unstable 
internal political order and its opposition to Britain’s efforts to secure 
the positions of its colonial territories in the region by fostering a 
federation that could include Malaya, Singapore and the states of North 
Borneo. The Federation of Malaysia was inaugurated in September 
1963, but Singapore was forced to depart in August 1965 and became 
a separate state. ASEAN was established in August 1967 in an effort 
to ameliorate the serious tensions among the states that formed it, and 
to make a contribution towards a more stable regional environment. 
Australia was intensely interested in all these developments. 
To discuss these issues, this chapter covers in turn the background 
to the emergence of interest in regional cooperation in Southeast Asia 
after the Second World War, the period of Indonesia’s Konfrontasi of 
Malaysia, the formation of ASEAN and the inauguration of multilateral 
relations with ASEAN in 1974 by Gough Whitlam’s government, and 
Australia’s early interactions with ASEAN in the period 1974‒75.
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The Cold War era and early approaches 
towards regional cooperation
The conception of ‘Southeast Asia’ as a distinct region in which 
states might wish to engage in regional cooperation emerged in an 
environment of international conflict and the end of the era of Western 
colonialism.1 Extensive communication and interactions developed 
in the pre-colonial era, but these were disrupted thoroughly by the 
arrival of Western powers. In the era of colonial intervention, all of 
the territories of Southeast Asia except Thailand were dominated by 
six different external countries (Britain, France, Holland, Portugal, 
Spain and the United States), and most administrative and commercial 
activities were oriented towards those external authorities. As Amitav 
Acharya has observed, the colonial authorities had no interest in 
fostering the development of any regional diplomatic framework.2 
Japan’s invasion and occupation of much of the region interrupted 
and undermined Western colonial domination and attempted to 
replace it with a new form of external control.3 In the aftermath of 
the Second World War, most areas of Southeast Asia were preoccupied 
with the challenges of seeking independence (either through peaceful 
negotiation or violent struggle), and then of attempting to establish 
new states and political orders. In this environment, not surprisingly, 
notions of regional cooperation took time to emerge.
In the period immediately after the Second World War nonetheless, 
some  independence leaders displayed interest in the potential for 
regional associations, including Ho Chi Minh in Vietnam and Aung 
San  in Burma. The idea of cooperation was also stimulated by 
conferences held in India, whose own transition to independence in 
1947 was an inspiration for other peoples still under colonial rule. 
India  sought to take a leading role. An unofficial Asian relations 
conference, chaired by Jawaharlal Nehru, was held in New Delhi in 
March–April 1947, and the 31 delegations included representatives 
from all of the states of Southeast Asia. The tone of the meeting 
1  Amitav Acharya, The Making of Southeast Asia: International Relations of a Region, 
Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2012, pp. 1–104; Nicholas Tarling, Regionalism in Southeast Asia: 
To Foster the Political Will, London: Routledge, 2006, pp. 35–92.
2  Acharya, The Making of Southeast Asia, pp. 80–1.
3  Tarling, Regionalism in Southeast Asia, pp. 49–68.
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was anti-European, pro-liberation and pro-neutrality. The conference 
provided a platform for subsequent protests against Dutch intervention 
in Indonesia, but no regional machinery emerged from the meeting. 
A subsequent conference in New Delhi in January 1949 (the second 
Asian relations conference) was again sponsored by Nehru (now prime 
minister).4 At the conference, Nehru declared that it would be natural 
that the ‘free countries of Asia’ should look towards developing 
an arrangement for consultation and the pursuit of common goals. 
However, as Acharya has argued, ‘prospects for a Pan-Asian grouping 
were plagued by differences among the pro-communist, pro-Western 
and neutrality-minded delegations. They had little to agree upon apart 
from the end to direct colonial rule’.5 
The conferences in India did however stimulate Southeast Asian 
nationalists to consider that a form of cooperation focusing on 
Southeast Asia was preferable to a ‘Pan-Asian’ model which would 
be dominated by China or India. At the 1947 meeting, delegates from 
Burma, Indonesia, Malaya, the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam 
discussed a cooperation group that could focus first on economic 
and cultural issues and, later on, political cooperation. However, 
no grouping followed from either the 1947 or the 1949 New Delhi 
conferences.6
An indigenous mode of institutional cooperation did not emerge in 
Southeast Asia in the 1950s. The states and territories of the area were 
divided by several factors. While some leaders and peoples were able 
to pursue independence through negotiation (as in the Philippines 
and Malaya), Vietnam and Laos were enmeshed in a revolutionary 
armed struggle against the French. In Indonesia, which had achieved 
independence after armed struggle and was the largest state in 
Southeast Asia, President Sukarno had little interest in cooperation 
with a regional Southeast Asian focus and had wider foreign policy 
ambitions.7 
4  Acharya, The Making of Southeast Asia, pp. 105–10.
5  Ibid., p. 109.
6  Ibid.
7  Ibid., pp. 116–17; see also Anthony Milner, ‘Regionalism in Asia’, in Juliet Love, ed., 
The Far East and Australasia 2014, 45th edn, Abingdon: Routledge, 2013.
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President Sukarno hosted a major conference of Asian and African 
countries in Bandung in April 1955.8 The Bandung communiqué 
condemned colonialism in all its forms and set out a number 
of principles for cooperation and peace including:
respect for the right of each nation to defend itself singly or 
collectively, in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations 
… abstention from the use of arrangements of collective defence to 
serve particular interests of any of the big powers and … from the 
exertion of pressure by one country on another … refraining from 
acts or threats of aggression or force against the territorial integrity 
or political independence of any country … settlement of disputes by 
peaceful means … promotion of mutual interest and cooperation; and 
… respect for justice and international obligation.9 
No specific ‘Southeast Asian view’ on possible cooperation emerged at 
the Bandung meeting but it had an important long-term significance 
in the evolution of regionalism.10 Acharya and See Seng Tan have 
commented that:
[T]he Bandung conference did not end the Cold War polarisation 
of Asia, nor did it create a standing regional organisation for the 
management of intra-regional conflict. But it articulated the basis for 
a normative regional and international order marked by tolerance of 
diversity, mutual accommodation, and the softening of ideological 
conflicts and rivalries. This approach to international order 
subsequently influenced the outlook and approach of ASEAN and 
could well be the basis for an emerging Asian security community.11
Interest in a more distinctly Southeast Asian focus for cooperation 
increased after Malaya gained independence in 1957. In February 
1958, Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman said at a press conference 
that Southeast Asian countries were:
8  Jamie Mackie, Bandung 1955: Non-Alignment and Afro-Asian Solidarity, Singapore: Editions 
Didier Millet, 2005.
9  Tarling, Regionalism in Southeast Asia, p. 92.
10  Acharya, The Making of Southeast Asia, pp. 116–17.
11  Amitav Acharya and See Seng Tan, ‘The Normative Relevance of the Bandung Conference 
for Contemporary Asian and International Order’, in See Seng Tan and Amitav Acharya, eds, 
Bandung Revisited: The Legacy of the 1955 Asian–African Conference for International Order, 
Singapore: NUS Press, 2008, p. 14.
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[t]oo much inclined to dance to the tune of bigger nations. They 
should not concern themselves unduly with the world and Afro-Asian 
politics when they had problems of their own nearer at hand. An effort 
should be made to build up their own unity and understanding. 
If they did not do this, they would have to look outside the area for 
protection and the full meaning of independence would be lost.12
In February 1959, the Tunku sought to advance these ideas by 
proposing a Southeast Asian Friendship and Economic Treaty 
(SEAFET), which could foster regional consultation and cultural and 
economic cooperation. The proposal attracted some interest from 
the Philippines, but Indonesia indicated that such a treaty would 
be contrary to the spirit of Afro–Asian cooperation.13 The SEAFET 
proposal, however, was an early example of interest in Southeast 
Asian-focused dialogue, a mode of cooperation that would emerge 
again in the next decade with the formation of ASEAN.
Australia’s emphasis in the first two decades of the period after the 
Second World War was directed principally towards the consolidation 
of its relationships with its two major power allies, the United States 
and Britain, and in developing bilateral relations with the emerging 
non-communist states in Southeast and Northeast Asia. Australia 
under Ben Chifley’s Labor Government adopted a supportive attitude 
towards the Indonesian struggle for independence against the Dutch. 
This approach was in contrast to the policies of the US and Britain; 
Australia’s support was a strong element in its subsequent relationship 
with Indonesia.14 The Chifley Government was interested in the 
1947 New Delhi conference and provided financial support for the 
attendance of representatives from two Australian non-governmental 
organisations: the Australian Institute of International Affairs and the 
Australian Institute of Political Science. Australia was represented 
12  Quoted in Tarling, Regionalism in Southeast Asia, p. 96.
13  Ibid., pp. 98–108.
14  David Lee, ‘Indonesia’s Independence’, in David Goldsworthy, ed., Facing North: A Century of 
Australian Engagement with Asia, Volume 1: 1901 to the 1970s, Carlton, Vic.: Melbourne University 
Press, 2001; Christopher Waters, ‘Creating a Tradition: The Foreign Policy of the Curtin and 
Chifley Labor Governments’, in David Lee and Christopher Waters, eds, Evatt to Evans: The Labor 
Tradition in Australian Foreign Policy, St Leonards, NSW: Allen & Unwin, in association with the 
Department of International Relations, The Australian National University, 1997.
ENgAgINg ThE NEIghBoURS
12
officially at the 1949 New Delhi conference by the Secretary of the 
Department of External Affairs, John Burton, and the government 
affirmed Australia’s support for Indonesia’s independence.15 
After the victory of the communist forces in China and inauguration 
of the People’s Republic of China (in October 1949), Australia’s foreign 
policy approaches under the newly elected Coalition Government 
led by Robert Menzies (in office from December 1949) emphasised 
support for Australia’s major power allies and opposition to communist 
movements and armed struggle in regional states. Australia thus 
gave backing to the British Government in opposing the Malayan 
Communist Party (which included a military commitment from 1955) 
and also supported the position of the non-communist regime in 
southern Vietnam. In this context of Cold War tensions, the Menzies 
Government did not support the Bandung conference of Afro–Asian 
nations, which it saw as presenting a challenge to Australian and 
Western interests, and made it clear that it did not wish Australia to 
be invited.16 Later in the decade, Australian officials were sympathetic 
towards the Tunku’s SEAFET proposal but (as noted above) this did 
not move beyond the discussion stage.17
Australia and regional cooperation: SEATO 
and ASPAC
In the environment of Cold War competition and tensions in the early 
1950s, the first phase of multilateral institutional cooperation was 
initiated by external powers. A conference in Manila in September 
1954 led to the adoption of the Southeast Asia Collective Defence 
Treaty (known widely as the Manila Treaty), which was followed by 
15  Julie Suares, ‘Engaging with Asia: The Chifley Government and the New Delhi Conferences 
of 1947 and 1949’, Australian Journal of Politics and History, 57(4) 2011.
16  The Menzies Government feared that the conference could see an increase in Chinese 
influence in East Asia, that it might encourage opposition to the military presence of the US and 
Britain in East Asia (which Australia strongly favoured), and that it might increase resistance to 
the newly formed Southeast Asia Treaty Organization. A senior official from the Department of 
External Affairs, Keith Shann, attended as an observer and Dr Burton, his wife and Professor 
C. P. Fitzgerald participated on a non-official basis. See Christopher Waters, ‘Lost Opportunity: 
Australia and the Bandung Conference’, in Derek McDougall and Antonia Finnane, eds, Bandung 
1955: Little Histories, Caulfield, Vic.: Monash University Press, 2010; and David Walker, 
‘Nervous Outsiders: Australia and the 1955 Asia–Africa Conference in Bandung’, Australian 
Historical Studies, 36(125) 2005.
17  Tarling, Regionalism in Southeast Asia, p. 103.
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the establishment of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO).18 
The Manila Treaty was signed by eight states (Australia, New Zealand, 
France, the United Kingdom, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand and 
the United States). While the treaty did not explicitly cite communism 
as a core concern, the US attached a unilateral statement at the time 
of signature limiting its commitment to instances of ‘communist 
aggression’. The specifically anti-communist orientation of the treaty 
precluded support from non-aligned states such as Indonesia. While 
SEATO was established as a  ‘Southeast Asian’ grouping, its concept 
of ‘region’ was loose and it in fact included only two Southeast Asian 
states.19
SEATO did not establish a strong presence as a ‘regional’ grouping. 
It  did not attract any further members from Southeast Asia. 
Its potential relevance to states in Southeast Asia was reduced by the 
fact that it did not have any mechanism for conflict resolution. A SEATO 
headquarters was established in Bangkok and some contingency 
planning pursued, but the US did not commit forces especially to 
SEATO in advance of a specific requirement. SEATO continued in 
existence for two decades, but did not maintain coherence and was 
abandoned formally in 1977.20 
In the mid-1960s another grouping developed, which from the 
Australian Government’s perspective seemed to offer some promise as 
a vehicle for multilateral dialogue and with a scope that encompassed 
both Southeast and Northeast Asia. The Asian and Pacific Council 
(ASPAC) was formed in 1966 by the Republic of Korea, the Republic 
of China, Japan, the Republic of Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Thailand, Australia and New Zealand.21 ASPAC was intended to reflect 
the ‘urgent need for continuing consultations among participating 
countries with a view to forging better international understanding, 
promoting closer and more fruitful regional cooperation and further 
18  For a comprehensive assessment of the Manila Treaty and SEATO, see Leszek Buszynski, 
SEATO – The Failure of an Alliance Strategy, Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1983.
19  Ibid., p. 38.
20  Acharya, The Making of Southeast Asia, p. 136.
21  C. W. Braddick, ‘Japan, Australia and ASPAC: The Rise and Fall of an Asia-Pacific Cooperative 
Security Framework’, in Brad Williams and Andrew Newman, eds, Japan, Australia and Asia-
Pacific Security, Abingdon: Routledge, 2006.
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strengthening Asian and Pacific solidarity’.22 The first ASPAC meeting 
established a standing committee that met in Canberra and advised 
and made preparations for the main Council. 
As its membership suggested, ASPAC was an explicitly anti-communist 
grouping. Political and security topics were discussed freely in the 
Council’s meetings. In 1968 the US, under Lyndon B. Johnson’s 
administration, expressed some interest in ASPAC as a potential 
vehicle for regional security cooperation. ASPAC’s members, however, 
did not have an agreed approach towards security issues or on how the 
Council might serve these. The representatives from the Republic of 
Korea and the Republic of Vietnam advocated harder-line positions on 
international issues.23 However, the Council’s largest member, Japan, 
was not willing to support any shift for ASPAC towards a more explicit 
security role. Australia did not favour this either: an official statement 
in July 1968 said that ‘ASPAC is in no sense a security organisation 
and in the view of the Australian Government it should not attempt 
to become one’.24 ASPAC never attained any major significance as a 
regional grouping and its relevance declined in the early 1970s in the 
context of the opening of communications between the United States 
and China. ASPAC was discontinued in May 1975.25
Regional conflict and Indonesia’s 
Konfrontasi of Malaysia
The period of serious conflict in Southeast Asia in the early 
1960s, particularly that surrounding Indonesia’s Konfrontasi,  or 
‘confrontation’  of the new Federation of Malaysia, led to the 
development of a new regional grouping, ASEAN, but this did 
not emerge quickly or easily. Southeast Asia at the beginning of 
the 1960s had several serious political and security problems. 
In  Vietnam, the insurgency in the south against the regime of Ngo 
Dinh Diem was gathering strength under the national direction of the 
22  ‘Asian and Pacific Council: Joint Communiqué on Establishment of Asian and Pacific 
Council’, International Legal Materials, 5(5) 1966: 985.
23  Henry S. Albinski, Australia in Southeast Asia: Interests, Capacity, and Acceptability, 
Springfield, VA: National Technical Information Service, December 1970, p. 21.
24  Ibid.
25  Braddick, ‘Japan, Australia and ASPAC’, pp. 40–1.
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communist leadership based in the north, but  also with substantial 
support within the south. Several other states faced challenges from 
insurgent communist movements, including Burma, the Philippines 
and Thailand. Indonesia had recently experienced secessionist revolts 
in Sulawesi, which had included some external support. Malaya had 
gained independence in 1957 and Singapore had secured internal self-
government in 1959, but Britain retained authority over the external 
relations of Singapore and over the North Borneo territories of Brunei, 
Sarawak and Sabah. The  process of the final decolonisation of the 
British-controlled territories was to prove highly contentious.
Britain and the newly independent state of Malaya had agreed on a plan 
for a federation that would encompass Malaya along with Singapore, 
the British territories of North Borneo (Sabah and Sarawak) and the 
British protectorate of Brunei. In Malaya, the government led by the 
Tunku had from 1961 supported the concept of including Singapore 
into a federation with Malaya. In Singapore, the state’s Prime Minister, 
Lee Kuan Yew, considered that a union with Malaya was essential to 
the future economic viability of the island and it had been the policy 
of his People’s Action Party since 1954. Britain saw the incorporation 
of the North Borneo territories into a federation both as a way of 
alleviating concerns in Malaya about a possible dominant position for 
Chinese citizens, and as a way of facilitating the decolonisation process 
for the Borneo territories. Britain accordingly sponsored a process of 
consultation in the North Borneo states that concluded (in a report in 
August 1962) that the majority of peoples in the territories generally 
supported the federation proposal.26
For its part, Australia had supported the merger of Singapore with 
Malaya since the mid-1950s. Australian policymakers feared that if 
Singapore became fully independent it might gravitate towards China 
and then become a focus for subversion in Malaya and in the region 
overall. The Australian Government did not have a strong opinion in 
relation to the Borneo territories, but it supported Britain’s preference 
that they be included in a new federation. Australia’s Minister for 
External Affairs, Garfield Barwick, summarised the government’s 
position in a conversation with President Diosdado Macapagal of the 
Philippines in March 1963 when he said that ‘[a]s far as we could see, 
26  J. A. C. Mackie, Konfrontasi: The Indonesia–Malaysia Dispute, 1963–1966, Kuala Lumpur: 
Oxford University Press, 1974, pp. 36–78.
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there was no alternative to Malaysia. The British could not remain 
in Singapore and the Borneo Territories. An independent Singapore 
would fall easy prey to the Communists, while separate British Borneo 
states had little chance of survival.’27
Indonesia under President Sukarno had a number of reservations 
about the proposed Federation of Malaysia. It thought that Malaysia 
might be used as a base by external powers, that Malaysia would be 
a venue for Britain to continue its influence in the Southeast Asian 
region to the detriment of Indonesia’s aspiration to regional leadership 
and that a federation would be susceptible to potential dominance 
by its Chinese communities, given their numbers, education and 
economic significance. In January 1963, President Sukarno rejected 
the Malaysian federation proposal as an artificial construct that was 
unacceptable to Indonesia. In the same month, Foreign Minister 
Subandrio characterised Indonesia’s attitude as one of ‘confrontation’. 
Britain in turn rejected Indonesia’s criticism and portrayed Indonesia’s 
approach as indicating a desire to dominate Malaya and the Philippines; 
Britain asked Australia and the US for assistance to help support and 
defend the federation.28 Australia was thus involved in a potentially 
serious emerging regional conflict. Some of Australia’s diplomatic 
efforts in relation to these tensions were to be of relevance to emerging 
approaches towards regional dialogue in Southeast Asia. 
Australia, along with Britain and New Zealand, held talks in Washington 
with the US Government in February 1963. The US made it clear that 
the protection of Malaysia was exclusively the responsibility of the 
British Commonwealth: the US declined to assume any responsibility 
towards Malaysia beyond attempting to persuade Indonesia and the 
Philippines to accept the proposed new state. After the Washington 
talks, the Australian Government adopted a cautious approach towards 
the Malaysian issue, supporting the concept of Malaysia without as 
yet making a commitment to defend it, and seeking regional, and 
particularly Indonesian, endorsement of the new federation.29
27  Quoted in David Lee and Moreen Dee, ‘Southeast Asian Conflicts’, in David Goldsworthy, 
ed., Facing North: A Century of Australian Engagement with Asia, Volume 1: 1901 to the 1970s, 
Carlton, Vic.: Melbourne University Press, 2001, p. 265.
28  Mackie, Konfrontasi, pp. 111–99.
29  Lee and Dee, ‘Southeast Asian Conflicts’, p. 267.
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In the first half of 1963, Barwick sought to promote reconciliation 
among Indonesia, Malaya and the Philippines. These efforts were 
pursued against Britain’s wishes and in the face of US scepticism. 
Barwick sought to advance his policy at a meeting in Manila in March 
1963. In talks with Subandrio, he encouraged Indonesia to accept a 
proposal by the Philippines for a three-way meeting with Malaya. 
Barwick also offered to use his contacts with the Tunku to advance 
this proposal with Malaya. Tensions were rising within the region, 
and in April 1963 Indonesian ‘volunteers’ crossed the border from 
Indonesia into Sarawak. Nonetheless, in June 1963 a meeting of the 
foreign ministers of Indonesia, Malaya and the Philippines took place 
in Manila and the ministers decided to set up a loose grouping called 
‘Maphilindo’.30 The Indonesian Government agreed to accept the 
establishment of Malaysia if an authority such as the United Nations 
Secretary-General ‘ascertained’ that the Malaysia proposal was 
supported by the peoples of North Borneo. The leaders of the three 
states went on to issue a joint statement in which they declared that 
foreign bases should not be allowed to subvert the independence of any 
of the three countries. They also agreed to ‘[a]bstention from the use 
of arrangements of collective defence to serve any particular interests 
of the big powers’. These declarations were a significant precursor 
to the viewpoints that would be included in ASEAN’s foundation 
declaration in 1967.31 David Lee and Moreen Dee have argued that 
this period marked a significant phase in Australia’s policies towards 
Southeast Asia:
Barwick’s initiative was important both in the history of Australia’s 
engagement with Asia and for the history of Southeast Asia itself. 
It resonated with the earlier Australian approach to Indonesian 
independence in the 1940s since Barwick, in pursuing a negotiated 
solution to a regional dispute, acted against the inclinations of the 
United States and Britain. The importance, in historical terms, of 
Barwick’s initiative was that it encouraged the process of regional 
Southeast Asian dialogue that would culminate some four years later 
in the establishment of ASEAN.32
30  Acharya, The Making of Southeast Asia, pp. 154–5; Tarling, Regionalism in Southeast Asia, 
pp. 115–23.
31  Christopher B. Roberts, ASEAN Regionalism: Cooperation, Values and Institutionalization, 
Abingdon: Routledge, 2012, pp. 38, 39–41.
32  Lee and Dee, ‘Southeast Asian Conflicts’, p. 268.
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The discussions between the Maphilindo states did not succeed 
in alleviating the rising crisis over the Malaysia proposal. The 
new federation was inaugurated formally on 16 September 1963. 
On  25  September, President Sukarno stated that he would ‘gobble 
Malaysia raw’.33 By the end of the year, Australia was committed to 
supporting Malaysia in the face of Indonesia’s Konfrontasi. In 1964, 
tensions rose further as Indonesian forces staged some incursions into 
Malaysian territory and Britain contemplated the potential for strikes 
against Indonesia. In February 1965, Australia deployed military 
forces to Borneo to support Malaysia and Britain.34 
In August 1965, an additional focus for stress in Southeast Asia 
emerged when Singapore was abruptly expelled from the Malaysian 
federation. Pressures had been rising between Singapore and the 
leadership of the federation over differing priorities for the future of 
the country, communal strains in Malaya and ethnic riots in Singapore. 
With  tensions rising, the Tunku and Lee met secretly on 7  August 
and it was then announced the next day that Singapore would leave 
the federation and become an independent state: Australia and 
Britain learned of the decision only a few hours before the formal 
announcement. When publicly announcing the news of Singapore’s 
departure, the normally controlled Lee shed tears. The region now 
had another independent state, whose economic and political future 
seemed highly uncertain.35
The establishment of ASEAN
The regional impasse involving Indonesia and Malaysia was 
transformed by events within Indonesia. A period of conflict 
between the Indonesian army and the Indonesian Communist Party 
(Partai  Komunis Indonesia or PKI) from September to October 1965 
was followed by mass killings of PKI members and alleged supporters 
by military units and vigilante groups. By March 1966, Sukarno was 
replaced as the dominant figure in Indonesia by General Suharto, 
who assumed the office of president in March 1967. Indonesia’s new 
33  Quoted in ibid., p. 270.
34  Ibid., p. 276.
35  Mackie, Konfrontasi, pp. 292–7.
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Foreign Minister, Adam Malik, and Malaysia’s Deputy Prime Minister, 
Tun Abdul Razak, negotiated an end to Konfrontasi in Bangkok in 
May 1966 and a formal agreement was signed in Jakarta in August.36 
The ending of Konfrontasi saw interest in establishing a new 
multilateral group that might help ease inter-state relations, although 
the prospects for a new cooperative association were not necessarily 
favourable. Two recent attempts at regional association had not 
succeeded. In 1961, Malaya, the Philippines and Thailand had come 
together to form the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA). The proposal 
for ASA had come from Malaya’s Tunku Abdul Rahman in the wake 
of his efforts to seek support for SEAFET: he envisaged a grouping to 
help combat communist insurgency by targeting what he considered 
to be its major cause, poverty. While Malaya gained support from 
the Philippines and Thailand, Indonesia refused to join a grouping it 
considered pro-Western and a front for SEATO. Rising tensions over 
the Malaysia proposal and the Philippines’ claim to North Borneo 
(Sabah) and then Indonesia’s declaration of Konfrontasi rendered ASA 
unviable.37 The Maphilindo grouping had provided another precedent 
for Southeast Asian cooperation, but it too had failed in the face of 
intense disputes over Malaysia and Konfrontasi. 
While these efforts had not succeeded, by 1966 there was renewed 
interest and increased motivation for another attempt at regional 
cooperation. The period of Konfrontasi had left Southeast Asia with 
a high degree of inter-state tension, particularly among Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines. Thailand had not been 
involved in any of these conflicts but felt vulnerable to other threats, 
including the conflicts in neighbouring Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia; 
Thailand also faced an internal communist insurgency. At the same 
time, as Rodolfo Severino has commented:
China posed a broader strategic threat, with the convulsions of the 
Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, the Chinese propaganda organs’ 
strident denunciations of the non-communist Southeast Asian regimes, 
and China’s at least verbal support for the communist insurgencies.38 
36  Ibid., pp. 308–24.
37  Acharya, The Making of Southeast Asia, pp. 150–5; Tarling, Regionalism in Southeast Asia, 
pp. 110–18.
38  Rodolfo C. Severino, Southeast Asia in Search of an ASEAN Community: Insights from the 
Former ASEAN Secretary-General, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2006, p. 3.
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In this highly uncertain environment, the foreign ministers of 
Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand and the deputy 
prime minister of Malaysia met in Bangkok to make a new attempt at 
regional cooperation. Rather than try to adapt ASA, it was felt desirable 
to establish a new grouping, because Indonesia preferred to join a new 
association as a founding member rather than enter an existing group 
consisting entirely of Western-aligned states. As a result, ASEAN 
was inaugurated on 8 August 1967. The Bangkok Declaration called 
for joint efforts to ‘accelerate the economic growth, social progress 
and cultural development’ of members; to promote ‘regional peace 
and stability through abiding respect for justice and the rule of law’; 
to advance ‘collaboration and mutual assistance … in the economic, 
social, cultural, technical, scientific and administrative fields’; to foster 
‘educational, professional, technical and administrative spheres’; and 
to ‘promote South-East Asian studies’.39 To carry out these goals, 
the Declaration set up what Severino has called a ‘rudimentary 
mechanism’. The member foreign ministers would meet annually and 
ASEAN would be managed by a Standing Committee comprising the 
foreign minister of the country chairing ASEAN in that particular 
year along with the ambassadors of the other members in that country. 
Committees of ‘specialists and officials on specific subjects’ would 
operate as necessary.40 
The formation of ASEAN did not initially attract substantial 
international attention. However, Australia, as an interested 
neighbouring state, immediately welcomed the inauguration of the 
new Association. In a statement on 9 August, a day after the Bangkok 
Declaration, the Minister for External Affairs Paul Hasluck:
expressed satisfaction at the announcement from Bangkok [and] … 
noted that the member nations of the new Association, who have a 
number of special interests in common and with all of whom Australia 
enjoys close and friendly relations, had undertaken to cooperate 
to accelerate the economic growth, social progress and cultural 
development of the region, and to promote regional peace and stability. 
These were objectives which had Australia’s full support.41
39  ASEAN Secretariat, ‘The ASEAN Declaration (Bangkok Declaration)’, Bangkok, 8 August 
1967.
40  Severino, Southeast Asia, p. 3; see also Roberts, ASEAN Regionalism, pp. 41–6.
41  Paul Hasluck, ‘Statement’, in Current Notes on International Affairs, 38(8) August 1967: 
328–9.
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ASEAN’s inauguration was also noted favourably by Whitlam, the 
Leader of the Opposition. In a speech on 17 August 1967, Whitlam 
stated:
All these countries are neighbours. With four of them we have 
political and defence arrangements. With all of them we have trade 
arrangements. Quite clearly, looking at the map, it is the most natural 
development in our part of the world. It is the first occasion on which 
Indonesia has been associated with all her immediate neighbours. 
It is the first occasion on which Singapore, a Chinese State as we are a 
British State, has been associated with Malay nations or other people 
in the region.42
At the time of ASEAN’s formation, there was some discussion about 
the possibility of Australian membership in the new group. The 
Bangkok Declaration had stated that ‘[t]he Association is open for 
participation to all States in the South-East Asian region subscribing 
to the aforementioned aims, principles and purposes’. While this 
implied that the membership would include the five participants and, 
potentially, the Indochina states and Burma, Ceylon made a short-lived 
effort to be considered as a member but this did not lead to a formal 
application.43 At the time of ASEAN’s formation, Malaysian officials 
raised with Australian Government representatives the possibility of 
Australia joining. Some elements in the Indonesian Government were 
also considered by the Department of External Affairs to favour the 
participation of Australia and New Zealand in ASEAN, but others 
‘perceived Australia as too closely aligned with Britain and the United 
States and as needing to make up its mind about whether it wished 
to become part of the Southeast Asian area before it could join a 
Southeast Asian regional organisation’.44 Lee and Dee have noted that:
There are no indications that the Australian government sought 
membership of ASEAN, whose future might not have seemed to 
Australian policy-makers at the time to be especially promising. 
For one thing, it was a strange mixture of aligned and non-aligned 
states. For another, two of its signatories, Malaysia and Indonesia, 
42  Gough Whitlam, in Commonwealth of Australia Parliamentary Debates, House 
of Representatives, Official Hansard, No. 33, 17 August 1967, p. 220.
43  Severino, Southeast Asia, pp. 41–7.
44  Lee and Dee, ‘Southeast Asian Conflicts’, p. 280.
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had recently ended a bitter three-year-long confrontation and another, 
Singapore, had undergone a difficult separation only two years earlier 
from Malaysia.45
As ASEAN consolidated its identity, it became clear that Australia 
was not likely to be considered to be a potential member. In 1971, 
at the time of the ASEAN foreign ministers’ meeting in Kuala Lumpur, 
Malaysian officials indicated that membership for either Australia or 
New Zealand in the Association was out of the question, and also that 
neither country would be welcome as observers.46 
ASEAN of necessity developed in a cautious manner and its first 
priority was to try to develop contacts and communication among its 
members in the uneasy aftermath of Konfrontasi. The Association faced 
some major difficulties in its early phase of existence. Sensitivities 
continued to be high between Singapore and both Indonesia and 
Malaysia, with the former keen to demonstrate its capacity for 
independent decision-making.47 Relations were also tense between 
Malaysia and the Philippines, given that the latter had not renounced 
its claim to the state of Sabah. The Sabah issue was a particular focus 
for contention after April 1968 until tensions were eased at the end of 
1969. ASEAN concentrated on attempting to develop cohesion and to 
assert the desirability of minimising the influence of external powers.48 
While in ASEAN’s early years there was little scope for any formal 
interaction on the part of Australia, the Australian Government 
continued to express support for the Association and its cooperation 
efforts. In November 1971, ASEAN sought to increase its profile by 
declaring that Southeast Asia should be a Zone of Peace, Freedom and 
Neutrality (ZOPFAN). The ZOPFAN Declaration represented a desire 
by ASEAN to affirm the goal of a regional order free from outside 
interference and it included an aspiration for the removal of foreign 
bases from the soil of ASEAN members. The Declaration, however, 
45  Ibid.
46  David Goldsworthy et al., ‘Reorientation’, in David Goldsworthy, ed., Facing North: 
A  Century of Australian Engagement with Asia, Volume 1: 1901 to the 1970s, Carlton, Vic.: 
Melbourne University Press, 2001, p. 345.
47  For example, tensions in Singapore–Indonesia relations were raised in October 1968 when 
Singapore executed two Indonesian marines who had been convicted of sabotage and murder for 
actions during Konfrontasi; see Tarling, Regionalism in Southeast Asia, p. 142.
48  Roberts, ASEAN Regionalism, pp. 46–8.
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was limited in scope: ASEAN did not move beyond an expression of 
interest in the concept, it was not binding on members, and it did not 
involve any timetable for implementation.49 
With Australia committed firmly to its alliance with the US and to 
an ongoing association with the UK in Southeast Asia (which was 
formalised through the Five Power Defence Arrangements in 1971),50 
the Liberal–Country Party Coalition Government led by Prime Minister 
William McMahon was initially concerned about the ZOPFAN concept, 
which was seen as an unwelcome endorsement of neutralism and as 
a potential challenge to Australia’s defence relations with Malaysia. 
However, in 1972, with a greater awareness of the long-term nature 
of the proposal, the government endorsed the ZOPFAN Declaration.51 
The  Minister for Foreign Affairs, Nigel Bowen, in an annex to his 
statement on foreign affairs on 9 May 1972 entitled ‘ASEAN and the 
Declaration on Neutralisation of Southeast Asia’, said:
All five signatories made it clear subsequently that they would retain 
present security arrangements until the neutralisation proposal 
became a reality … The Declaration does not ask the Great Powers 
to guarantee the proposed neutralised zone. Rather it seeks to secure 
recognition and respect for the concept of neutrality and freedom from 
interference by outside powers … Despite the practical difficulties 
involved in working for neutrality as a long-term solution for stability 
in South-East Asia, Australia welcomes the Declaration as a regional 
initiative directed toward peace, and stability in Asia.52
At the conclusion of the visit to Malaysia by Prime Minister McMahon 
in June 1972, in a joint communiqué between McMahon and Tun 
Razak, McMahon reaffirmed that Australia ‘welcomed the declaration 
as a regional initiative directed towards peace and stability in Asia’.53
49  Tarling, Regionalism in Southeast Asia, pp. 141–74; Roberts, ASEAN Regionalism, pp. 48–50.
50  The Five Power Defence Arrangements brought together Australia, Britain, New Zealand, 
Malaysia and Singapore and provided an ongoing framework for Australian defence associations 
with Malaysia and Singapore which have involved extensive cooperation; see John Blaxland, 
‘Australia, Indonesia and Southeast Asia’, in Peter J. Dean, Stephan Frühling and Brendan Taylor, 
eds, Australia’s Defence: Towards A New Era? Carlton, Vic.: Melbourne University Press, 2014, 
pp. 119–24.
51  John Rowland, ‘Two Transitions: Indochina 1952‒1955, Malaysia, 1969‒1972’, Australians 
in Asia Series No. 8, Nathan, Qld: Centre for the Study of Australian–Asian Relations, Griffith 
University, 1992, pp. 47‒8.
52  ‘South-East Asia: The Neutralisation Proposal’, Current Notes on International Affairs, 
43(10) October 1972, p. 503.
53  Ibid., p. 504.
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The Whitlam Government and the 
inauguration of multilateral relations 
with ASEAN
The election of the government led by Gough Whitlam in December 
1972 brought a new phase of Australian interest in regional cooperation 
and in ASEAN. Whitlam came to office at a time of substantial change 
in the international and regional environment for Australian foreign 
policy. At the international level, the United States had begun a 
process of détente with China, which had included President Richard 
Nixon’s historic visit in February 1972. The period of direct US 
military involvement in the conflict in Vietnam was drawing to an end 
and a US withdrawal from Vietnam followed the signing of the Paris 
Agreements in February 1973. These developments created a climate 
in which Whitlam was able to change the emphasis and direction of 
Australian foreign policy.54
In a statement just after his election, Whitlam noted that:
the general direction of my thinking is towards a more independent 
Australian stance in international affairs, an Australia which will 
be less militarily oriented and not open to suggestions of racism; 
an Australia which will enjoy a growing standing as a distinctive, 
tolerant, co-operative and well regarded nation not only in the Asian 
and Pacific region, but in the world at large.55
Whitlam pursued this overall direction in a number of ways. Australia 
established diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China. 
The government also moved to deepen relations with Japan, including 
through negotiation of a friendship treaty. In Southeast Asia, as well 
as emphasising relations with ASEAN and its members, Australia 
also extended recognition to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam 
(in February 1973). Australia’s policies towards Asia overall were 
54  Nancy Viviani, ‘The Whitlam Government’s Policy Towards Asia’, in David Lee and 
Christopher Waters, eds, Evatt to Evans: The Labor Tradition in Australian Foreign Policy, 
St Leonards, NSW: Allen & Unwin, in association with the Department of International Relations, 
The Australian National University, 1997.
55  Quoted in ibid., p. 103.
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enhanced by the final official termination of racial discrimination in 
Australia’s immigration policies, thus removing a long-standing focus 
of discord in Australia’s international and regional relationships.56
After assuming office, Whitlam moved quickly to assert the importance 
for his government of Southeast Asian relations and multilateral 
cooperation. In a speech on 27 January 1973, Whitlam stated that 
the government in its approach to Southeast Asia wished to look 
beyond the former emphasis on ‘forward defence’. Australia did not 
see Southeast Asia as a frontier ‘where we might fight nameless Asian 
enemies as far to the north of our own shores as possible – in other 
people’s backyards’. Whitlam said that ‘[t]o meet the new realities and 
our perception of them we shall be seeking new forms of regional 
co-operation.’ Regional cooperation, he said, ‘will be one of the 
keystones of Australia’s foreign policy for the 70s’.57 Whitlam argued 
that ASPAC in its present form no longer reflected the new realities 
in the region and that Australia was interested in exploring bases for 
a new and wider cooperation forum in the Asia-Pacific (see below).58 
In his first overseas visit as prime minister, to Indonesia in February 
1973, Whitlam said that his government regarded ASEAN as ‘a model 
of regional co-operation’. He also reaffirmed that Australia supported 
ASEAN’s concept of ZOPFAN for Southeast Asia.59 Whitlam continued 
to praise ASEAN’s value and relevance for Australia. In an interview 
with the New York Times in March 1973, he said he considered the 
SEATO pact to be moribund and irrelevant and that the ANZUS 
(Australia, New Zealand, United States) alliance and ASEAN were 
the only groupings which were still vital: ‘All other arrangements are 
either transitory or belong in the past.’60 
56  Ibid., pp. 102–3. The Whitlam Government’s actions followed important steps taken by the 
Coalition Government led by Prime Minister Harold Holt (1966–67) which had liberalised access 
to residence and citizenship rights for non-Europeans and provided for an increased intake of 
skilled migrants from non-European backgrounds; see Tom Frame, The Life and Death of Harold 
Holt, St Leonards, NSW: Allen & Unwin, 2005, pp. 158–61.
57  Gough Whitlam, ‘Opening Address’, delivered to the Australian Institute of Political 
Science Summer School, Canberra, 27 January 1973.
58  ‘Whitlam Sets New Policy on Asia’, The Herald (Melbourne), 29 January 1973.
59  ‘Indonesia Tells Whitlam, Aust Welcomed in SE-Asian Defence’, Sydney Morning Herald, 
22 February 1973.
60  C. L. Sulzberger, ‘New Look, Not New Reality’, New York Times, 11 March 1973.
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Whitlam gave further emphasis to ASEAN in February 1974, during a 
regional visit that included Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines and 
Thailand, along with Burma and Laos. Brian Johns noted at the time 
that: 
The present tour, taking in as it does four of the five ASEAN nations, 
points to Mr Whitlam’s emphasis on the importance of this regional 
grouping … [I]n his speeches Mr Whitlam has lauded ASEAN as 
had no other Australian Prime Minister. The previous Australian 
Government gave ASEAN attention but did not show Mr Whitlam’s 
positive enthusiasm for it.61 
In a speech in Bangkok, for example, Whitlam described ASEAN 
as ‘unquestionably the most important, the most relevant, the most 
natural of the regional organisations’.62
After returning from this regional visit, Whitlam indicated that he 
saw ASEAN as likely to be of long-term interest and significance for 
Australia and said that as the Association consolidated, Australia might 
develop political links with the ASEAN Secretariat. He said in March 
1974 in a prescient comment: ‘Looking ahead and depending on the 
views of the ASEAN countries, we could consider the accreditation in 
the future of an ambassador to ASEAN as an organisation, as we have 
done with the European Economic Community and the OECD.’63
At the time of this heightened interest on Australia’s part, the ASEAN 
members were moving to advance their own cooperative activities with 
other states. ASEAN’s decision in 1973 to establish a small secretariat 
to be based in Jakarta enhanced the potential for joint cooperation 
with external parties. In 1973, ASEAN engaged in discussion with 
Japan about economic issues, particularly on the problems perceived 
61  Brian Johns, ‘Whitlam: Some Rabbits Out of the Hat’, Sydney Morning Herald, 25 February 
1974.
62  Ibid.
63  Quoted in John Ingleson, ‘Southeast Asia’, in W. J. Hudson, ed., Australia in World Affairs 
1971–1975, Sydney: Allen & Unwin and Australian Institute of International Affairs, 1980, p. 301. 
Australia ultimately did nominate an ambassador to ASEAN, but not until 2008; see Chapter 5.
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to be posed by Japan’s production of synthetic rubber.64 ASEAN 
also took steps to develop discussions with the European Economic 
Community, particularly on economic issues.65 
In this environment, discussion began in the latter part of 1973 between 
ASEAN and Australia on the possibility of Australian assistance to 
ASEAN joint economic cooperation projects, and the Australian 
Government supported this idea strongly.66 In December 1973, ASEAN 
issued an invitation for Australia to participate in consultations 
in Thailand in the next year.67 Talks duly took place in Bangkok in 
January 1974 to advance these proposals and led to an invitation by 
Australia for ASEAN representatives to meet in Canberra.68
On 15 April 1974, talks were held between the ASEAN members’ 
secretaries-general and Australian officials. The meeting was notable as 
the first gathering of the ASEAN national secretaries-general to be held 
outside an ASEAN member.69 Australia’s Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
Don Willesee, announced that Australia would provide A$5 million for 
joint ASEAN–Australia economic projects. Richard Woolcott, Deputy 
Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs, in addressing the 
opening of the talks, said that the forging of a new link with ASEAN 
was ‘novel’ and ‘an appropriate new step in terms of our joint aims and 
interests’. Woolcott said that the Australian Government:
welcomes the possibility of forging a cooperative link between Australia 
and ASEAN … Australia is conscious that there are differences in 
character between itself and the ASEAN countries. For that reason we 
do not think of ourselves as potential members of ASEAN. On the other 
hand, we see the success of ASEAN as very important to our hope for 
the future of South East Asia. We wish to make a practical contribution 
to its success in terms that are welcome to ASEAN.70
64  Michael Richardson, ‘Asean Warns of Trade Reprisals’, The Age, 23 April 1973.
65  Harvey Stockwin, ‘The Europeans Lack Vision’, Financial Times (London), 3 May 1973; 
see also Acharya, The Making of Southeast Asia, pp. 171–2. Severino notes that the European 
Economic Community can be considered to have become ASEAN’s first dialogue partner (in 
1973) but that Australia was the first individual country to become a dialogue partner (in 1974); 
see Severino, Southeast Asia, pp. 309‒10.
66  Michael Richardson, ‘Aust Hand of Friendship to South-East Asia’, Sydney Morning Herald, 
17 November 1973.
67  ‘A.S.E.A.N.’, Canberra Times, 20 December 1973.
68  Henry S. Albinski, Australian External Policy under Labor: Content, Process and the National 
Debate, St Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1977, p. 95.
69  Ibid., p. 95.
70  Richard Woolcott, ‘Opening Remarks by Mr Richard Woolcott, Deputy Secretary, Department 
of Foreign Affairs, to Meeting with ASEAN Secretaries General’, Canberra, 15 April 1974.
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Willesee said after the meeting that ‘Australia is honoured that ASEAN 
should have singled it out as the first country for discussions of 
this kind. We think that ASEAN’s action denotes its confidence in 
Australia and the Australian Government will do what it can to justify 
that confidence’.71 The inauguration of the multilateral relationship 
was given bipartisan support: just after the Canberra meeting, the 
Opposition’s Shadow Minister for Foreign Affairs, Andrew Peacock, 
said that the Opposition supported the move.72
Whitlam, ASEAN and the ‘Asia-Pacific forum’ 
proposal
While the Whitlam Government pursued the enhancement of 
relations with ASEAN, it also had ambitions to try to develop a basis 
for wider cooperation in the Asia-Pacific. This effort was advanced 
with enthusiasm by the government but was met with some caution 
and disquiet by its neighbours in ASEAN. This proved to be an early 
example of ASEAN sensitivities over Australia’s interest in pursuing a 
conception of ‘region’ encompassing countries beyond Southeast Asia. 
The concept of a cooperative group or forum for the Asia-Pacific 
was advanced by Whitlam soon after his government came to office. 
The idea was discussed by Whitlam in meetings with New Zealand’s 
Prime Minister Norman Kirk (also a newly elected leader of a Labour 
Government) in January 1973. In a speech on 27 January 1973, 
Whitlam said that he foresaw a grouping ‘genuinely representative 
of the region, without ideological overtones’. Such a forum, he 
suggested, could ‘help free the region of great power rivalries that 
have bedevilled its progress for decades and [was] designed to insulate 
the region against ideological interference from the great powers’.73 
The proposal was not subsequently defined in any substantial detail. 
In comments in January 1974 in Kuala Lumpur, Whitlam suggested 
an analogy of the Commonwealth of Nations. His concept was ‘not a 
body where decisions are made and then [made] binding, but where 
it is possible for heads of government regularly to exchange views 
71  ‘$5m. to Aid Asian Ties’, Courier Mail, 17 April 1974. 
72  ‘Import Quality Control Sought by ASEAN’, Canberra Times, 18 April 1974.
73  Whitlam, ‘Opening Address’. 
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which are of mutual interest’.74 No precise envisaged membership 
was provided by Australia – it was understood that Australia, New 
Zealand and the ASEAN members should be included, along with 
China, India and Japan, but probably neither the United States nor 
the Soviet Union.75
The Asia-Pacific forum proposal reflected the Whitlam Government’s 
strong interest in regional multilateral cooperation as a potential 
contribution towards enhanced security and economic development. 
Henry Albinski has argued that ‘[t]he government’s investment of time 
and energy in sponsoring the idea was demonstration that Australia 
under Labor was capable of initiatives, of exercising an “independent” 
foreign policy’.76 
The Asia-Pacific forum concept, however, met with a cool response 
both from Australia’s ally the US and among the ASEAN members. 
The US under the Nixon administration was unenthusiastic about 
the Whitlam concept, principally because it did not wish to see 
any disruption to the United States’ existing pattern of bilateral 
relationships and alliances in the Asia-Pacific. The administration also 
felt that recent developments had shown that relationships between 
the US and its allies with China and the Soviet Union could be improved 
without altering regional multilateral arrangements.77
When Whitlam raised the proposal with President Suharto in 
February 1973, Suharto responded by saying that there were not 
sufficient common interests within Asia for such a grouping to be 
practicable. Suharto said, ‘he doubted the usefulness of a formal 
conference or organisation. This would only aggravate conflicting 
interests. ASEAN also needed to be consolidated beforehand’. Suharto 
opposed participation by India and said there would be questions 
about China’s participation.78 Singapore’s attitude was also negative: 
74  Albinski, Australian External Policy under Labor, p. 92. 
75  Ibid., p. 93.
76  Ibid.
77  James Curran, Unholy Fury: Whitlam and Nixon at War, Carlton, Vic.: Melbourne University 
Press, 2015, pp. 238‒40.
78  Australian Department of Foreign Affairs, record of the meeting between Prime Minister 
Whitlam and President Suharto, 25 February 1973, quoted in Graeme Dobell, Australia Finds 
Home: The Choices and Chances of an Asia Pacific Journey, Sydney: ABC Books, 2000, p. 80.
ENgAgINg ThE NEIghBoURS
30
Prime Minister Lee criticised the Whitlam proposal in May 1973 as 
‘lacking in sensitivity’.79 The concept continued to be discussed by 
the Australian Government but did not gain any significant traction.
Part of the problem with the Whitlam proposal was the manner in 
which it was seen to have been advanced. The proposal was introduced 
in Whitlam’s speech at the end of January 1973 and it was evident that 
there had been no substantial consultation in regional states (including 
among the ASEAN members) and that there was little supporting 
detail available on it. In a commentary written in 1974, David Solomon 
and Laurie Oakes argued that ‘[t]he flurry of activity was counter-
productive given the lack of detail available. ASEAN ministers in 
mid-February informally discussed the proposal, but rejected it as it 
stood.’80 Graeme Dobell later wrote: 
Whitlam’s 1973 attempt to create an Asia Pacific forum was killed 
off by ASEAN’s objection that such a body would be a threat to the 
Association’s own importance. It was an early demonstration of the 
veto that ASEAN could wield in dealing with regional initiatives from 
Canberra.81 
As Dobell suggested, the question of how Australia pursued ideas about 
regional cooperation could easily arouse some concerns and tensions 
in relations with ASEAN. This was later to be evident in discussion 
about the proposals at the end of the 1980s for economic cooperation 
in the Asia-Pacific and over regional security dialogues. There are also 
some notable parallels between the debate over Whitlam’s Asia-Pacific 
forum concept and the ‘Asia Pacific Community’ proposal advanced by 
Kevin Rudd in 2008, as discussed in Chapter 5.
The changing security environment in 1975 
The Whitlam Government had been pursuing its regional policies 
since 1973 with a substantial degree of optimism about the future 
prospects for Southeast Asia. However, two developments in 1975 had 
significant and potentially problematic implications for the politics 
79  Curran, Unholy Fury, p. 239.
80  Quoted in Albinski, Australian External Policy under Labor, p. 97.
81  Dobell, Australia Finds Home, p. 79.
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and security of the region and for Australia’s relations with ASEAN. 
They were the end of the Second Indochina War and Indonesia’s 
invasion and subsequent incorporation of East Timor.
The conflicts that had engulfed Indochina since the late 1950s 
culminated in 1975 with the collapse of the non-communist regimes 
in Cambodia and southern Vietnam in April 1975, and the assumption 
of full control by communist forces in Laos by the end of the year.82 
The developments in Cambodia and southern Vietnam in April 1975 
were followed by new concerns about security, especially among 
the ASEAN members. In the immediate aftermath of April 1975, 
the prospects for détente between ASEAN and the new regimes in 
Indochina were not promising. Both Thailand and the Philippines 
had been involved militarily in the Vietnam War and the regime in 
Hanoi had made some highly critical comments about their roles in 
supporting US policies.83 There were widespread concerns among 
ASEAN members about the capture of large supplies of arms by the 
victorious communist forces in Vietnam and at the potential that these 
could be deployed to assist communist-led resistance movements in 
ASEAN members.84 The ASEAN members moved to take actions to 
consolidate their own coordination and began to prepare for their first 
heads of government summit meeting (held in Bali in February 1976, 
see Chapter 2).
In this new environment, the Whitlam Government expressed 
the hope that all states in Southeast Asia would be able to co-exist 
peacefully. In comments in Japan in June 1975, Minister for Foreign 
Affairs Willesee urged Southeast Asian governments to ‘face up’ to 
the existence of the new governments in Indochina and live together 
with them in ‘peace, neutrality and friendship’. Willesee noted that 
Australia’s approach towards Asia overall was to ‘show our concern 
for developments in the region and to try at all times to be helpful, 
without ever becoming meddlesome’.85 The issue of how Australia 
82  William S. Turley, The Second Indochina War: A Concise Political and Military History, 
2nd edn, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2009, pp. 205–36.
83  Frank Frost, ‘Vietnam’s Foreign Relations: Dynamics of Change’, Pacific Strategic Paper No. 
6, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1993, pp. 58–9.
84  M. G. G. Pillai, ‘Viet Hardware Now Going Cheap’, The Nation Review (Melbourne), 19 June 
1975; Peter Bathurst, ‘Common Denominator: Captured Guns’, Far Eastern Economic Review, 
4 July 1975.
85  Eduardo Lachica, ‘Australia Suggests Coexistence Talks’, The Australian, 20 June 1975.
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could approach the issue of relations and interactions between ASEAN 
and the regimes in Indochina, particularly Vietnam and Cambodia, 
was to be one of the dominant themes in Australian policy concerns 
over the next two decades.
A second set of political and security issues arose in late 1975 
when Indonesia invaded and then assumed control of East Timor, a 
Portuguese colonial outpost. After securing independence in 1949, 
Indonesia had not pursued any claim in relation to the territory, 
which had been under Portuguese rather than Dutch control since 
the seventeenth century. However, the collapse of Marcelo Caetano’s 
dictatorship amid political and economic turmoil in Portugal in April 
1974 was followed by rapid change in Portugal’s colonies, including 
in East Timor where there was a rise in pro-independence sentiment 
at a time when Portugal had lost the will and capacity to maintain its 
rule. The Suharto Government began to view developments in East 
Timor with increasing interest and concern. Against the background 
of Cold War global tensions, and with the fall of Saigon in April 1975 
seeming to presage a possible rise in communist influence throughout 
Southeast Asia, the Suharto Government feared the establishment of a 
radical regime in East Timor.86
In this environment, the weight of opinion in Jakarta, particularly 
amongst the dominant military, was that East Timor should be 
integrated into Indonesia. To this end, Indonesia launched Operasi 
Komodo, which comprised a campaign to win international diplomatic 
support for its position, an intelligence and propaganda operation 
against pro-independence groups and, from mid-1975, a series of 
military actions in East Timor. After the pro-independence party 
Fretilin (Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor) gained 
dominance in the territory in September, Indonesian forces launched 
an invasion and seized control in Dili on 7 December 1975. Indonesia 
subsequently incorporated East Timor as a province.87 While the state 
of Indonesia after 1949 had accommodated many different areas and 
peoples, it became clear over the following years that much of the 
population in East Timor did not accept the imposition of Indonesian 
rule, which resulted in prolonged internal conflict and the loss of as 
86  James Cotton, East Timor, Australia and Regional Order: Intervention and its Aftermath 
in Southeast Asia, London: Routledge, 2004, pp. 4–48.
87  Ibid.
33
1 . AUSTRALIA AND ThE oRIgINS of ASEAN
many as 200,000 lives.88 The status of the territory continued to be an 
issue for Indonesia in its foreign relations for the next two and a half 
decades.89
The invasion and incorporation of East Timor into Indonesia became a 
highly sensitive and controversial issue in Australia. Controversy was 
heightened by the deaths of five Australian journalists at Balibo on 
16 October 1975 and of another journalist in Dili on 8 December at the 
hands of Indonesian forces. The Whitlam Government had supported 
the right of the people of the territory to decide their own future but 
it had also supported its ultimate incorporation into Indonesia, while 
urging that this be done peacefully. Whitlam and his government 
came under substantial criticism over East Timor. Nancy Viviani has 
commented:
Whitlam suffered continual attack for his policies on Timor – that 
he had helped foreclose the independence option, that he had not 
protested strongly enough on the use of force by the Indonesians 
before the invasion, and that he had not protested the journalists’ 
deaths at Balibo.90
The incorporation of East Timor into Indonesia was subsequently 
granted de facto and de jure recognition by Malcolm Fraser’s 
government, in 1978 and 1979 respectively (most states internationally 
did not recognise Indonesia’s incorporation; 31 other governments 
did extend such recognition).91 However the circumstances and 
direction of Australian policies in 1975 remained highly controversial 
in Australia, with many observers arguing that Australia had made 
insufficient efforts to affirm and protect the East Timorese people’s 
right to self-determination.92 In the years that followed, the status of 
88  Ibid., p. 53.
89  Ibid.; Rawdon Dalrymple, Continental Drift: Australia’s Search for a Regional Identity, 
Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003, pp. 185–210.
90  Viviani, ‘The Whitlam Government’s Policy’, p. 106.
91  The 31 other countries recognised Indonesia’s sovereignty, either expressly (through direct 
statements or by explanation of their votes in the United Nations General Assembly) or by 
implication (by signing treaties with Indonesia which contained clauses that defined Indonesia’s 
territory as including East Timor); see Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, East 
Timor in Transition 1998–2000: An Australian Policy Challenge, Canberra: Australian Department 
of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2001, p. 12.
92  Viviani, ‘The Whitlam Government’s Policy’; Cotton, East Timor.
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East Timor continued to be a source of controversy and contention in 
Australia–Indonesia relations and this in turn affected the climate for 
Australia’s ASEAN relations.
Conclusion
By 1975, ASEAN had gained a significant profile in Australia’s 
policies towards Southeast Asia. After the highly disruptive period of 
Konfrontasi, the Coalition Government had shown interest in ASEAN’s 
establishment and emerging role in Southeast Asia. Australia’s 
interest had heightened after 1972 when the Whitlam Government 
saw ASEAN as an important indigenous effort at cooperation that 
could help stabilise relations among its members and could begin to 
contribute positively to regional security. This led to the inauguration 
of a direct multilateral connection in April 1974, ASEAN’s first with 
an external partner. While the relationship had begun auspiciously, 
there had already been signs that Australia’s interactions with ASEAN 
as a corporate identity would have elements of discord and tensions. 
The sensitivity shown by ASEAN from early 1973 over the Whitlam 
Government’s proposal for a wider Asia-Pacific cooperative forum had 
indicated that ASEAN had the potential to be a factor to be reckoned 
with in Australia’s regional diplomacy.
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Economic disputes and the 
Third Indochina War (1976–1983)
The period after 1975 was marked by considerable uncertainty in 
Southeast Asia and in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN). The regimes in Indochina were estranged from the ASEAN 
members and ASEAN’s concerns about regional security prompted it 
to undertake a major upgrade in its cooperation efforts at its conference 
in Bali in February 1976. In Australia, a new Coalition Government 
led by Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser (elected on 13 December 1975) 
expressed strong concerns about the potential expansion of Soviet 
influence, both internationally and in Southeast Asia. The Fraser 
Government was committed to continuing and advancing Australia’s 
relations with ASEAN, but it soon encountered significant tensions 
in economic and trade relations. Later in the decade, major additional 
security problems arose as Southeast Asia experienced the traumatic 
impact of the outflows of refugees from the Indochina states. Southeast 
Asia then faced renewed conflict and major power involvements 
after Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia in December 1978 and China’s 
subsequent invasion of northern Vietnam in February–March 1979, in 
the period of conflict known as the Third Indochina War.1 Australia’s 
interactions with ASEAN on regional security in this period were 
marked by both substantial cooperation and some discord, notably 
over the role of the ousted Khmer Rouge movement in ASEAN’s 
1  Odd Arne Westad and Sophie Quinn-Judge, eds, The Third Indochina War: Conflict Between 
China, Vietnam and Cambodia, 1972–79, London: Routledge, 2006.
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strategies in opposing Vietnam’s presence in Cambodia. This chapter 
discusses these issues by focusing in turn on ASEAN’s Bali summit 
in 1976, the Fraser Government’s approach towards Southeast Asia, 
the advent of disputes between Australia and ASEAN over trade and 
civil aviation policies, the impact of the Indochina refugee crisis, 
and ASEAN and Australian approaches to the conflict over Cambodia.
ASEAN’s 1976 Bali summit
A key factor for Australia in its approaches towards Southeast Asia was 
ASEAN’s efforts to upgrade its cooperation and raise its own profile. 
As noted in Chapter 1, there were widespread concerns amongst 
the ASEAN members in the aftermath of the communist victories 
in Indochina in 1975. The ASEAN members saw a need for greater 
foreign policy coordination and an increased emphasis on ASEAN as 
an institution.2 ASEAN’s first summit meeting of heads of government 
in Bali in February 1976 was a watershed for the Association, as has 
been widely observed. The members adopted two key documents ‒ 
the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation and the Declaration of ASEAN 
Concord. The treaty set out basic norms of inter-state behaviour that 
ASEAN sought to advance for the conduct of relationships in the region, 
including the concept of sovereign equality, freedom from external 
coercion, the peaceful resolution of disputes and the renunciation of 
the use of force against one another. The treaty provided for a dispute 
resolution mechanism, a ‘High Council’ of ministers that could 
consider conflicts and, with the agreement of all participants, make 
recommendations on appropriate means of settlement; the Council has 
not so far been convened.3 While the treaty was developed explicitly 
for ASEAN and for other states who might in the future be eligible to 
join ASEAN, it later became a key means by which ASEAN could seek 
recognition and endorsement from countries from outside Southeast 
2  Amitav Acharya, The Making of Southeast Asia: International Relations of a Region, 
Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2012, pp. 164–79; Nicholas Tarling, Regionalism in Southeast Asia: 
To Foster the Political Will, London: Routledge, 2006, pp. 174–85.
3  ASEAN, ‘Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia’, Indonesia, 24 February 
1976; Christopher B. Roberts, ASEAN Regionalism: Cooperation, Values and Institutionalization, 
Abingdon: Routledge, 2012, pp. 53–5.
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Asia who wanted to increase their interaction with ASEAN. In 2005, 
accession to this treaty was a key step by which Australia was able 
to join the ASEAN-initiated East Asia Summit (see Chapter 5). 
The Bali summit reaffirmed ASEAN’s distinctive approach to and 
‘norms’ of cooperation, which have been referred to widely as the 
‘ASEAN way’.4 This approach emphasised regular communication 
among the members’ ministers and (after 1976) heads of government, 
often conducted in an informal manner and with the aim of building 
up familiarity and confidence. The values of respect for national 
sovereignty, non-interference in internal affairs, opposition to external 
interference, support for the peaceful resolution of disputes and 
renunciation of the threat or use of force continued to be emphasised. 
ASEAN’s style was based on frequent meetings and the avoidance 
of ‘top heavy’ institutions. It maintained a Secretariat in Jakarta but 
its size and budget were modest. ASEAN also emphasised the value 
of dialogue with the major powers with interests in Southeast Asia.5 
It sought to express its cooperative norms in several ways, including 
its declaration in 1971 that Southeast Asia should be a Zone of Peace, 
Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN, discussed in Chapter 1) and its 
sponsorship of wider forums such as the ASEAN Regional Forum 
and the East Asia Summit (discussed in Chapters 3 and 4). In 1997, 
ASEAN added to its norms of cooperation by adopting the Treaty on 
the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone by which members 
reassured each other that they would not acquire, store, transport 
or test nuclear weapons.6
The ‘ASEAN way’ has continued to be emphasised by the Association 
in the years since 1976 as a focus for developing cooperation among 
highly diverse states with little previous bases for communication or 
accord.7 ASEAN’s emphasis on consensus-based decision-making, 
4  On the ‘ASEAN way’, see Rodolfo C. Severino, Southeast Asia in Search of an ASEAN 
Community: Insights from the Former ASEAN Secretary-General, Singapore: Institute of Southeast 
Asian Studies, 2006, pp. 1‒40.
5  This section draws from Frank Frost, ‘ASEAN and Regional Cooperation: Recent 
Developments and Australia’s Interests’, Parliamentary Library Research Paper Series, 2013–14, 
Canberra: Department of Parliamentary Services, 8 November 2013, www.aph.gov.au/About_
Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/rp/rp1314/ASEAN 
(accessed 1 October 2015), pp. 5‒19.
6  Roberts, ASEAN Regionalism, p. 59.
7  See also Amitav Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and 
the Problem of Regional Order, 3rd edn, Abingdon: Routledge, 2014, pp. 43‒78.
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informality and voluntary compliance in relation to agreements 
has been criticised for producing a cautious and slow pace of 
development. The Association has, for example, been described as 
‘making process not progress’.8 ASEAN’s style of cooperation has 
continued to be debated within and outside the Association since the 
1970s, particularly in relation to approaches to the issues of national 
sovereignty and the principle of non-interference in internal affairs.9 
The directions set through the Bali summit have nonetheless continued 
to be highly influential, as subsequent chapters will suggest.
In addition to reaffirming ASEAN’s identity and style of operation, 
the Bali summit sought to upgrade economic cooperation among the 
members. One avenue was to promote joint industrial projects by 
which a designated enterprise located in one of the member countries 
could gain preferential access to the whole five-country ASEAN 
market.10 A second avenue was the endorsement of the desirability 
of joint cooperation to try to secure more favourable market access 
for ASEAN countries’ exports to their major trading partners. In a 
significant comment, one section of the Declaration of ASEAN Concord 
stated that ASEAN members ‘shall accelerate joint efforts to improve 
access to markets outside ASEAN for their raw materials and finished 
products by seeking the elimination of all trade barriers in those 
markets’.11 This area of ASEAN cooperation was to figure prominently 
in the first phase of Australia’s relationship with the Association from 
1976 onwards.
The Fraser Government (December 1975 – March 1983) pursued 
Australian foreign policy with some different emphases from the 
preceding Gough Whitlam administration. Fraser was suspicious of 
and apprehensive about the role of the Soviet Union and re-emphasised 
Australia’s commitment to the US alliance, while maintaining 
8  David Martin Jones and Michael Smith, ‘Making Process, not Progress’, International 
Security, 32(1) 2007. See also David Martin Jones, Nicholas Khoo and M. L. R. Smith, Asian 
Security and the Rise of China: International Relations in an Age of Insecurity, Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar, 2013, pp. 68‒130.
9  Severino, Southeast Asia, pp. 372‒85; Shaun Narine, ‘Asia, ASEAN and the Question 
of  Sovereignty’, in Mark Beeson and Richard Stubbs, eds, Routledge Handbook of Asian 
Regionalism, London: Routledge, 2012.
10  Severino, Southeast Asia, pp. 212–22.
11  ASEAN, ‘The Declaration of ASEAN Concord’, Bali, Indonesia, February 1976; see also 
Michael Richardson, ‘Asean Upset By Our Trade Curb’, The Age, 27 February 1976.
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a willingness to differentiate Australian policies from its ally, as was 
the case in approaches towards Vietnam after 1975 (see below). Stewart 
Firth has provided a concise summary of Fraser’s policy approaches:
Fraser dominated the making of Australian foreign policy in his time 
almost as much as Whitlam dominated it in his. The two men differed 
in outlook. Where Whitlam was an optimist in international affairs 
and inclined to a tolerant view of Soviet intentions, Fraser was a 
pessimist who saw Soviet expansion as a serious threat to world peace. 
Where Whitlam sought greater independence from the United States, 
Fraser reasserted the central importance to Australia’s security of the 
American alliance. And where Whitlam welcomed détente between 
the two superpowers, Fraser believed the Soviets were exploiting it to 
build themselves a military advantage over the West.12
A further element in Fraser’s approach to foreign policy was an interest 
in the challenges of relationships between the developed countries and 
the developing states (refered to widely as ‘North–South relations’). 
The Fraser Government commissioned a report on ‘Australia and the 
Third World’ and expressed some interest in efforts by developing 
states to seek more equitable international economic relationships, 
although it was not always easy for the government to reconcile this 
overall attitude with specific policies, for example, in trade relations 
with ASEAN.13
Fraser’s overall foreign policy emphasis was reflected in his government’s 
approach towards Southeast Asia. In the period immediately after the 
defeat of the non-communist regimes in Indochina, the United States 
moved to reduce its military presence in Southeast Asia: it withdrew 
from its bases in Thailand although it retained a security relationship 
with that country and maintained its bases in the Philippines. 
The Fraser Government, from 1976, was concerned about a perceived 
decline of US interest in the region and sought to persuade the 
US Government of the region’s continuing importance.14
12  Stewart Firth, Australia in International Politics: An Introduction to Australian Foreign 
Policy, 3rd edn, Crows Nest, NSW: Allen & Unwin, 2011, p. 22.
13  The government’s report was written by Professor Owen Harries; see Owen Harries, 
Australia and the Third World: Report of the Committee on Australia’s Relations with the Third 
World, Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1979.
14  David Goldsworthy et al., ‘Reorientation’, in David Goldsworthy, ed., Facing North: 
A  Century of Australian Engagement with Asia, Volume 1: 1901 to the 1970s, Carlton, Vic.: 
Melbourne University Press, 2001, pp. 346–7.
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The new Australian Government was also keen to pursue relations 
with the Southeast Asian region and its states. On 18 January 1976, 
shortly after his election to office and just before a visit to Malaysia 
to attend the funeral of Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak, Fraser said 
that ‘[i]t is the intention of my government to concentrate its activities 
more in our own region. I think that in recent times, Australia’s 
diplomatic effort have [sic] been scattered too far and wide around the 
world’. Fraser said that efforts should be made at two levels, country 
to country, and between Australia and ASEAN as a group. He noted, 
‘[j]ust as Australia recognises the importance of Asean to Australia, the 
Asean countries for their part recognise the importance of Australia’.15
Fraser accordingly sought to maintain and extend the emphasis that 
had been given to ASEAN by the Whitlam Government. Soon after 
coming to office, he pursued his government’s interest in ASEAN by 
seeking talks with the ASEAN leaders at their inaugural summit in 
Bali in February 1976.16 Minister for Foreign Affairs Andrew Peacock 
told the Indonesian ambassador in Canberra in January 1976 that 
‘the Prime Minister was most anxious to receive an invitation’ to 
visit Bali for discussions after the ASEAN summit the next month, 
but the response from Jakarta was that ‘the timing is not correct’ (a 
position that also applied to Japan and New Zealand).17 A media report 
in February 1976 suggested that the timing of the Australian request 
had been an issue for some ASEAN members. A Malaysian official was 
quoted as saying that ‘[t]he proposal was too sudden. It came out of 
the blue without consultation. If we had been given three months’ 
notice and time to prepare, there might have been no problem.’18 
While Australia was not able to gain representation at the Bali summit, 
ASEAN’s approaches to cooperation soon became significant issues 
in Australia’s regional relations.
15  ‘Improve Asean Relations – PM’, Courier Mail, 19 January 1976. 
16  Michael Richardson, ‘PM Sought Invitation from ASEAN’, The Age, 11 February 1976.
17  Goldsworthy et al., ‘Reorientation’, p. 347.
18  Michael Richardson, ‘How Mr Fraser Got the Cold Shoulder’, Australian Financial Review, 
27 February 1976.
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The politics of trade
As noted in Chapter 1, when Australia established its formal link with 
ASEAN after talks in Canberra in April 1974, the discussions had 
aroused no controversy; the major item agreed upon was a modest A$5 
million multilateral aid program.19 At this time, however, developments 
were already taking place in both the Australian economy and some 
ASEAN members’ economies, which were soon to lead to significant 
problems in trade relations. After the events of early 1975 in 
Indochina, and the drive by the ASEAN members to find meaningful 
avenues for economic cooperation, a multilateral political framework 
was now established that enabled ASEAN members’ complaints about 
Australian policies to be given sharp focus.
By the early 1970s, Australia had developed a trading relationship 
with the ASEAN members that was a relatively small part of Australia’s 
overall trade (6.6 per cent of its exports in 1976–77 and 4.1 per cent of 
imports in the same period), but that was heavily in Australia’s favour. 
ASEAN members were a useful market for Australian manu factures, 
minerals and primary products. For ASEAN, Australia was also a 
minor trading partner, supplying 4.6 per cent of imports and taking 
2.4 per cent of exports in 1975.20
In the early 1970s, several ASEAN members (Malaysia, the Philippines 
and Thailand) had begun to follow the Singaporean example by 
developing export-oriented manufacturing sectors, and producing 
labour-intensive goods such as textiles, clothing and footwear. In this 
period the Australian economy was buoyant. In response to a strong 
balance of payments position and gathering inflationary pressure, the 
Whitlam Government revalued the Australian dollar several times in 
1973, cut tariffs abruptly by 25 per cent and adopted a more extensive 
system of tariff preferences for developing countries. Exporters in 
Northeast and Southeast Asia were the immediate beneficiaries of 
these changes. In 1974, the Australian economy began to weaken, 
but imports were rapidly rising, putting pressure on manufacturing 
19  The discussion below draws in part from Frank Frost, ‘Political Issues in Australia–ASEAN 
Relations’, Asia Pacific Community (Tokyo), 7(Winter) 1980; and Frank Frost, ‘ASEAN and 
Australia’, in Alison Broinowski, ed., Understanding ASEAN, London: Macmillan, 1982.
20  Clive T. Edwards, ‘Current Issues in Australian–ASEAN Trade Relations’, Southeast Asian 
Affairs 1979, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1979, pp. 30–1.
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in Australia. In response, the Australian Government devalued the 
dollar and placed import restrictions on ‘sensitive goods’ including 
textiles, clothing and footwear. Most of these restrictions hit Northeast 
Asian exporters: China, Hong Kong, South Korea and Taiwan. When 
Australian importers, in response, turned to alternative suppliers 
from ASEAN members, the government imposed restraints on goods 
coming from Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand.21
Not surprisingly, the Australian restrictions had an unfavourable 
psychological and political impact on states whose economic 
expectations in foreign trade were rapidly changing. Clive Edwards 
wrote of the ASEAN states:
History had cast them in the role of raw material suppliers. 
The experience of the fifties and sixties seemed to indicate that, in the 
field of manufacturing, they could not be internationally competitive. 
The exhilarating experience of 1973–74 permanently changed this 
depressing scenario. The ASEAN countries realised that there were 
manufac tures that they could export at highly competitive prices. 
Unfortunately, it was at this moment of euphoria that Australia 
struck.22
In this context, the ASEAN members took a significant new step 
in dealing with Australia. In line with their Declaration of ASEAN 
Concord, ASEAN formulated a ‘joint approach’, which was transmitted 
formally to Australia in November 1976, but quoted extensively in the 
Australian Financial Review on 27 July 1976, effectively beginning 
substantive debate in Australia on ASEAN relations.23 The ASEAN 
‘aide-memoire’ heavily criticised Australia’s protection policies and 
indicated disappointment with Australia’s system of tariff preferences 
for developing countries. The document stated that: 
For a developed country, Australia has one of the highest tariff rates, 
especially on labour-intensive light industrial goods exported by 
developing countries … Although Australia was the first developed 
country to grant tariff preferences to the developing countries, the 
benefits derived therefrom have been far below the expectations of the 
ASEAN member countries.24 
21  Ibid., pp. 34–7. See also Jiro Okamoto, Australia’s Foreign Economic Policy and ASEAN, 
Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2010, pp. 112–19. 
22  Edwards, ‘Current Issues’, p. 36, emphasis in original.
23  Michael Richardson, ‘ASEAN Takes Fraser to Task’, Australian Financial Review, 27 July 1976.
24  Ibid.
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The main reasons for ASEAN dissatisfaction with Australia’s policy on 
tariff preferences were the scheme’s limited product coverage, the low 
level of tariff reductions, the existence of a quota system and stringent 
definitions of handicrafts.25 Malaysia and the Philippines followed up 
this move with informal delays to Australian exports.26 
Debate about Australian trade policies with ASEAN was continued 
by contributions from Singapore’s Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew. 
In a notable statement in June 1977, Lee argued that trade liberalisation 
by Australia would:
remove a source of considerable frustration and bitterness on the 
part of countries like the Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia, 
which feel this is a one-sided business – of a very wealthy continent, 
sparsely populated, with enormous natural resources, not yet fully 
developed with an indus trial capacity commensurate with those 
resources, yet wanting to make all the little things. It wants labour-
intensive products like shirts and garments, knitwear, shoes and 
socks, all for itself, behind high tariff walls. Buying little and selling 
more. Of course, let me add that succes sive Australian governments 
have been conscious of this and have made up with dollops of aid 
– it’s like giving toffees and chocolates away. That’s not the kind of 
relationship which generates mutual esteem, respect and an adult 
mutual continuing inter-dependence which in the long term is the 
only sound relationship we can develop … And if that’s the way the 
world is going to be – if the relationship between the countries of 
ASEAN and Australia is the relationship between the developed and 
underdeveloped world – then I see strife.27
ASEAN continued its approach on a joint basis. A further detailed 
critique of Australian policies was presented in an ASEAN paper 
in November 1978, which stated that ‘Australia seems to regard 
developing countries only as a source of supply of certain materials for 
her industrial outputs’. The document called on Australia to liberalise 
tariffs, assist ASEAN export promotion efforts in the Australian market 
and promote ASEAN–Australia cooperation in industrial development 
in the region.28
25  Ibid.
26  Edwards, ‘Current Issues’, p. 40.
27  Michael Richardson, ‘Lee Defines the ASEAN Blueprint’, Far Eastern Economic Review, 
10 June 1977.




The ASEAN challenge to Australian trade and economic policies 
had a significant impact in Australian Government, business and 
academic circles. There had been a long-standing debate in Australia 
about the structure of its economy and the question of protection for 
secondary industry.29 While the challenge from ASEAN on this issue 
after 1976 was unexpected, it came from a region in which Australia 
had in recent years been closely interested, and the ASEAN criticism 
was thus given a credence that similar criticism from Europe or even 
Northeast Asia would probably not have received. Many Australian 
observers, including some businesspeople, academics and journalists, 
readily accepted the ASEAN claims and argued for Australian trade 
liberalisation.30
The Fraser Government in this period adopted a more reserved 
approach. It emphasised Australia’s continuing interest in maximising 
political and economic relations with the ASEAN region and it 
initiated a series of joint projects and regular consultations. However, 
the government simultaneously continued to main tain policies of 
protection for endangered Australian labour-intensive industries, and 
it attempted to put the best possible face on the existing ASEAN–
Australia economic relationship.31
Australian Government responses to the ASEAN criticism began in 
earnest in 1977. A Standing Interdepartmental Committee on Relations 
with ASEAN was established in January to bring together the many 
departments involved in ASEAN relations.32 The government initiated 
efforts to secure an invitation for Fraser to attend ASEAN’s planned 
second Heads of Government Meeting, to be held in Kuala Lumpur 
in August 1977, and this effort was successful.33 Several Australian 
missions visited the region in the months leading up to the Kuala 
Lumpur meeting to prepare the ground for Fraser’s visit.34 
29  Okamoto, Australia’s Foreign Economic Policy, pp. 34–95. 
30  Joanna Lawe-Davies, ‘The Politics of Protection: Australian–ASEAN Economic Relations 
1975–1980’, Research Paper No. 13, Nathan, Qld: Centre for the Study of Australian–Asian 
Relations, Griffith University, 1981.
31  ‘Fraser “No” to ASEAN Plea on Imports’, Sydney Morning Herald, 18 January 1978.
32  Andrew Peacock, ‘Australia–ASEAN Relations’, news release, 19 January 1977.
33  ‘Fraser May Get ASEAN Invite’, Canberra Times, 28 February 1977.
34  Michael Richardson, ‘Asians Will Put Fraser to the Test’, The Age, 14 July 1977.
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At the ASEAN Kuala Lumpur summit in August 1977, Fraser held 
discussions on 7 August on a variety of issues, including global 
economic problems such as the need for stability in commodity prices 
and improved marketing facilities, Australian aid and consultative 
projects and trade problems.35 Australia did not offer immediate 
concessions on trade issues, but did agree to increase its overall foreign 
aid commitment to the ASEAN members, and it offered to provide 
assistance to the ASEAN joint industrial projects. The discussions also 
resulted in an agreement on a series of meetings (including a trade fair 
and an industrial cooperation conference), a joint research project into 
the ASEAN–Australia economic relationship and an arrangement for 
regular consultation on trade matters.36
Considerable progress was subsequently made in establish ing the 
pattern of relations agreed upon at Kuala Lumpur. Building on the 
original multilateral aid projects initiated in 1974, the ASEAN–
Australian Economic Co-operation Program by 1980 involved a series of 
projects at a cost of A$34.5 million in areas including the development 
of low-cost, protein-rich foods from locally available sources, studies 
on post-harvest handling, transportation and storing of grain, meat 
and cereals, and assistance to education and population programs and 
regional animal quarantine. The joint research project into economic 
relations was initiated in 1980. An Industrial Co-operation Conference 
was held in Melbourne in June 1978 and ASEAN Trade Fairs were 
mounted in Sydney (October 1978) and Melbourne (August 1980). 
Private business links were also developed on a multi lateral basis; 
an ASEAN–Australia Business Conference was inaugurated in Kuala 
Lumpur in June 1980.37 In November 1978, agreement was reached 
on the ASEAN–Australia Consultative Meeting (AACM) between 
the ASEAN Canberra Committee (comprising the head of ASEAN 
diplomatic missions in Canberra) and the Australian Interdepart mental 
Committee on Relations with ASEAN. Under the AACM, a working 
group on trade matters was set up to provide ASEAN members with 
‘early warning’ of Australian policy changes.38
35  Malcolm Fraser, ‘Post ASEAN Conference Talks’, Ministerial Statement, in Commonwealth 
of  Australia Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Official Hansard, No. 33, 
17 August 1977.
36  ASEAN, ‘Joint Press Statement of the ASEAN Heads of Government and the Prime Minister 
of Australia’, Kuala Lumpur, 7 August 1977.
37  Frost, ‘Political Issues’, pp. 131–2; ‘ASEAN Talks End in Trade Pact’, The Age, 22 June 1978.
38  Minister for Foreign Affairs, news release, M129, 13 November 1978.
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The consultation and discussions provided by these forums were 
undoubtedly of some value to ASEAN. Since sudden and seemingly 
arbitrary changes in Australian tariff policy had been a major 
problem for some ASEAN producers in 1974 and 1975, the AACM 
was potentially useful. But while Australia was prepared to consult 
extensively, the Fraser Government made it clear in a number of 
statements and actions that in the domestic economic environment 
of the late 1970s in Australia, major liberalisation in areas of trade 
relevant to ASEAN would not occur.39 On the same day as Prime 
Minister Fraser’s report to the Australian Parliament on his successful 
talks with ASEAN leaders (17 August 1977), the Ministers of Industry 
and Commerce, and Business and Consumer Affairs announced 
that the government would attempt to maintain existing levels of 
employment in the textiles, clothing and footwear industries for the 
following three years. Further guarantees were given during the 1977 
election campaign and, in August 1978, an additional tariff surcharge 
of 12.5 per cent was imposed for revenue purposes on a number of 
products of concern to ASEAN members. A commitment to attempt to 
maximise employment in the textiles, clothing and footwear industries 
was announced in August 1980.40
Although the substance of Australian external economic policy 
conceded little to ASEAN claims, Australian statements asserted 
consistently that ASEAN’s market access in Australia was expanding 
rapidly, that Australia in fact imported considerably larger amounts 
of sensitive goods (such as textiles and footwear) per capita than 
ASEAN’s other major markets, that ASEAN members should look at 
their problem of adverse balances of trade with Australia in a global 
context, and that as the Australian economy recovered and expanded, 
ASEAN exporters’ opportunities would also further expand.41 
By 1980, in a regional climate now dominated by concern over Sino-
Vietnam relations and the ongoing problem of Cambodia (see below), 
ASEAN’s criticism of Australian trade policies was no longer advanced 
with the stridency of 1976 and 1977. ASEAN’s concern continued, 
39  Michael Richardson, ‘Govt Seeks a New Patsy on ASEAN Trade War’, Australian Financial 
Review, 11 July 1977.
40  Okamoto, Australia’s Foreign Economic Policy, pp. 117–19; Frost, ‘ASEAN and Australia’, 
p.  157; Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence, Australia and ASEAN, 
Report, Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1980, pp. 31–4.
41  See Malcolm Fraser, ‘Address to the Second ASEAN Trade Fair’, Melbourne, 4 August 1980.
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however, and it was illustrated in a speech delivered by Malaysia’s 
Finance Minister Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah to the first ASEAN–
Australia Business Conference in June 1980. Tengku Razaleigh 
reminded his audience of the link that ASEAN leaders saw between 
economic growth and political stability and said: 
Unfortunately there are many countries in the north which ironically 
are concerned with global security but which at the same time, adopt 
international economic and trade policies and practices, that in the 
longer-term erode the very foundation of security that they try to 
promote. 
Razaleigh praised the steps that had been taken to develop and 
institutionalise ASEAN–Australia cooperation, but noted that 
protectionism was still a problem. He added:
While ASEAN and other developing countries have strongly supported 
Australia’s efforts in combating pro tectionist policies emanating from 
the United States, the EEC [European Economic Community] and OECD 
[Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development] countries, 
it is understandably difficult for us simultaneously to experience the 
adverse effects of Australia’s own protectionist policies.42
The tensions over trade relations were not resolved during the tenure 
of the Fraser Government. While that government supported close 
economic relations with the ASEAN members, it was not prepared 
to alter the basic pattern of protection for Australian industries.43 
Significant change in this area would have to wait for Bob Hawke’s 
Labor Government, which did pursue major macroeconomic and trade 
policy reform.
Trade was not the only issue of contention to gain prominence in 
ASEAN–Australia relations in the late 1970s. The framework for 
discussion and negotiations set up by 1978 provided a ready avenue 
for consideration of additional ASEAN claims. Australia’s civil aviation 
policies provided another source of ASEAN concern from 1978.
42  Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah, ‘Speech’, delivered to the first ASEAN–Australia Business 
Conference, 24 June 1980, pp. 7–8. 
43  Rawdon Dalrymple, Continental Drift: Australia’s Search for a Regional Identity, Aldershot: 
Ashgate, 2003, pp. 67–73.
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The civil aviation dispute
The dispute that emerged over civil aviation in 1978 and 1979 did not 
necessarily fit easily into the context and framework of the ASEAN–
Australia relationship.44 The issue impinged directly on the interests 
of only one ASEAN member in a major way: Singapore. It was not 
automatically to be expected that Singapore would receive backing 
from its ASEAN partners. For a variety of interacting economic and 
political reasons, the civil aviation issue nonetheless became for a time 
a cause celebre in the relationship.
The genesis of the problem lay in an emerging conflict of interest 
between Australia and Singapore in the 1970s. Australia’s national 
airline Qantas had steadily come under increasing competition on its 
most important air routes (Australia to Europe) from a number of other 
carriers, including Singapore Airlines (SIA). The financial position of 
Qantas came under pressure at a time when there was also a rising 
demand for cheaper fares from sections of the Australian public and 
travel industry. In order to secure cheaper fares and to ensure that a new 
arrangement to achieve these fares would safeguard Qantas’s position, 
the Australian Government and Qantas devised a new approach – the 
International Civil Aviation Policy (ICAP) – which would limit foreign 
airlines’ capacity on the Australia–Europe route, and guarantee high 
‘load factors’ (that is, proportion of seats filled on flights) for the 
entire flight between Australian and European ports by discouraging 
(through a high-cost surcharge) ‘stopovers’ by passengers en route. 
This policy was justified on the grounds that it was in accord with the 
norms of international airline negotiating procedures, and that it was 
an assertion of legitimate Australian economic interests.45 Singapore, 
however, was able to place the issue squarely in the ASEAN–Australia 
context.46
44  This section draws in part from Frost, ‘ASEAN and Australia’, pp. 159–62. On the civil 
aviation issue overall, see also Okamoto, Australia’s Foreign Economic Policy, pp. 119–20; and 
Robyn Lim, ‘Current Australian–ASEAN Relations’, Southeast Asian Affairs 1980, Singapore: 
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1980.
45  Peter Nixon, ‘International Aviation Policy’, Ministerial Statement, in Commonwealth 
of Australia Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Official Hansard, No. 41, 
11 October 1978.
46  Michael Richardson, ‘ASEAN’s Air Fare Threat’, Australian Financial Review, 19 May 1978.
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Singapore had a great deal to lose through the Australian policy. 
Its national airline had been operating under the SIA name only since 
1972 (when Malaysia–Singapore Airlines was dissolved), but it had 
achieved by 1977 the highest passenger and freight load factors of 
any international airline. Singapore was understandably proud of its 
airline, which in 1978 accounted for over 3 per cent of the country’s 
gross national product. Part of its successful growth had been based 
on the Australia–Europe route in which the airline had gained as 
much as 30 per cent of the traffic by 1978. ICAP threatened to reduce 
significantly SIA’s participation in this traffic and the discouragement 
of stopovers threatened to damage Singapore’s tourist industry, which 
was heavily dependent on this type of short-stay tourism. No other 
airline from an ASEAN member was as dependent on the Australia to 
Europe traffic to the same degree as SIA. Singapore’s ASEAN partners 
were not automatically sympathetic towards its economic problems, 
and it had been involved in an acrimonious dispute with Malaysia 
over civil aviation.47 Australian officials seem to have assumed that 
SIA could be isolated effectively through the initiation of favourable 
bilateral negotiations with other ASEAN members. Singapore, however, 
was able to successfully mobilise ASEAN support to  challenge the 
Australian policy.48 
Singapore depicted the dispute as one between Australia and ASEAN 
that was relevant to the wider issue of North–South economic 
relations. It was relatively easy for Singapore to attack the Australian 
policy as an act of discrimination against a successful airline from a 
rapidly developing Third World state, which was being penalised 
for its success in competing in the Western-dominated, technically 
sophisticated airline business.49 
After preliminary complaints in early and mid-1978, ASEAN jointly 
criticised ICAP at the end of October, and in December the ASEAN 
economic ministers agreed that negotiations with Australia on ICAP 
would be broached on a group basis. Joint negotiations were held 
with Australia in January 1979, but the results were inconclusive. 
In February 1979, the economic ministers met again: their joint 
47  Hamish McDonald, ‘ASEAN Hostile to “Fly-Over” Air Fares’, Australian Financial Review, 
8 June 1978.
48  Lim, ‘Current Australian–ASEAN Relations’; see also Frost, ‘Political Issues’, pp. 132–7.
49  Michael Richardson, ‘Asean Aims to Fight Cheap Air Fares’, The Age, 18 December 1978.
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communiqué included the statement that ‘ICAP would not be 
confined to ASEAN and Australia alone … ICAP is a manifestation 
of the tendency of developed countries to change the rules as soon as 
the developing countries have mastered the … rules and overcome the 
obstruction posed by them’.50 ASEAN’s major demands were that its 
airlines should be able to participate in the Australia–Europe low-fare 
scheme with or without stopovers, that stopovers should not be prohib-
itively costly for low-fare passengers, and that for ASEAN–Australia 
cheap fares, the cost per kilometre should be roughly equivalent to 
that charged between Australia and Europe.51
ASEAN pursued its case actively in early 1979, partly through 
negotiations with Australia and partly through a variety of comments 
and statements by Singaporean and other ASEAN spokespeople that 
gained extensive coverage in the Australian media. In May 1979, a 
preliminary agreement on the issue was reached and this agreement 
was subsequently accepted by the ASEAN economic ministers in 
September. The agreement did not meet all ASEAN demands, but it 
seemed to effectively defuse the issue as an ASEAN problem and much 
of the controversy on the question had subsided by the end of 1979.52
The ICAP dispute was significant in a variety of ways. The ASEAN 
members showed an impressive ability to coalesce on an issue that for 
them was potentially far more a divisive than a cohesive influence. They 
linked the dispute with Australia to the wider context of North–South 
relations. The framework for public and governmental discussions of 
ASEAN–Australia issues that had been developed initially to discuss 
trade relations could be used to consider other issues as they arose and 
used to exert pressure on Australia for concessions. While the ASEAN 
approach did not achieve all its aims, it did force significant Australian 
policy changes, and the ICAP challenge probably constituted 
ASEAN’s single most influential external joint approach in economic 
relations up to 1979. The dispute showed that the ASEAN members 
had a considerable capacity both to advance their interests through 
50  ASEAN, ‘The Special ASEAN Economic Ministers Meeting’, Kuala Lumpur, 22 February 1979.
51  Ibid.
52  Greg Hywood, ‘ASEAN Cracks Australia’s Air Fare Barriers’, Australian Financial Review, 
8 May 1979; Lim, ‘Current Australian–ASEAN Relations’, pp. 45–7.
51
2 . ECoNomIC DISPUTES AND ThE ThIRD INDoChINA WAR
the Australian domestic media, and to cause Australia considerable 
embarrassment by placing ASEAN–Australia issues in the context of 
the North–South dialogue.
The Indochina refugee crisis
While trade and economic issues had been sources of discord, Australia 
and ASEAN continued to have important interests in common, 
particularly in relation to security in the Southeast Asian region 
and the problem of great power interference. Towards the end of the 
1970s, areas of long-term mutual interest for Australia and ASEAN 
were reaffirmed as the crisis stemming from the outflows of people 
from the three Indochina states and then the conflict that developed 
over Cambodia posed significant challenges to security and stability 
in Southeast Asia. These common concerns were a stimulus towards 
further important developments in the relationship that included 
both some extensive cooperation but also some discord, notably 
over the role of the radical Khmer Rouge movement in relation to the 
Cambodian conflict.
The refugee exodus from Vietnam and the other Indochina states from 
early 1975 had a profound impact on the ASEAN members, especially 
Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia. Large numbers of people began 
to depart from Vietnam and Cambodia after the collapse of the non-
communist regimes in April 1975 and substantial numbers also left 
Laos, where communist forces attained full control by the end of the 
year. There was a steady and large flow of people from 1975 to 1977, 
but from early 1977 several factors led to an increase in the pace of 
departures, particularly from Vietnam. While the departing people 
from Vietnam after 1975 had been principally ethnic Vietnamese, the 
government’s decision to severely restrict the operations of private 
businesses in southern Vietnam in March 1978 led to a further exodus 
that included many Sino-Vietnamese. The deterioration of relations 
between Vietnam and China was heightened after Vietnam’s invasion 
of Cambodia from 25 December 1978. China responded with a limited 
but highly damaging invasion of northern Vietnam in February–March 
1979. From 1978, the Vietnamese Government pursued active policies 
of discrimination against the ethnic Chinese, which encouraged large 
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numbers to try to flee by boat to both Hong Kong and Southeast Asia. 
Overall, between 1975 and 1982, about two million people left the 
three countries of Indochina and over 800,000 sought resettlement.53
The departures of people both by land and by sea posed major problems 
for the ASEAN member countries where they sought refuge. By 1977, 
Thailand had received over 200,000 people arriving by both land and 
sea. Up to the end of 1977, about 20,000 people had arrived by boat 
in ASEAN member countries, but the numbers escalated in 1978. By 
the end of 1978, 68,000 had arrived in Malaysia and only 31,000 had 
gained resettlement in third countries.54 The people seeking asylum 
faced difficult and often dangerous journeys: many people perished 
at sea through accident or attacks from pirates operating from nearby 
countries, particularly Thailand. The refugees posed economic and 
administrative problems in the countries that gave them temporary 
entry, and were at times a source of some social and political tension.55 
In Malaysia, for example, there were social and political concerns 
about the impact of the arrival of large numbers of ethnic Chinese 
people on the east coast of the peninsula.56 
The flows of asylum seekers, particularly the boat arrivals from 
Vietnam, were also of very real concern to Australia. In 1976, some 
refugee boats began arriving in northern Australia, having travelled 
onwards from Malaysia and Indonesia, and in November 1977 a number 
of boats arrived in Darwin. The boat arrivals provoked a hostile public 
reaction in Australia since they raised the spectre of an uncontrolled 
influx of Asian immigrants. The prospect of continued boat arrivals 
threatened to undermine support for the Australian Government’s 
policy of accepting Indochinese refugees through organised channels 
53  For an overview of the process and pattern of departures, see Nancy Viviani, The Long 
Journey: Vietnamese Migration and Settlement in Australia, Carlton, Vic.: Melbourne University 
Press, 1984, pp. 38–52. See also W. Courtland-Robinson, Terms of Refuge: The Indochinese Exodus 
and the International Response, London: Zed Books, 1998; and Frank Frost, ‘Vietnam, ASEAN and 
the Indochina Refugee Crisis’, Southeast Asian Affairs 1980, Singapore: Institute of Southeast 
Asian Studies, 1980.
54  Viviani, The Long Journey, p. 46; ‘Refugee Talks Planned Monday’, Canberra Times, 
7 January 1979.
55  Peter Hastings, ‘Price of the “Expel” Policy’, Sydney Morning Herald, 6 July 1979; 
‘War Fears Over Flood of S-E Asian Refugees’, The Australian, 31 July 1979; see also Barry Wain, 
The Refused: The Agony of the Indochina Refugees, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982.
56  Viviani, The Long Journey, p. 74.
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and it also threatened to reawaken controversy about the general 
question of Asian immigration. These issues provided a strong impetus 
for cooperation between Australia and ASEAN.57
The Australian Government adopted an active policy of gaining the 
cooperation of the ASEAN members, and it sought the assistance of 
Malaysia and Indonesia in preventing the onward passage of boats 
from their points of first asylum to Australia. The government moved 
actively to support the ASEAN members’ efforts to ‘internationalise’ 
the refugee problem by gaining increased financial assistance and 
particularly increased resettlement commitments from Western states. 
Australia initiated the proposal that led to the first Geneva conference 
on Indochina refugees in December 1978. Australia played a major role 
in supporting the diplomacy of the ASEAN members in 1979, leading 
up to the ASEAN foreign ministers’ meeting in Bali in early July, 
which Australia’s Minister for Foreign Affairs attended, along with 
the foreign ministers of Japan and the US.58 Australia also supported 
and took part in the second Geneva conference in July, which saw 
additional commitments of aid and offers of resettlement for refugees. 
By 1980, Australia was accepting 14,000 Indochinese refugees per 
year and by 1982 had accepted over 60,000 people from Indochinese 
countries since April 1975. Australia had now accepted more refugees 
per capita than any other country of asylum (only the British colony 
of Hong Kong accepted more) and the policy had maintained a high 
degree of public acceptance.59
The refugee crisis had posed substantial challenges for Australia 
and for its relations with the ASEAN members. The capacity and 
willingness of Australia to cooperate with its ASEAN neighbours 
was particularly important because it came against the backdrop 
of Australia’s moves since 1966 to end the policies of restriction in 
immigration in relation to Asia. The significance of the issues raised 
for Australia in foreign relations from the refugee crisis were identified 
in a notable joint statement by the Australian Ministers for Foreign 
Affairs (Andrew Peacock) and Immigration and Multicultural Affairs 
(Michael MacKellar) on 29 November 1977:
57  Ibid., pp. 82–115.
58  ‘Peacock Goes to ASEAN Talks on Refugees’, The Australian, 30 June 1979; Michael 
Richardson, ‘Ease Curbs, Asean Asked’, The Age, 4 July 1979.
59  Viviani, The Long Journey, pp. 82–115.
ENgAgINg ThE NEIghBoURS
54
The comparatively small countries of Southeast Asia have had to 
bear the brunt of the post-war exodus of refugees from Vietnam. 
It has presented them with serious problems. With rapidly growing 
populations, a shortage of employment opportunities, and very 
limited social services, they are ill-equipped to cope with the influx. 
The  problem is a regional problem and the validity of Australia’s 
credentials as a good neighbour will depend largely on a willingness 
to meet our regional obligations by bearing part of the burden. 
Our immigration policy has been misunderstood and misrepresented 
abroad in the past. It has taken a sustained effort to remove this 
misunderstanding. If we were now to respond to the Vietnamese 
refugee question in a narrow, ungenerous and emotive way, that effort 
would have gone for nothing.60
In its response to the refugee crisis, Australia had lent valuable support 
on an issue of major concern to all of the ASEAN members and it had 
demonstrated a capacity to make a contribution towards participating 
in the resolution of a serious regional problem. An official history of 
Australian–Asian relations has observed that ‘[i]t seems fair to say that 
ASEAN–Australian relations were enhanced by Australia’s refugee 
policies in this period’.61
Australia, ASEAN and the Cambodia conflict 
As ASEAN and Australia were responding to the refugee crisis, 
a  further focus for regional disorder and conflict was emerging in 
Indochina as relations between the regimes in Vietnam and Cambodia 
deteriorated and a new phase of major power competition developed. 
The conflict over Cambodia was to be a major issue for the region and 
in Australian relations with ASEAN for the next 15 years.
A new phase of conflict emerged soon after the communist regimes 
took power in Vietnam and in Cambodia. The radical Khmer Rouge 
regime, which renamed the country Democratic Kampuchea (DK), 
pursued autarkic and nationalist policies that produced large-scale 
losses of life (of an estimated 1.7 million people) within the country and 
60  Minister for Foreign Affairs, news release, M35/IEA 94/77, 28 November 1977.
61  Moreen Dee and Frank Frost, ‘Indochina’, in Peter Edwards and David Goldsworthy, eds, 
Facing North: A Century of Australian Engagement with Asia, Volume 2: 1970s to 2000, Carlton, 
Vic.: Melbourne University Press, 2003, p. 195; see also Viviani, The Long Journey, p. 114.
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also involved substantial hostility towards Vietnam.62 Armed conflict 
took place between the Khmer Rouge regime and Vietnamese forces 
from 1975, and fighting along their disputed border intensified in 1976 
and 1977. During 1978, the Vietnamese leadership decided to launch 
an invasion. On 3 December 1978, a Kampuchean National Salvation 
Front was established with Vietnamese sponsorship and, three weeks 
later, a Vietnamese force, along with some dissident Cambodian allies, 
invaded the country. Phnom Penh was occupied on 7 January 1979 
and the remnants of the Khmer Rouge regime fled to sanctuary in 
Thailand.63
Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia aroused strong concern in Southeast 
Asia and helped fuel a new phase of major power competition. 
The  reaction in ASEAN members was strongly critical of Vietnam. 
Some progress had occurred in Vietnam’s relations with ASEAN after 
1975, in which a series of discussions had served to reduce the extensive 
mutual suspicions that had been a carry-over from the period of the 
Second Indochina War. The invasion of Cambodia, however, was seen 
as posing a considerable security threat to Thailand, and no Southeast 
Asian state was willing to accept the violation of the principle of 
territorial sovereignty that the invasion had represented.64 The ASEAN 
reaction was also affected by the traumatic impact of the refugee crisis 
that was reaching a highpoint in late 1978, when over 200,000 people 
had already arrived in ASEAN member countries. The impact of the 
refugee arrivals intensified suspicion of Vietnam and bolstered the 
tendency within ASEAN to take a hard-line of opposition towards 
the invasion and Vietnam’s presence in Cambodia. From 1979 and 
through the next decade, ASEAN’s efforts to influence developments 
in relation to Cambodia and to secure a Vietnamese withdrawal were 
the centrepiece of its diplomatic activities and significantly increased 
the Association’s international profile.65 
62  Ben Kiernan, The Pol Pot Regime: Race, Power, and Genocide in Cambodia under the Khmer 
Rouge, 1975–79, 3rd edn, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008.
63  Huynh Kim Khanh, ‘Into the Third Indochina War’, Southeast Asian Affairs 1980, 
Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1980, pp. 338–9. For a comprehensive analysis 
of the Cambodia conflict overall, see Nayan Chanda, Brother Enemy: The War After the War, 
New York: Free Press, 1988.
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The conflict fuelled major power competition and involvement. Vietnam 
had moved closer to the Soviet Union in the 1970s and concluded 
a treaty of friendship in November 1978. The Soviet Union and its 
allies supported Vietnam and the new regime it sponsored in Phnom 
Penh. For its part, China had supported the Khmer Rouge regime since 
1975. A bilateral agreement had been concluded in August 1976 and 
China had provided substantial aid to DK. China denounced Vietnam’s 
invasion and in February–March 1979 launched a limited invasion of 
northern Vietnam that failed to dissuade Vietnam from continuing its 
presence in Cambodia, but which caused substantial economic and 
social dislocation in Vietnam.66
For over a decade from 1979, the conflict over Cambodia became the 
dominant political, diplomatic and security problem in Southeast Asia. 
Within Cambodia, the Vietnamese-sponsored regime, the People’s 
Republic of Kampuchea (PRK), whose dominant leader was Hun Sen, 
attempted to promote economic reconstruction and its own political 
consolidation. Vietnam and the PRK regime faced armed opposition 
from three Cambodian resistance movements, operating on and near the 
Thai border: the ousted Khmer Rouge (referred to widely as the ‘Pol Pot 
regime’ after its leading figure); the royalist FUNCINPEC (the National 
United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative 
Cambodia) led by Prince Norodom Sihanouk; and the republican 
KPNLF (Khmer People’s National Liberation Front) led by Son Sann. 
Vietnam and the PRK faced opposition from ASEAN, which refused 
to accept the PRK regime’s legitimacy and worked to deny acceptance 
of the regime internationally and to mobilise support for Vietnam’s 
withdrawal. A key avenue for ASEAN’s diplomacy was sponsorship of 
a resolution in the United Nations (UN) General Assembly calling for 
an immediate ceasefire and the withdrawal of Vietnam’s forces – the 
first such resolution was adopted on 14 November 1979 and ASEAN 
continued to gain large majorities in support of similar resolutions for 
the next decade.67 Cambodia furthermore became the focus of ongoing 
rivalry between the Soviet Union and China (which provided material 
aid to the resistance groups), while other major actors, including 
the US, Japan and the European Community also pursued an active 
66  Simon, ‘Cambodia and Regional Diplomacy’.
67  Ang Cheng Guan, Singapore, ASEAN and the Cambodian Conflict 1978–1991, Singapore: 
NUS Press, 2013, pp. 28–36.
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although mostly less direct interest in the conflict. This pattern of 
conflict became a major issue for Australian policymakers and a focus 
for both cooperation and some tensions in relations with ASEAN.68
The Fraser Government, ASEAN and Cambodia
After coming to office in December 1975, the Fraser Government 
continued the orientation of the Whitlam Government towards 
Indochina, and this was maintained up until late 1978. Australian 
approaches towards ASEAN and the states of Indochina after 1975 
were discussed in late 1976 in an internal Department of Foreign Affairs 
policy planning paper on Australia and Southeast Asia. The paper stated 
that ‘in the next few years there will probably not be much scope for 
an activist Australian policy’ towards Southeast Asia, but argued that 
Australia still had an interest in carefully seeking ‘accommodations 
reached across the “fault-lines” separating Indochina from the ASEAN 
countries’. The paper argued that Australia’s responsibilities under 
the ANZUS (Australia, New Zealand, United States) alliance ‘do not 
necessarily entail an obligation to endorse or acquiesce in particular US 
policies that cut across important Australian interests in the area’, such 
as the ‘hostile attitude’ of the US towards Vietnam, which the paper saw 
as obstructing ‘Australia’s important political interest in attempting 
to minimise the risk of polarisation and confrontation’ in the region. 
The paper considered peaceful social and economic development in 
the ASEAN member countries as Australia’s primary political interest, 
and observed that ‘clearly, Australian political and strategic interests 
in South-East Asia are of major importance as compared with our 
economic interests there, which are still relatively minor, although 
with considerable potential for the future’. With Southeast Asia ‘now 
likely to enjoy greater autonomy within the international political 
system’, Australia ‘should finally drop the concept of reliance on a 
particular major power protecting our interests in South-East Asia, 
and accept the implications of a self-reliant policy there’.69
The Fraser Government from 1976 pursued policies that were in line 
with this suggested approach and that differed significantly from 
those then being pursued by Australia’s ally, the US. The government 
68  Chanda, Brother Enemy; Frank Frost, ‘The Cambodia Conflict: The Path Towards Peace’, 
Contemporary Southeast Asia, 13(2) 1991. 
69  Quoted in Goldsworthy et al., ‘Reorientation’, pp. 346–7.
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emphasised the desirability of trying to prevent the isolation of 
the  Indochinese states through cautious development of diplomatic 
contacts. Minister for Foreign Affairs Peacock stated in April 1977:
We believe … that nothing will be gained by either Australia or 
the region ostracising, ignoring, or setting out to alienate these 
governments. In the case of Vietnam in particular, it will be dangerous 
if it is placed in a position where it feels it can only maintain cordial 
relations with other Communist states.70 
To support engagement, the government initiated a A$6 million aid 
program to Vietnam to be granted over three years. Facilities made 
available for Vietnamese students by the Whitlam Government in 1975 
were continued, and in March 1978 the Fraser Government pledged to 
continue its support for the Mekong Committee of the UN Economic 
and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, a project of benefit to 
Vietnam. The Fraser Government supported Vietnam’s entry into the 
UN (in contrast to prevailing US policy) and Australia received a visit 
from Vietnam’s Deputy Foreign Minister Phan Hien in July 1978 at a 
time when no such visit would have been possible for a Vietnamese 
representative to Washington.71
When reports emerged of border clashes between Vietnam and 
Cambodia from late 1977, the Fraser Government was initially 
cautious. However, the deterioration of Vietnam–Cambodia relations 
in 1978, along with an intensification of Sino-Vietnamese tensions and 
the increased rate of refugee outflows from Vietnam from mid-1978, 
began to change the context of Australian policy. There was particular 
concern at the scale of the outflows from Vietnam and at reports of 
Vietnamese Government involvement.72
When Vietnam invaded Cambodia from 25 December 1978, the Fraser 
Government reacted sharply. On 23 January 1979, Cabinet suspended 
Australia’s aid program to Vietnam and cancelled cultural exchanges.73 
The government denounced Vietnam’s invasion and Australian 
policies quickly became aligned with those of ASEAN in demanding 
the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Cambodia and a halt to the 
70  Carlyle A. Thayer, ‘Australia and Vietnam, 1950–1980, Part II, From Conciliation 
to Condemnation, 1972–1980’, Dyason House Papers, 6(3) 1980: 7.
71  Ibid., pp. 7–8.
72  Ibid.
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refugee exodus. When China launched a limited invasion of northern 
Vietnam on 17 February 1979, Australia’s criticism of China’s actions 
appeared less severe than its condemnation of Vietnam. At the height 
of China’s invasion, Australia received Vice Premier Chen Muhua, the 
most senior Chinese official to visit Australia up to that time. Carlyle 
Thayer commented:
Australian statements on China’s invasion of Vietnam were always 
linked with a condemnation of Vietnam’s actions, and, more 
significantly, with a satisfactory resolution of the Kampuchean 
situation. In brief, the Fraser Government gave the impression that 
while Vietnam had provoked the conflict, China had merely reacted 
to it.74
From early 1979, Australia supported ASEAN’s diplomatic activity in 
the UN. A key part of ASEAN’s strategy was to utilise its capacity 
to mobilise support in the General Assembly to maintain UN 
representation for the ousted Khmer Rouge DK regime and thus to 
gain explicit international backing for ASEAN’s ongoing opposition to 
Vietnam’s invasion through denial of recognition for the pro-Vietnam 
PRK in Phnom Penh. In keeping with ASEAN’s approach, Australia at 
first maintained its recognition of the ousted Khmer Rouge DK regime, 
both bilaterally and in the UN, by voting in support of DK credentials 
in September 1979.75 This aspect of Australian policy, however, became 
the subject of domestic controversy and a clash began to emerge 
between the policies supported by ASEAN and domestic attitudes 
within Australia.
The Pol Pot regime recognition issue
In Australia, the situation in Cambodia had become a matter of 
considerable public interest. The devastation during the Khmer 
Rouge period became even more clear after Vietnam’s invasion and 
the need for humanitarian aid received considerable media attention. 
The  Australian public contributed over A$10 million to relief 
programs. Pressure was exerted for the withdrawal of Australian 
recognition from the ousted Khmer Rouge regime by members of the 
public, the Australian Labor Party, and from within the government’s 
74  Thayer, ‘Australia and Vietnam, 1950–1980’, p. 10.
75  ‘Britain Drops Kampuchea’s Pol Pot Government’, Sydney Morning Herald, 8 December 1979.
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ranks.76 By July 1980, this pressure on the recognition issue had 
become significant enough for Peacock to say in an interview that 
‘the bestiality of that regime [DK] is such that there is no way I can 
allow a feeling of revulsion that exists in the Australian community to 
be simply swept aside’.77 
The recognition issue fuelled tensions within the Fraser Government. 
Peacock strongly favoured the withdrawal of recognition from the DK 
regime, but Fraser and the rest of the Cabinet supported the existing 
policy, based on Australian support for ASEAN’s stance on recognition 
as a source of political pressure in its campaign of opposing Vietnam’s 
presence in Cambodia. Fraser stated to Parliament on 28 August 1980 
that ‘[i]t is not possible to move away from Pol Pot without moving 
a distance towards that Vietnamese-supported regime [the PRK] … 
There is no way of avoiding the fact that a move away from Pol Pot is 
in part an encouragement to the Vietnamese-supported aggression.’78 
After further debate within the government in September 1980 
(particularly between Fraser and Peacock), during which Peacock 
threatened to resign over the issue, the government reached a decision 
on 23 September that recognition would be withdrawn from the DK 
regime in the near future. The issue was a notable case of a clash 
between the government’s commitment to ASEAN’s position on 
Cambodia and the pressures of Australian domestic concerns about 
the human rights issues raised by the record of the Pol Pot regime. 
As a result, Australia changed its position on the recognition issue by 
withdrawing recognition in October 1980.79
On 14 October 1980, Peacock announced that Australia had decided 
on a policy of ‘de-recognition’; he stated that ‘Australia cannot 
prolong its recognition of such a loathsome regime as that of Pol Pot’. 
Formalisation of de-recognition would be delayed for a limited time 
period. This announcement did not affect Australia’s vote in the UN 
in 1980 on the issue of DK credentials; that vote took place just before 
the announcement and Australia voted in favour of DK’s credentials.80 
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The formal bilateral ‘de-recognition’ was brought into effect by 
Australia on 14 February 1981 and, on 28 May 1981, a statement by 
Minister for Foreign Affairs Tony Street (who had replaced Peacock in 
this office) made it clear that in voting at international forums, Australia 
now recognised no Cambodian regime and thus would not support 
recognition of DK. Street added the proviso that if ‘a coherent and 
effective regime truly representative of the Khmer people’ emerged, 
Australia would reconsider its position.81 
The Australian Government’s change of policy on recognition had 
responded to domestic opinion but produced some critical reactions 
from ASEAN, and from China and the US, especially after the May 
1981 announcement on recognition policy at international forums. 
In late May, the policy change was criticised by Singapore’s Deputy 
Prime Minister Sinnathamby Rajaratnam, as one that ‘will certainly 
damage the foreign-policy interests of Australia, seriously question 
its credentials as a reliable ally of those who have taken up the Soviet 
challenge in South-East Asia and bring comfort to the Vietnamese’.82 
At the time of the ASEAN foreign ministers’ meeting in June 1981 in 
Manila, the Philippines foreign minister described Australia as being 
‘recalcitrant’ on the issue, and reservations were also reported to have 
been expressed by US and Chinese officials.83
While Australia maintained support for ASEAN’s policies of opposition 
to Vietnam’s presence in Cambodia, some disagreement continued over 
the ongoing role of the Khmer Rouge. In 1982, ASEAN attempted 
to ameliorate the issue of the unpopularity of the Khmer Rouge by 
supporting the development of a coalition government in exile that 
included the Khmer Rouge along with the two non-communist 
resistance parties, FUNCINPEC and the KPNLF. This resulted in the 
inauguration of the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea 
(CGDK) in June 1982. While the Fraser Government welcomed moves 
to establish a coalition, it continued to be concerned that such a process 
should not lead to a situation in which the Khmer Rouge could regain 
81  Minister for Foreign Affairs, news release, M58, 28 May 1981.
82  ‘Our Stand on Kampuchea Criticised’, The Mercury (Hobart), 1 June 1981.
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power in Cambodia.84 Prime Minister Fraser, after talks with Chinese 
Premier Zhao Ziyang on 9 August 1982, reaffirmed that Australia 
would not support the new coalition if it were used merely as a front 
for a re-emergence of the Khmer Rouge under Pol Pot. Fraser said, 
‘I put the view very strongly that if international support is wanted 
for the coalition, it is going to be much easier to obtain if the figure of 
Pol Pot is not part of it’. He added, ‘there is fairly general acceptance 
that an independent, non-aligned government under the leadership of 
Prince Sihanouk would be the best final outcome’.85
Although this statement by Fraser indicated that Australia was 
most unlikely to change its policy on recognition in 1982 and would 
therefore not be willing to support UN recognition for the Cambodian 
coalition, ASEAN officials renewed efforts to achieve such a policy 
change in the weeks leading up to the 1982 credentials debate in the 
UN. In early August 1982, Thailand’s Foreign Minister, Air Chief 
Marshall Siddhi Savetsila, said in an interview that Australia’s refusal 
to recognise the CGDK was a ‘strong disappointment’ to ASEAN.86 
In early September 1982, Malaysia’s Foreign Minister, Tan Sri Ghazali 
Shafie, made a visit to Canberra to personally put ASEAN’s case for 
the extension of recognition to the Cambodian opposition coalition.87 
In early October, the ASEAN heads of mission in Canberra presented 
a letter to Street from the ASEAN Standing Committee reiterating 
ASEAN’s request for Australian support at the UN on the recognition 
question.88
On the recognition issue, however, Australia did not accede to the 
ASEAN request for a change of policy. For the remainder of the period 
of the Fraser Government, and subsequently under the Hawke Labor 
Government, Australia abstained in the UN General Assembly vote 
on the credentials of the CGDK whenever that issue arose.89 Australia 
in this period had thus needed to manage a substantial difference of 
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87  Peter Hastings, ‘Australia Remains Cool on Kampuchea Coalition’, Sydney Morning Herald, 
9 September 1982.
88  John Bryant, ‘Australian Support Canvassed’, Canberra Times, 2 October 1982.
89  Ken Berry, Cambodia from Red to Blue: Australia’s Initiative for Peace, St Leonards, NSW: 
Allen & Unwin, in association with the Department of International Relations, The Australian 
National University, 1997, pp. 5–6.
63
2 . ECoNomIC DISPUTES AND ThE ThIRD INDoChINA WAR
policy with ASEAN while maintaining support for ASEAN’s overall 
approach towards Cambodia. Australia’s preparedness to adopt a 
policy position on Cambodia different to that of ASEAN was notable 
and can be seen in that sense as a prelude to the approaches that were 
to be pursued from 1983 by the incoming Labor Government.90
Conclusion
The period of the Fraser Government saw ASEAN assume a higher 
profile in Australian relations with Southeast Asia and in Australian 
foreign policy overall. Australia’s links with ASEAN developed 
further, and substantial cooperation was achieved in dealing with the 
regional crisis over refugee outflows from Indochina and over ASEAN’s 
response to the Cambodia conflict. However, greater closeness meant 
that differences had more significance. In disputes over trade and 
market access, the Australian Government improved communication 
with ASEAN but did not substantively alter trade policies. In relation 
to Cambodia, while the government was supportive of ASEAN’s overall 
position in opposing Vietnam’s invasion, it disagreed with ASEAN 
on the role of the Khmer Rouge. Domestic public opinion forced 
Australia’s withdrawal of recognition from the Khmer Rouge regime, 
causing discord with ASEAN. The issue of Cambodia continued to be 
a central element in Australian diplomacy with ASEAN in the next 
phase of foreign relations under the Labor Government that replaced 
the Fraser administration from March 1983.




Regional activism and the end 
of the Cold War (1983–1996)
The Australian election of 5 March 1983 ushered in a new phase in 
Australian relations with Southeast Asia and with the Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Australia’s domestic priorities 
shifted towards economic reform, which produced liberalisation of 
major sectors of the financial system, and ultimately more open trade 
policies. The Labor Government maintained a strong commitment to 
the US alliance while seeking deeper engagement with both Southeast 
and Northeast Asia. The context for ASEAN and for Australian 
policies was affected by profound changes in the international system 
at the end of the 1980s, when Cold War tensions and relationships 
were replaced by a more fluid environment. New challenges arose 
but avenues opened up for greater regional multilateral cooperation. 
All these developments had substantial implications for Australia’s 
relations with ASEAN. To explore these issues, this chapter discusses 
in turn the Bob Hawke and Paul Keating governments’ approaches to 
Asia, Australia’s policies and diplomatic initiatives in relation to the 
Cambodian conflict, the decline in Cold War confrontation and the 
development of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) group 
and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and the state of Australia’s 
ASEAN relations in the early 1990s.
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The Hawke and Keating governments 
and Asian relations
When the Hawke Government assumed office, it maintained 
considerable continuity with the preceding Malcolm Fraser 
Government in foreign relations. The Labor Government reaffirmed 
the primacy of the US alliance as a central pillar of foreign policy. 
There was substantial continuity in key areas of Australia’s Asia 
relations. The Labor Government maintained a strong emphasis 
on the relationship with Indonesia although there was substantial 
disquiet within the Australian Labor Party (ALP), and more widely 
in the Australian community, about East Timor. In Northeast Asia, the 
Labor governments maintained close relations with Japan and worked 
to advance linkages with China.1 By the late 1980s, the increasing 
significance of the growth of the Chinese and other Northeast 
Asian economies was emphasised by a report commissioned by the 
government that called for major changes in Australia’s own economic 
practices to enable a closer and prosperous economic relationship to 
flourish.2
Important areas of policy difference and development that emerged 
after 1983 were driven by Labor’s concerns about the impact of 
international economic developments and about Australia’s economic 
competitiveness. The Hawke Government (with Keating as Treasurer) 
inaugurated a series of changes that included the floating of the dollar 
and the liberalisation of financial markets. Through the 1980s, the 
government was highly aware of the problems posed for Australia’s 
primary commodity exports in agriculture by protectionist policies 
in the United States and the European Union (EU). The pursuit of 
multilateral cooperation was very important to the government, both 
internationally and regionally. One manifestation of this was the 
creation of a multilateral grouping to combat protectionist practices, 
1  For an overview of this period in Australian foreign policy, see Stewart Firth, Australia in 
International Politics: An Introduction to Australian Foreign Policy, 3rd edn, Crows Nest, NSW: 
Allen & Unwin, 2011, pp. 30–51.
2  Ross Garnaut, Australia and the Northeast Asian Ascendancy: Report to the Prime Minister 
and the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, Canberra: Australian Government Publishing 
Service, 1989.
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the Cairns Group of Agricultural Fair Traders, which campaigned for 
more favourable treatment for agricultural producers in international 
trade negotiations.3 A second major area of attention became the 
cooperation efforts that led to the APEC grouping (discussed below). 
In the latter period of the Labor Government, economic reforms were 
extended to encompass major reductions in tariffs. International 
challenges drove domestic changes, and that shifting domestic agenda 
encouraged international activism.
In defence and security, the Hawke Government sponsored a 
reassessment of Australia’s defence priorities to reorient policy towards 
self-reliance while remaining within the US alliance. From the late 
1980s, the government placed special emphasis on the desirability of 
deeper networks of defence cooperation with neighbouring countries, 
notably in Southeast Asia.4
Australia, ASEAN and the Cambodian 
conflict
In this overall context, the Labor Government from 1983 sought to 
emphasise relations with Southeast Asia. Hawke has written that 
when he came to office, he and Minister for Foreign Affairs Bill Hayden 
‘agreed that under our Government our involvement with the South-
East Asian region should be enhanced. Australia was particularly close 
to the ASEAN … countries. And thanks to the intelligent approach 
of my two immediate predecessors, Whitlam and Fraser, we enjoyed 
good relations with China.’5 The government had also come to office 
with an interest in the conflict over Cambodia and this issue rapidly 
came to dominate Australia’s ASEAN diplomacy and relationships. 
3  Gareth Evans and Bruce Grant, Australia’s Foreign Relations in the World of the 1990s, 2nd 
edn, Carlton, Vic.: Melbourne University Press, 1995, pp. 124–5.
4  Ibid., pp. 104–19. 




Indochina policies 1983–88: Seeking an 
independent role
The ALP in Opposition had disagreed with the Fraser Government’s 
policy approach to both Vietnam and Cambodia after 1979.6 While the 
ALP leaders criticised Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia and did not 
advocate recognition of the new regime in Phnom Penh, the People’s 
Republic of Kampuchea (PRK), they had opposed the cancellation of 
aid to Vietnam by the Fraser Government. In January 1979, Opposition 
leader Hayden argued that the suspension of aid to Vietnam was 
neither wise nor constructive and would weaken Australia’s influence 
with the Vietnamese Government.7 
The ALP welcomed the Fraser Government’s withdrawal of diplomatic 
recognition of the Khmer Rouge Democratic Kampuchea opposition 
movement in 1981, but continued to advocate revised Australian 
policies towards Indochina. Labor policy advocated that the Australian 
Government should support independent and democratic Indochinese 
regimes, that Australia’s aid to Vietnam should be reinstated, and that 
Australia should discourage all support to the ‘Pol Pot forces’ and 
no recognition should be given, bilaterally or multilaterally, to any 
coalition involving the Pol Pot forces. Australia should provide cultural 
and developmental assistance to Cambodia and a Labor Government 
should encourage regional solutions to Indochina’s problems with 
reduced great power involvement.8
When the ALP came to office after the elections in March 1983, 
the new government moved to revise Australia’s policies towards 
Southeast Asia and Indochina. However, the high levels of regional 
and international sensitivities involved were soon apparent. When 
the new government suggested that it might fulfil its commitment 
to restore bilateral aid to Vietnam, ASEAN officials expressed strong 
6  This section draws in part from Frank Frost, ‘Labor and Cambodia’, in David Lee and 
Christopher Waters, eds, Evatt to Evans: The Labor Tradition in Australian Foreign Policy, 
St Leonards, NSW: Allen & Unwin, in association with the Department of International Relations, 
The Australian National University, 1997.
7  Susan Woods, ‘Govt Denies Peacock Bypassed on Vietnam Decision’, Australian Financial 
Review, 25 January 1979.
8  Australian Labor Party, Platform, Constitution and Rules as Approved by the 35th National 
Conference, Canberra: Australian Labor Party, 1982, pp. 83–4.
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concern.9 China’s Premier Zhao Ziyang made it clear that China 
opposed any provision of aid.10 After consultations with a number 
of governments including the members of ASEAN, the government 
indicated in June 1983 that Australia would not make any early move 
to restore bilateral aid to Vietnam.11
However, the Hawke Government decided to try to pursue an initiative 
in relation to Indochina by exploring dialogue on Cambodia. In his 
memoirs, Hawke wrote:
[O]ne of the most important initiatives of my entire prime ministership 
was our diplomatic effort to help bring about a lasting peace in the 
tragic, conflict-ridden country of Cambodia … Both Hayden and 
I were acutely aware of the obstacles ahead. ASEAN had arisen from 
the instability in Indo-China and the intrusion of the Soviet Union and 
China into the affairs of the region; its members remained suspicious 
of Vietnam and the two communist giants. The antagonism between 
China and Vietnam stretched back a thousand years. Cambodia itself 
remained sunk in conflict, with an uneasy alliance of forces arranged 
against the puppet Hun Sen regime. Our knowledge of and closeness 
to the regional players had its advantages, but understanding the 
range of their conflicting interests meant that Australia’s diplomacy 
would have to be deft in the extreme.12
Hayden (Minister for Foreign Affairs March 1983 – August 1988) 
subsequently wrote that he had initial reservations about the proposal:
The aim was to facilitate a process of dialogue leading to a peaceful 
settlement of the warring inside and near the borders of Kampuchea.13 
I regarded the proposal with some caution. There were a great number 
of differences between many of these parties and some had large 
political interests at stake. Australia strolling into this particular pastry 
shop and upsetting the wares so carefully if unsteadily arranged, 
could well be disastrous.14
9  Peter Samuel, ‘Labor’s Support for Vietnam Aid Sparks ASEAN Outcry’, The Australian, 
17 March 1983. 
10  Wio Joustra, ‘Zhao Plans Tough Talk on Our Aid to Vietnam’, The Australian, 15 April 1983.
11  Mike Steketee, ‘Timor, Viet Aid: Hawke Goes Alone’, Sydney Morning Herald, 6 June 1983.
12  Hawke, The Hawke Memoirs, pp. 222–4.
13  ‘Kampuchea’ is the name of the country in the Khmer language. This name was used 
officially by the Khmer Rouge (who named their regime Democratic Kampuchea) and by the 
regime which replaced it after Vietnam’s invasion in December 1978 (the People’s Republic of 
Kampuchea). That regime renamed the country the State of Cambodia in 1989 and Cambodia has 
since continued to be used as the country’s official name.
14  Bill Hayden, Hayden: An Autobiography, Sydney: Angus & Robertson, 1996, p. 380.
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Hayden also thought that Hawke was interested in pursuing the 
Cambodian initiative at least in part because it was a way of deflecting 
attention within the ALP over the sensitive issue of the status of and 
situation in East Timor.15
Whatever Hayden’s reservations, he pursued the government’s policies 
towards Indochina and Southeast Asia. He cautiously developed 
bilateral relations with Vietnam (which came to include aid donated 
through multilateral agencies).16 Hayden also laid the basis for an effort 
towards dialogue over Cambodia. In a policy statement on Indochina 
to Parliament on 7 December 1983, Hayden set out a rationale for the 
government’s interests in relation to Cambodia. He argued that there 
existed a ‘new form of stalemate in Indo-China which offers further 
risks of instability and of great power involvement in the region’.17 
ASEAN had the strength and unity to stand behind Thailand and the 
Cambodian coalition in their resistance to Vietnam; while on the other 
hand, Vietnam could take comfort from the fact that the situation on 
the ground in Cambodia was largely in its favour despite resistance 
to its occupation, especially in the border areas. The ongoing conflict 
over Cambodia, Hayden argued, imposed a continuing refugee 
problem, prevented recovery within Cambodia and involved the 
ongoing dilemma of growing Soviet influence, particularly because 
of Vietnam’s reliance on Soviet assistance to sustain its military effort. 
To address this array of problems, Hayden set out the principles 
that Australia regarded as necessary in seeking détente and ultimate 
settlement. Australia would seek to pursue a comprehensive Cambodian 
solution based on the acceptance by Vietnam of an appropriate 
accommodation with its neighbours; phased withdrawal of Vietnamese 
troops from Cambodia matched by an effective arrangement to 
prevent Khmer Rouge forces going back into Cambodia; an act of 
self-determination for Cambodia; the creation of conditions for the 
peaceful return of displaced Cambodians to Cambodia; the acceptance 
15  Ibid., p. 382.
16  Michelle Grattan, ‘PM Resumes Disaster Aid to the Viets’, The Age, 22 November 1983.
17  Bill Hayden, ‘Australia and Indo-China’, Ministerial Statement, in Commonwealth 
of  Australia Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Official Hansard, No. 134, 
7 December 1983, p. 3407.
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by all parties that Cambodia should be neutral, independent and non-
aligned; and the restoration of normal relations on the part of Vietnam 
with China, ASEAN and the West.18
Hayden explored the concepts he had outlined in a series of 
discussions with the principal parties involved in the Cambodian 
conflict, including the ASEAN members, Vietnam, Laos and China. 
Hayden and the Australian Government encountered considerable 
resistance from both ASEAN and China in attempting to assert a more 
independent Australian approach: Hayden acknowledged later that 
‘[a]t the beginning it was all rather rough going’.19 When Australia 
withdrew its co-sponsorship of the annual ASEAN resolution on 
Cambodia in the United Nations (UN) General Assembly in October 
1983 (because the government disagreed with some of the wording 
and did not wish to be seen to be auto matically endorsing all ASEAN 
positions), this was regarded as a breach of solidarity by the ASEAN 
members.20 Hayden met with a negative ASEAN response when in July 
1984 at the annual ASEAN ministerial meetings he proposed informal 
talks between ASEAN, Vietnam and Laos and offered Australia as 
a venue.21 
By 1985, it was clear that it was difficult for Australia to make much 
headway in seeking dialogue on Cambodia in the prevailing climate of 
regional and international confrontation. Hayden found considerable 
variation in individual attitudes towards the feasibility of negotiations, 
with Malaysia and Indonesia relatively more sympathetic to Australia’s 
efforts than Thailand or Singapore, but ASEAN as a group had a 
major stake in Cambodia and was committed to retaining solidarity, 
18  Ibid., pp. 3404–9.
19  Hayden, Hayden, p. 382.
20  Malaysia’s Foreign Minister Tan Sri Ghazali Shafie walked out of the UN General Assembly 
chamber while Hayden was speaking. See Nicholas Rothwell, ‘Malaysia Walks Out as Hayden 
Speaks’, The Australian, 4 October 1983.
21  Michael Richardson, ‘Hayden Rebuffed on Kampuchea Proposal’, The Age, 14 July 1984. 
On the first phase of the Labor Government’s Cambodian policies, see also Joint Committee 
on Foreign Affairs and Defence, Australia and ASEAN: Challenges and Opportunities, Report, 
Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1984, pp. 37–56.
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resisting dilution of their stand.22 Hayden continued to try to insert 
new ideas into the debate. A series of three seminars on Cambodia 
were held at Griffith University (Queensland) that brought together 
representatives of all major contending parties (except the Khmer 
Rouge). In 1986, Hayden proposed that a tribunal be instituted to try 
Khmer Rouge figures on charges of genocide as a way of improving 
the climate for reconciliation. The idea aroused interest but was not 
adopted.23
By 1988, after five years of diplomatic activity, the efforts to promote 
dialogue over Cambodia had raised Australia’s profile as a concerned 
regional participant but had produced little result. Ken Berry later 
commented:
The policies pursued by Bill Hayden did not, at the end of the day, 
achieve any breakthrough or substantive shift in the position of the 
major participants in a Cambodian settlement. But they did manage to 
impart a sense of urgency to the effort to find a solution. Indeed, it was 
ironic in some ways that Australia’s virtual isolation on the question of 
non-recognition stood it in good stead when putting forward its peace 
initiative in 1989, since the country was clearly not aligned to any 
of the major powers or their client Cambodian factions.24
Australia’s Cambodia initiatives: 1988–91
Towards the end of Hayden’s tenure as foreign minister, major changes 
in the pattern of major power relationships began to exercise strong 
influences at the regional level in Southeast Asia. A key catalyst 
internationally was the impact of President Mikhail Gorbachev’s 
policies in the Soviet Union. Gorbachev’s speech in Vladivostok in 
July 1986 introduced a new era of flexibility in foreign relations as 
the Soviet Union sought to curtail costly foreign involvements. Moves 
intensified for Sino-Soviet détente. Vietnam was stimulated by internal 
22  Hayden, Hayden, pp. 380–1; Philip O’Brien, ‘The Making of Australia’s Indochina Policies 
Under the Labor Government (1983–1986): The Politics of Circumspection?’ Australia–Asia Papers 
No. 39, Nathan, Qld: Centre for the Study of Australian–Asian Relations, Griffith University, 
September 1987, p. 20. For a concise summary of the individual ASEAN members’ approaches to 
the Cambodia issue, see Ken Berry, Cambodia from Red to Blue: Australia’s Initiative for Peace, St 
Leonards, NSW: Allen & Unwin, in association with the Department of International Relations, 
The Australian National University, 1997, pp. 52–5.
23  O’Brien, ‘The Making of Australia’s Indochina Policies’, p. 21; Berry, Cambodia from Red 
to Blue, pp. 6–7.
24  Berry, Cambodia from Red to Blue, p. 7.
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economic problems, and by the example of the Soviet Union, to pursue 
extensive domestic economic reforms from 1986; this process began to 
create new incentives for ending the drain of the Cambodian conflict 
and enabling wider foreign relations to be developed.25 
Perspectives also began to be revised within ASEAN. A series 
of negotiations among the Cambodian parties was initiated with 
ASEAN’s support at the end of 1987, when Prince Norodom Sihanouk 
and PRK Premier Hun Sen held discussions. In July 1988, further 
negotiations occurred when ASEAN’s largest member, Indonesia, 
hosted informal multilateral talks among the Cambodian parties, along 
with the other ASEAN members and Vietnam and Laos.26 From 1988, 
the Thai Government, led by Prime Minister Chatichai Choonhaven, 
feeling more confident about Thailand’s security position after more 
than a decade of high economic growth and with the Thai Communist 
Party neutralised, began to pursue more conciliatory policies towards 
Vietnam and the Cambodian conflict.27 In this more flexible atmosphere, 
new opportunities opened for cooperation between Australia and 
ASEAN over Cambodia. 
The pace of negotiations increased from the end of July 1989, with 
the convening of the Paris International Conference on Cambodia. 
The conference met for one month and was attended by the four 
Cambodian factions, the six ASEAN members, the ‘Permanent Five’ 
members of the UN Security Council (China, France, the Soviet Union, 
the United Kingdom and the United States), Vietnam, Laos, Australia, 
Canada, India, Zimbabwe (representing the Non-Aligned Movement) 
and a representative of the UN Secretary-General. Indonesia 
continued its active role in the negotiation effort as co-chair of the 
conference. The conference developed a general blueprint for peace 
that involved, essentially, the monitored withdrawal of all Vietnamese 
forces, a ceasefire, the cessation of external support, the creation of 
a transitional administration, and the holding of free elections, all 
under the supervision of an international control mechanism. It also 
involved measures to guarantee the neutrality of Cambodia and 
25  MacAlister Brown and Joseph J. Zasloff, Cambodia Confounds the Peacemakers, 1979–1998, 
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998, pp. 34–42.
26  Berry, Cambodia from Red to Blue, p. 7.




non-interference in its internal affairs, to deal with the repatriation of 
refugees and displaced persons, and to provide for reconstruction in 
Cambodia.28
The Paris conference confronted the continuing deep suspicion and 
hostilities among the Cambodian parties and their main external 
backers. As a result, at the end of August 1989, the Paris conference 
was forced to suspend its proceedings without having achieved a 
compre hensive settlement. Vietnam, facing a decline in economic and 
military assistance from the Soviet Union and anxious to extricate 
itself from Cambodia, announced its withdrawal of combat forces from 
Cambodia, and in September 1989 declared this process completed. 
However, since the Paris conference had been suspended without 
agreement, there was no internationally recognised procedure for the 
monitoring of Vietnam’s withdrawal or for confirmation that it had 
occurred. The stage was thus set for ongoing conflict in Cambodia.29
It was at this point, in late 1989, that Australia intensified its efforts to 
facilitate negotiations. As former Minister for Foreign Affairs Gareth 
Evans later recalled, he sought to continue and expand the efforts that 
had been made by Hayden: 
Bill was very actively involved with … trying to create a relationship 
with Vietnam and to work on Vietnam–ASEAN issues and … that was 
when Cambodia first started featuring in our policy landscape because 
Bill took it very seriously as an issue and I  really just built on the 
initial work that he’d done.30
Australian policymakers, led by Evans, focused on what they saw 
as the key stumbling block: the issue of the composition of the 
transitional administration in Cambodia. The resistance forces of 
Prince Sihanouk, Son Sann and the Khmer Rouge, together with 
their international backers, were continuing to demand a place for 
28  Berry, Cambodia from Red to Blue, pp. 14–20. 
29  Ibid.
30  Gareth Evans, interview with the author, Canberra, 2 July 2014.
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each of the four internal parties, including the Khmer Rouge, in the 
transitional administration. This was a demand rejected by the PRK 
Government of Hun Sen and its international backers.31
Building on initial suggestions by Prince Sihanouk and US 
Congressman Stephen Solarz, Australia suggested an enhanced role 
for the UN in the transitional process (a proposal first announced on 
24 November 1989). To sidestep the power-sharing issue that had 
confounded the Paris conference, and to constrain the role of the 
Khmer Rouge, Australia proposed that the UN be directly involved in 
the civil administration of Cambodia during the transitional period. 
A UN military presence to monitor the ceasefire, cessation of external 
military assistance, a UN role in organising and conducting elections, 
and UN involvement in the transitional administrative arrangements 
would, it was hoped, ensure a neutral political environment conducive 
to free and fair general elections.32
Evans recognised that the Australian proposals involved a more 
ambitious and complicated role for the UN than any it had attempted 
before. Nonetheless, the concept of an enhanced UN role in the 
transitional period of a peace settlement for Cambodia rapidly gained 
support. Australia devoted extensive diplomatic efforts to advance 
it. From December 1989, Senator Evans’s envoy, Michael Costello, 
engaged in a major series of consultations. A departmental task force, 
under the direction of Evans, drew up a detailed set of scenarios and 
plans for a UN role in Cambodia, and these papers were presented to 
a meeting of the ASEAN members, the Cambodian parties, Vietnam 
and Laos in February 1990 (the Jakarta Informal Meeting). These were 
then published and became known – because of the colour of the 
cover – as the ‘Red Book’.33
31  Evans provided a detailed account of the origins of Australia’s proposals in a speech to the 
Senate in December 1990; see Gareth Evans, ‘Prospects for a Cambodian Peace Settlement’, 
Ministerial Statement, in Commonwealth of Australia Parliamentary Debates, Senate, Official 
Hansard, No. 142, 6 December 1990.
32  Ibid.
33  Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Cambodia: An Australian Peace 
Proposal, working papers prepared for the Informal Meeting on Cambodia, Jakarta, 26–28 
February 1990, Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service for the Australian 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 1990.
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The decline of Cold War confrontation had created a greatly improved 
climate for detailed discussions on Cambodia. Australia was now 
able to play the kind of facilitation role that Hawke and Hayden had 
hoped for from 1983. An important factor in the new climate was that 
Australia was able to cooperate actively with the ASEAN members in 
pursuing a settlement. Indonesia, in particular, had taken the initiative 
in sponsoring the informal talks on Cambodia from 1988, and was co-
chairman of the Paris conference. The Australian Government placed 
special emphasis on operating in close cooperation with Indonesia 
and with Foreign Minister Ali Alatas. Senator Evans’s envoy kept in 
close contact with Alatas, informing him of every step in Australia’s 
diplomatic efforts.34 Evans has emphasised the crucial role played by 
Indonesia and by Alatas in particular:
Alatas felt that he had to carry ASEAN with him and there was a 
lot of consultation … others were significant voices but none were 
as remotely significant or as consistently engaged as Indonesia and 
without Indonesia … and Alatas’ personal role I don’t think ASEAN 
would have been anything like a coherent player delivering effective 
results.35
Australia was able to turn its status as a middle-ranking power into 
an advantage in seeking a settlement. As Berry observed:
Our coalition-building in this case meant working from the outset with 
Indonesia and the other ASEANs, all five Permanent Members of the 
UN Security Council (the P5), Vietnam and the four Cambodia factions 
themselves. The fact that Australia came to the process without the 
political and other baggage normally associated with superpower or 
major power status meant that the various central parties were more 
prepared to listen and be less suspicious of our proposals.36
From early 1990, the concept of a UN transitional authority as part 
of a comprehensive settlement gained widespread acceptance. The P5 
adopted the concept in August 1990, as did the Cambodian parties in 
November. After further tortuous negotiations, the way was cleared 
for the development of the Paris Agreements, which were signed 
on 23 October 1991, and for the deployment of the United Nations 
Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) in February 1992. 
34  Michael Costello, ‘Cambodia: A Diplomatic Memoir’, Sydney Papers, 6(3) 1994: 104.
35  Evans, interview with the author,  July 2014.
36  Ken Berry, ‘UNTAC as a Paradigm: A Flawed Success’, Pacifica Review, 7(2) 1995: 89.
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While UNTAC faced formidable difficulties in many areas, it was able 
to implement key aspects of the Paris Agreements and organised and 
conducted elections in May 1993, which led to the inauguration of a 
new Royal Government of Cambodia.37
Australia made a substantial contribution to UNTAC and to supporting 
the peace process. Australia provided 495 military personnel to 
support UNTAC’s communications capacity and Australian police 
and civil officials served with UNTAC. In May 1993, when there 
were concerns about the potential for disruption of the forthcoming 
elections, Australia contributed an additional 100 military personnel 
and six Blackhawk helicopters to boost UNTAC’s transport capacities.38 
Australians also served in some key roles in UNTAC, including 
Lieutenant-General John Sanderson in the crucial position of military 
commander. Lieutenant-General Sanderson’s position as head of the 
diverse multinational UNTAC military component was one of the 
most prominent roles ever assumed by an Australian in Southeast 
Asia. Berry has observed that ‘the overall successful conclusion of the 
Cambodia operation can in large measure be attributed to the counsels 
and calming assessments of the UNTAC military component leadership 
in Phnom Penh’.39
The achievements of the Paris Agreements and of the UN involvement 
in Cambodia were clearly mixed. Within Cambodia, poverty and 
dislocation continued and the uneasy governing coalition broke down 
after the parties and forces led by Hun Sen and by Prince Norodom 
Ranariddh came into violent conflict in 1997, and Hun Sen and his 
party emerged as dominant in the country.40 However, at the regional 
and international levels, the peace process advocated by Australia and 
ASEAN produced results. The Paris Agreements enabled both Vietnam 
and China to decisively withdraw from their active support for the 
contending Cambodian warring parties. The period after 1991 saw 
Vietnam and China pursue a substantial (although not trouble-free) 
redevelopment of relations, Vietnam and the United States normalised 
relations in July 1995, Vietnam and the ASEAN members transcended 
37  Ibid.; Brown and Zasloff, Cambodia Confounds the Peacemakers, pp. 269–300.
38  Frank Frost, ‘The Peace Process in Cambodia: Issues and Prospects’, Australia–Asia Paper 
No. 69, Nathan, Qld: Centre for the Study of Australian–Asian Relations, Griffith University, 
1993, pp. 43–7.
39  Berry, Cambodia from Red to Blue, p. 328.
40  Brown and Zasloff, Cambodia Confounds the Peacemakers, pp. 239–68.
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their former animosity to become partners in ASEAN itself (on 28 July 
1995), and Cambodia gained a government able to attract international 
recognition and to pursue a gradually increasing involvement in 
regional affairs, including ASEAN membership in 1999.41 
All of these regional and international developments were striking 
and productive, and it is likely that none could have been achieved 
without the Paris Agreements. The Cambodian negotiations involved 
a number of key participants, but ASEAN and Australia played 
major parts in the process. Australia was able to provide ideas and 
policymaking resources, and Australian diplomatic communications, 
including the consultations conducted by Evans and by Costello, were 
significant contributions. Without the dialogue and communication 
between Australia and ASEAN, and with Indonesia in particular, 
the peace process might well not have been developed. The issue of 
Cambodia was a substantial instance where Australia and ASEAN 
cooperated on a major issue of security and regional concern and 
achieved a significant outcome.
Australia, ASEAN and APEC 
The decline of Cold War confrontation, which had facilitated 
efforts towards a Cambodia settlement, also encouraged interest in 
the formation of new regional groupings to enhance economic and 
security cooperation. Australia and ASEAN played important roles in 
the advent of both the APEC process and the ARF. In each case, the 
establishment of the new groupings in this period involved extensive 
dialogue and cooperation between Australia and ASEAN. They also 
involved elements of tension as Australia’s interests in pursuing 
cooperation with a focus encompassing countries both in East Asia and 
more widely (including the United States) produced some sensitivities 
with ASEAN over its desire to protect its corporate identity.
As noted in Chapter 2, Australia and ASEAN had clashed over trade 
and economic relations in the 1970s and early 1980s, but they had 
by the late 1980s increased bases for common interests in these 
areas. Both Australia and a number of ASEAN members had moved 
41  Berry, Cambodia from Red to Blue, pp. 311–16; Frost, ‘The Peace Process in Cambodia’, 
pp. 48–50. 
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to liberalise their economies to maximise prospects for growth. They 
shared concerns about market access for exports to their major trading 
partners. These concerns fed interest in new avenues to promote trade 
cooperation. One reflection of this, as has been noted, was Australia’s 
initiative to establish a grouping of agricultural exporters to seek 
more favourable treatment for these commodities in international 
trade negotiations. The Cairns Group of Agricultural Fair Traders was 
established in 1986, and since its membership included four ASEAN 
member countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand), 
it helped to broaden the bases for common interests between Australia 
and Southeast Asian countries.42
Ideas for economic cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region had been 
promoted by non-governmental groups and by elements in some major 
economies from the 1960s, including in Japan and Australia. Interest 
was advanced by the Pacific Basin Economic Council (formed in 1967) 
and by the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC) (inaugurated 
in 1980 in Canberra), which brought together both non-government 
and official representatives (in a private capacity).43 
Support for new efforts in cooperation was bolstered in the late 1980s 
by heightened concern about the emergence of trading blocs that 
seemed to threaten the interests of regional economies. In Europe, the 
already protectionist EU was moving towards its Final Unification Act 
and was developing new connections with Eastern Europe. In North 
America, the US, Canada and Mexico were pursuing negotiations 
for a North American Free Trade Agreement. In Australia, there 
were concerns that the US and Japan might arrive at arrangements 
to handle their economic relations problems that excluded other 
Asia-Pacific economies. In Southeast Asia there were added concerns 
that capital from Western Europe might flow heavily towards the 
Eastern European states, to the detriment of investment in ASEAN. 
Singapore’s Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew expressed widespread views 
42  On the Cairns Group, see Jiro Okamoto, Australia’s Foreign Economic Policy and ASEAN, 
Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2010, pp. 146–9.
43  Donald Crone, ‘The Politics of Emerging Pacific Cooperation’, Pacific Affairs, 65(1) 1992: 70; 
Amitav Acharya, The Making of Southeast Asia: International Relations of a Region, Singapore: 
ISEAS Publishing, 2012, pp. 224–7.
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in the region when he said in July 1989 that ‘major trading nations 
were moving away from the multilateral trading system’ towards more 
restrictive blocs.44
There was strong interest in Japan in pursuing regional economic 
cooperation that could bolster trade in the face of discriminatory 
regionalism in Europe and North America. In August 1988, a report 
was  issued by a study group sponsored by the Ministry for 
International Trade and Industry advocating ‘new forms of economic 
cooperation’ in the Asia-Pacific region.45 However, in both Japan and 
Australia it was considered that it would not be feasible for Japan itself 
to attempt to take the lead in advocating a new form of cooperation, 
given ongoing sensitivities in East and Southeast Asia about Japan’s 
regional role. Takashi Terada wrote that ‘it would be better for a 
small non-threatening country like Australia to launch a new regional 
initiative, without too many specifics about the nature of proposed 
cooperation’.46
Australia under the Hawke Government had developed strong 
interests in contributing towards economic cooperation in a ‘region’ 
that could encompass the economies of Southeast and Northeast 
Asia and potentially the US. Australia had been frustrated at the 
slow progress of the Uruguay Round multilateral trade negotiations, 
particularly in agriculture. With concerns rising in the late 1980s 
about a possible trade war between the US and the EU, the Hawke 
Government hoped that an outward-looking Asia-Pacific grouping 
might counter this trend. The government considered that Australia’s 
financial and manufacturing sectors would benefit from additional 
international competition and would be better placed to gain 
advantages from interaction with the East Asian economies.47 Hawke 
took the initiative by introducing a proposal for a form of Asia-
Pacific economic cooperation in a speech in Seoul on 30 January 
1989, calling for ‘a more formal intergovernmental vehicle for regional 
cooperation’.48 Reviewing earlier initiatives, Hawke said that although 
44  Crone, ‘The Politics of Emerging Pacific Cooperation’, p. 73.
45  Rawdon Dalrymple, Continental Drift: Australia’s Search for a Regional Identity, Aldershot: 
Ashgate, 2003, p. 85.
46  Quoted in ibid.
47  Hawke, The Hawke Memoirs, pp. 232–3.
48  Joseph A. Camilleri, Regionalism in the New Asia-Pacific Order: The Political Economy of the 
Asia-Pacific Region, Volume II, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2003, p. 128.
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PECC ‘had illuminated large areas of common interest within the 
region’, its informality meant that it could not readily ‘address policy 
issues which are properly the responsibility of Governments’.49 
The attitudes of ASEAN members would be crucial to the prospects 
for any new regional forum. Before 1989, ASEAN members had 
opposed any new cooperative grouping. In July 1984 for example, 
Indonesia’s Foreign Minister Dr Mochtar Kusmaatmaja stated that 
ASEAN had ‘no intention’ of considering any new forum, which was 
‘too difficult’ and ‘not practical’.50 Australia therefore needed to place 
special emphasis on gaining acceptance and support from ASEAN.
After Hawke’s Seoul speech, the Australian Government set out to 
mobilise support from potential participants. Hawke appointed the 
head of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), Richard 
Woolcott, as his special envoy, and in early 1989 Woolcott visited 
all the (then) six ASEAN members, New Zealand, Japan and South 
Korea to canvass support for an inaugural regional meeting. Within 
the Australian Government there was initial debate about whether the 
US and Canada should be included, but by May 1989 the government 
considered that US participation would be highly desirable.51
ASEAN’s views were critical to the feasibility of the proposal for 
APEC and, as Amitav Acharya has observed, there were considerable 
reservations in ASEAN about a possible new grouping:
ASEAN governments were initially lukewarm to APEC, fearing that it 
would be dominated by non-Southeast Asian countries such as Japan, 
Australia and the United States. ASEAN wished to be the model for 
APEC and was keen to ensure that the new grouping should not on 
any account reduce the activities or status of ASEAN. ASEAN wished 
to remain as the core of multilateral processes in the region; other 
regional institutions should assess the ASEAN experience and proceed 
from there.52
49  Robert Hawke, ‘Speech by the Prime Minister, State Banquet, Seoul – 30 January 1989’.
50  Quoted in Crone, ‘The Politics of Emerging Pacific Cooperation’, p. 74.
51  Roderic Pitty, ‘Regional Economic Co-operation’, in Peter Edwards and David Goldsworthy, 
eds, Facing North: A Century of Australian Engagement with Asia, Volume 2: 1970s to 2000, 
Carlton, Vic.: Melbourne University Press, 2003, pp. 25–6.
52  Acharya, The Making of Southeast Asia, p. 227.
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The appointment and role of Woolcott was an important factor in 
Australia’s diplomacy on this issue. Graeme Dobell commented that:
For Australia, ASEAN held the crucial cards in the creation of APEC. 
The initial omission of the US from the core membership reflected this 
concentration on Southeast Asia. A masterstroke in this diplomatic 
dance was the dispatch in April 1989 of Richard Woolcott, as the 
prime minister’s emissary, to each ASEAN capital.53
Woolcott, who had extensive experience in Southeast Asia, went first 
to Indonesia where in discussions with President Suharto he said that 
Australia was coming to him for advice on how a new regional body 
might proceed. President Suharto responded that the APEC concept 
was an interesting proposal worth discussing. Woolcott then went to 
Singapore, which was strongly supportive of the idea on condition 
that it must not harm ASEAN, that it must not take the form of a trade 
bloc and that its operations should be consistent with the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).54 The proposal also received 
support from Thailand and the Philippines. Malaysia’s response was 
cool but the concept had gained momentum. Dobell has written that:
Malaysian officials later complained at the skilful way Woolcott had 
played his ASEAN cards, claiming that Suharto’s simple expression of 
willingness to listen had been used to leverage stronger endorsements 
from the rest of ASEAN. Certainly Woolcott had made full use of the 
guidance he had received from Suharto and the fact that there was no 
Indonesian veto. It was shuttle diplomacy of the highest order.55
Woolcott reported to the Australian Government that the major 
concern expressed by the ASEAN members was whether any new 
regional organisation was in fact required. Some ASEAN members, 
especially Malaysia, considered that expanding ASEAN’s Post-
Ministerial Conference (PMC) dialogue process and boosting ASEAN’s 
secretariat could provide a sufficient strengthening of regional 
arrangements. However, Woolcott felt that ASEAN would not oppose 
the creation of a new regional group if the agenda were to be confined 
to economic matters. In a speech in May 1989, Minister for Foreign 
53  Graeme Dobell, Australia Finds Home: The Choices and Chances of an Asia Pacific Journey, 
Sydney: ABC Books, 2000, p. 36.
54  GATT was a multilateral trade agreement inaugurated in 1948; GATT was replaced by the 
World Trade Organization in 1995.
55  Dobell, Australia Finds Home, pp. 36–7.
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Affairs Evans affirmed that ASEAN ‘was likely to remain the pre-
eminent body in the region’ and argued that a broader group would 
‘enhance the capacity of ASEAN, and of the other participants, to 
project their economic interests regionally and globally’.56 ASEAN at 
its ministerial meeting in July 1989 did not support the Australian 
proposal directly, but a  tentative agreement was made at the PMC 
to hold an initial exploratory ministerial meeting in Canberra in 
November.57 ASEAN economic ministers then expressed support for 
this proposal in September.58
The inaugural APEC ministerial meeting was duly held in Canberra on 
6–7 November 1989, chaired by Evans and attended by ministers from 
all six ASEAN members, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea 
and the US. The secretaries-general of ASEAN and of the South Pacific 
Forum, and the chair of PECC attended as observers. At the meeting 
it was evident that the ASEAN members continued to have concerns 
about the implications of a new grouping for the identity and role of 
ASEAN.59 The Canberra meeting recognised the central role of ASEAN 
in regional cooperation, and it was agreed that every second meeting 
of APEC would be in an ASEAN country. However, ASEAN members 
were concerned at what they perceived to be the excessive speed of 
the development of APEC and at its potential to be dominated by 
wealthier members. They also were not satisfied at the statement of 
principles for economic cooperation in the Asia-Pacific adopted at the 
Canberra meeting.60
ASEAN accordingly asserted its own position on APEC and how 
it should evolve. ASEAN held its first joint meeting of foreign and 
economics ministers in Kuching, Malaysia, in February 1990, and 
adopted a further list of principles for ASEAN participation in the 
APEC process. These principles included that ASEAN’s identity and 
cohesion should be preserved and its cooperative relations with 
56  Gareth Evans, ‘An Idea Whose Time Has Come’, Australian Foreign Affairs Record, 60(5) 
1989: 185.
57  David Goldsworthy, ‘Introduction’, in Peter Edwards and David Goldsworthy, eds, Facing 
North: A Century of Australian Engagement with Asia, Volume 2: 1970s to 2000, Carlton, Vic.: 
Melbourne University Press, 2003, p. 26.
58  Sarah Sargent, ‘Region Ministers in Favour of Pact’, Australian Financial Review, 
13 September 1989.
59  Paul Grigson, ‘ASEAN Bid to Absorb the New Conference’, The Age, 7 November 1989.
60  John Ravenhill, APEC and the Construction of Pacific Rim Regionalism, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001, pp. 104–5.
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dialogue partners and third partners should not be diluted in any 
enhanced APEC; an enhanced APEC should be based on equality, 
equity and mutual benefit taking full account of the differences in 
stages of development and in socio-political systems of members; 
APEC should not be directed towards the formation of any inward-
looking trading bloc; it should provide a consultative forum on 
economic issues and should not lead to the adoption of any mandatory 
directives for participants to pursue; and it should proceed gradually 
and pragmatically, especially in relation to institutionalisation.61
In the early phases of APEC’s existence and activities, ASEAN 
members were able to maintain an effective united front and gave 
ASEAN a central decision-making role in APEC.62 However, differences 
in emphasis among major ASEAN members in relation to APEC 
soon emerged, which were significant both for APEC itself and for 
Australian policies towards ASEAN and regional cooperation.
APEC made significant progress in its first years of activity. Meetings 
of senior officials initiated work on areas of economic and technical 
cooperation, including human resources development. APEC quickly 
made an important expansion in its coverage of major regional 
economies. China had not taken part in the initial APEC meeting in 
Canberra. That meeting had taken place just five months after the 
crackdown on dissenters in Tiananmen Square in June 1989, which 
had killed hundreds and was condemned by a number of Western 
governments, including the US and Australia. In 1991, however, moves 
were made to involve China in APEC, and at the meeting in November 
1991 in Seoul, China joined the grouping, along with Hong Kong and 
Taiwan (as ‘Chinese Taipei’). APEC thus became the one major regional 
group in which the People’s Republic of China participated alongside 
Taiwan.63
APEC began to consider the question of cooperation for trade 
liberalisation. Australia supported the promotion of discussion on 
avenues towards liberalisation, and in 1991, Australia also floated the 
idea of an Eminent Persons’ Group (EPG). This ultimately led to the 
agreement at APEC’s ministerial meeting in Bangkok in September 
61  Ibid.
62  Ibid.
63  Steve Burrell, ‘APEC Takes Off as EAEG Nose-Dives’, Australian Financial Review, 
18 November 1991.
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1992 of an EPG of 12 representatives (led by Fred Bergsten of the US 
and including former New South Wales Premier Neville Wran from 
Australia).64
The priority given by Australia to APEC was heightened after 
Keating replaced Hawke as Australian prime minister in December 
1991. Keating proposed that APEC should establish a meeting at 
leaders’ level and raised this with US President George H. W. Bush 
on New Year’s Day 1992. Keating’s broader purpose was to turn APEC 
from a body talking about economic cooperation, to one that could 
potentially have political authority. Keating later wrote that ‘I wanted 
to use the heads of government meetings to give it more political and 
institutional weight’.65 While the formal agenda would be economic, 
there was value in bringing together key leaders from the major powers 
including China, Japan and the US, and Keating also considered that 
there were benefits in having the leaders of China and ASEAN in a 
multilateral forum. Such a leaders’ gathering could help maintain 
US involvement in the region and would give Australia a  place in 
a potentially significant dialogue.66 
The first APEC leaders’ meeting was held in Seattle in November 
1993, hosted by President Bill Clinton. Five out of the then six 
ASEAN members were represented, but not Malaysia. Prime Minister 
Mahathir Mohamad continued to be concerned at APEC’s potential to 
challenge ASEAN’s identity and role (see below). Mahathir’s refusal to 
attend became the focus of a diplomatic spat between Australia and 
Malaysia. Keating in discussions with journalists after the gathering 
said, when the subject of Dr Mahathir was raised ‘[p]lease don’t ask 
me any more questions about Dr Mahathir. I couldn’t care less, frankly, 
whether he comes here or not’. Keating said that he would be meeting 
with his Malaysian counterpart in the following year but added that 
‘APEC is bigger than all of us – Australia, the US and Malaysia and 
Dr Mahathir and any other recalcitrants.’67 Mahathir took offence 
64  Goldsworthy, ‘Introduction’, p. 30.
65  Paul Keating, Engagement: Australia Faces the Asia-Pacific, Sydney: Pan Macmillan, 2000, 
p. 84.
66  Ibid., pp. 76–97.
67  Quoted in Dobell, Australia Finds Home, p. 40.
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at the comments and the dispute added to a sense of discord in the 
bilateral relationship, which had implications for Australia’s overall 
relationship with ASEAN as a group.68
The Seattle meeting received a report from the APEC EPG, which called 
for enhanced efforts towards trade liberalisation. The leaders called for 
further action towards liberalisation in the global multilateral trade 
negotiations process. A significant development at the Seattle meeting 
was that President Suharto was asked to host the second such leaders’ 
meeting and agreed to do so. In the lead-up to the initial Canberra 
meeting, Indonesia had been cautious about the prospects for APEC 
and had been an advocate for the view that ASEAN’s Secretariat should 
be the core around which economic cooperation efforts should be 
developed. Indonesia at this time had echoed Malaysia’s reservations 
about institutionalising APEC.69 As John Ravenhill has argued, the 
invitation to Suharto was significant both for APEC and for ASEAN: 
The decision to invite Suharto to host a follow-up meeting was 
particularly astute. It appeared to pay tribute to Suharto’s role as the 
elder statesman of ASEAN, and to Indonesia’s long-standing claim to 
be the most important of the ASEAN countries. Moreover, a leaders 
meeting in Jakarta would pose a vexatious dilemma for Malaysian 
Prime Minister Mahathir, who had boycotted the Seattle meeting. 
To fail to participate in a meeting hosted by a fellow ASEAN member 
would be regarded in the region as a grave insult.70
Suharto took up the task of hosting the 1994 APEC meeting. He was 
encouraged to support efforts towards free trade and investment 
by Australian and US diplomatic efforts. Suharto may also have 
considered that advocacy of free trade by APEC would help bolster 
moves within Indonesia towards domestic liberalisation that would 
help make Indonesia’s economy more competitive. Suharto took an 
active leadership role within ASEAN on these issues: he forestalled 
potential objections from other ASEAN members by rejecting efforts 
by Thailand and the Philippines to hold an informal ASEAN summit 
before the forthcoming Bogor meeting.71
68  Harold Crouch, ‘Understanding Malaysia’, in Anthony Milner and Mary Quilty, eds, 
Australia in Asia: Episodes, Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1998.
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The second APEC leaders’ meeting, in Bogor in November 1994, was 
a high point for APEC. The leaders agreed on a timetable to achieve 
free and open trade and investment by 2010 for developed economies 
and 2020 for developing economies. President Suharto had played 
a significant role in securing this agreement by withstanding pressures 
from some ASEAN members for more qualified commitments on the 
key issues of trade and investment. The existence of differing views 
within ASEAN, however, continued to be evident.72
Malaysia and the East Asian Economic Group 
proposal
Malaysia’s position was particularly significant. Malaysia, as has 
been noted, had strong reservations about the development of APEC. 
Dr Mahathir set out his views in comments in 1994:
When the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum (APEC) was 
proposed by Australia, all the ASEAN countries, with the exception 
of Malaysia, welcomed it. Malaysia’s fear was that the inclusion of 
economic giants like the United States, Canada and Japan would 
result in the domination of the grouping by these countries … Fear 
prevails that ASEAN will disappear within the very much enlarged 
and more powerful APEC grouping. There may be conflict between 
ASEAN interest and the broader Pacific interest. APEC is likely 
to dominate ASEAN and hinder its progress towards greater intra-
ASEAN cooperation.73
Mahathir’s fears about APEC’s potential to dominate ASEAN were 
not realised, primarily because APEC lost cohesion and focus as a 
vehicle for trade liberalisation in the years after the Asian financial 
crisis (see Chapter 4). However, Mahathir’s reactions to the challenges 
posed by APEC had some significant impact on debates on regional 
cooperation in East Asia and the Asia-Pacific. In the period after the 
initial Canberra meeting, Mahathir had underscored his antipathy 
towards APEC by proposing an alternative model for cooperation. 
In December 1990, he advocated the development of an East Asian 
Economic Group (EAEG) whose participants would be restricted to 
the ASEAN members and China, Japan and South Korea. Japan was 
understood to be sceptical about the concept and several ASEAN 
72  Ibid., pp. 110–11.
73  Quoted in ibid., pp. 109–10.
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members (including Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand) were also 
understood to be unenthusiastic.74 At a meeting of ASEAN economics 
ministers in September 1991, Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand 
persuaded Malaysia to reformulate the proposal as an informal 
arrangement, now termed the East Asia Economic Caucus, that could 
operate under the aegis of APEC. As countries explicitly excluded 
from the coverage of the notional grouping, the US and Australia 
were both opposed to the concept. US Secretary of State James Baker 
commented frankly that in private he did all he could to ‘kill’ the 
proposal.75 However, while the East Asia Economic Caucus concept 
did not initially gain substantial support, the idea of a grouping with 
an explicitly ‘East Asian’ identity was a significant development with 
long-term implications. 
The diplomatic interaction, including that between Australia and 
ASEAN, surrounding the emergence of APEC, was thus a complex 
process. APEC was established successfully and it had participation 
from all of the six members then in ASEAN. APEC by 1993 involved 
both economic dialogue and a meeting at leadership level, the first 
to be established in the Asia-Pacific region. The formation of APEC, 
however, was also accompanied by the promotion of another model 
for Asian cooperation, based on a regional conception of East Asia 
rather than the Asia-Pacific, and with a proposed membership that 
was exclusively from East Asia. The contest and competition between 
Asia-Pacific and East Asian modes of cooperation would be an 
important ongoing issue for Australia in its regional diplomacy.
Regional security and the ARF
The changing international environment in the late 1980s had 
substantial implications for security policies, both nationally and 
regionally. New questions arose about the character of security after 
the demise of the Soviet Union and the end of Cold War confrontation 
in Europe, and about the role that multilateral cooperation could play 
74  Alan Boyd, ‘Proposal for Asian Trading Bloc Gets Lukewarm Reception’, The Australian, 
8 February 1991; Viberto Selochan, ‘New Directions and New Thinking in Australia-Southeast 
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in enhancing security. Discussions about these issues led to a further 
major stage in ASEAN–Australia interaction and to the advent of 
a second new grouping, the ARF.
The decline of Cold War confrontation between the US and the 
Soviet Union, which had a substantial impact on the character of 
the Cambodian conflict, also stimulated revised thinking on the 
requirements for regional security in Southeast Asia and East Asia 
overall. The changes of policy in the Soviet Union under the Gorbachev 
regime led to a reduction in tensions with the US, a development 
that was consolidated in July 1990 by an agreement between the two 
parties in Irkutsk in which they stated that they no longer regarded 
each other as adversaries in the Asia-Pacific. The decline in US–Soviet 
confrontation coincided with the loosening or outright disintegration 
of a number of alliances, including those between the Soviet Union 
and Vietnam, the Soviet Union and North Korea, the US and the 
Philippines, the US and New Zealand, and the US and South Korea.76
The regional environment was also influenced by a number of other 
factors, including the comparative decline in the military presence 
of the US (with the impending closure of its air and naval bases at 
Clark Field and Subic Bay in the Philippines) and the economic rise of 
Japan.77 China’s progress towards market-oriented economic reforms 
and its greater involvement in the regional and international economy 
was a further significant development. China from the late 1980s 
moved to extend its linkages in Southeast Asia through normalising 
relations with Indonesia and Singapore in 1990 and by expressing 
interest in establishing formal relations with ASEAN, a move that 
ASEAN welcomed.78
The decline of Cold War antagonisms still left Southeast and East Asia 
with major security challenges. Some conflicts clearly were outgrowths 
of Cold War tensions, such as relations between China and Taiwan, 
and the confrontation on the Korean peninsula. However, a number of 
conflicts in East Asia could not be attributed solely or even primarily 
76  Camilleri, Regionalism, p. 113.
77  Ibid. On the background to the ARF, see Noel M. Morada, ‘The ASEAN Regional Forum: 
Origins and Evolution’, in Jürgen Haacke and Noel M. Morada, eds, Cooperative Security in the 
Asia-Pacific: The ASEAN Regional Forum, London: Routledge, 2010.




to Cold War geopolitical bipolarity. There were also ongoing pressures 
from economic competition and arms acquisitions by regional states. 
Overall, as Joseph A. Camilleri observed:
By the late 1980s the idea that new forms of regional as much as 
global cooperation were needed to contain the structural instabilities 
generated by the end of the Cold War and economic globalisation was 
rapidly gaining ground. Relaxation of tensions on the one hand and 
new uncertainties on the other were combining to create a multilateral 
window of opportunity.79
Australia was keenly interested in the changing regional security 
environment and in how regional relationships might be affected by 
it. Canberra’s perspectives on regional security had been influenced 
by its own defence policy reassessment in the second half of the 
1980s. Australian policymakers and analysts had sought to reassess 
the basis for thinking about national security so Australia could 
seek self-reliance within the context of the US alliance and reduce 
traditional concerns about vulnerability in relation to its neighbours 
in Southeast and East Asia. This process was stimulated particularly 
by the government-commissioned Dibb Report and then the 1987 
Defence White Paper.80 Although the White Paper did little to promote 
further Australian activities in Southeast Asia, it did have significant 
implications for Australian regional policies overall. Desmond Ball and 
Pauline Kerr have argued that: 
[T]he effective implementation of the strategic policy of greater self-
reliance/defence of Australia outlined in the White Paper, the greater 
maturity of Australian policy-makers and the population at large that 
it reflected, and the national self-confidence that it generated, had 
effects that went well beyond the defence establishment and laid the 
ground for greater regional cooperation.81
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On 6 December 1989, Evans presented a major statement for the 
Australian Government on regional security. The statement came 
just weeks after the fall of the Berlin Wall and one week after the 
inaugural APEC ministerial conference. The statement provided a 
‘policy framework’ for Australia’s relations with Asia and the South 
Pacific and it was presented as a redefinition of diplomatic means:
[T]he policy responses or instruments available to protect Australia’s 
security are multidimensional. They go well beyond strictly military 
capabilities, essential though these are. They also embrace traditional 
diplomacy, politico-military capabilities (in the border-zone 
between defence and diplomacy), economic and trade relations, and 
development assistance. And they extend to immigration, education 
and training, cultural relations, information activities, and a number 
of other less obvious areas of government activity. The relative 
importance of this large variety of policy instruments will vary from 
situation to situation, but none exists in isolation, and all should be 
regarded as mutually reinforcing contributions to our security.82
The statement argued that while Australia had previously seen 
the relevance of Southeast Asia and the South Pacific to Australian 
security in largely military terms, there was now an ‘opportunity 
to reinforce our national security by utilising the many dimensions 
of our external policies in an informed, coordinated and vigorous 
way to participate in  the shaping of the regional environment’.83 
An  important element of the statement was its thinking on the 
importance to Australia of Southeast Asia and of the ASEAN countries. 
The statement emphasised that ‘for reasons of fundamental national 
security, Australia needs to develop more substantial linkages with its 
neighbours’ in order to become ‘an accepted and natural participant 
in regional affairs … [I]f we can manage to develop a substantial and 
mutually beneficial range of linkages with the Southeast Asia region, 
then the motivation and intention to threaten us will be minimal’.84 
Australia would therefore seek to extend its relations with the ASEAN 
members and (in a further reflection of a major theme in Australia’s 
regional policies since the 1970s) to encourage the participation of 
Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar in regional affairs. Australia 
82  Gareth Evans, ‘Australia’s Regional Security’, Ministerial Statement, Canberra: Australian 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 1989, p. 2, emphasis in original.
83  Ibid., p. 46.
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would also aim to participate ‘actively in the gradual development 
of a regional security community based on a sense of shared security 
interests’.85
Evans advocated new thinking on regional security issues, but this did 
not initially find favour with the ASEAN members, or with Japan and 
the US. Evans, speaking in Australia in March 1990, referred to the 
process of institutionalised security dialogue in Europe, and said that 
‘the time may be approaching for a similar process to commence in the 
Asia region’.86 He also began to discuss the relevance of the Conference 
on Security and Cooperation in Europe, a security dialogue that had 
been established through the Helsinki agreements in 1975 to manage 
and ameliorate regional tensions in Europe. In July 1990, Evans in a 
newspaper article wrote that there was a need:
to be looking ahead to the kind of wholly new or institutional 
processes that might be capable of evolving in Asia just as in Europe, 
as a framework for addressing and resolving security problems …
Why should there not be developed a similar institutional framework 
– a ‘CSCA’ [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Asia] – for 
addressing the apparently intractable security issues which exist in 
Asia?87
Evans said ‘negative responses’ that emphasised the complexity 
of regional issues in Asia and the diversity of Asian states, should 
not obstruct ‘a process of dialogue, both bilaterally and regionally’, 
in which he said ‘Australia is now amply equipped to participate’.88
Evans advanced the need for wider security dialogue at the ASEAN 
PMC held in Jakarta on 27 July 1990. He said that while the region 
was ‘short of institutions for a broad working dialogue about security’, 
Australia’s interest was not in establishing a new structure but rather 
to seek ways of adding further substance to the present framework 
85  Ibid., p. 44.
86  Gareth Evans, ‘Australia and Northeast Asia’, Address by the Minister for Foreign Affairs 
and Trade, Senator Gareth Evans, to the Committee for the Economic Development of Australia 
(CEDA), Melbourne, 22 March 1990. 
87  Quoted in Ball and Kerr, Presumptive Engagement, p. 18.
88  Quoted in Roderic Pitty, ‘Strategic Engagement’, in Peter Edwards and David Goldsworthy, 
eds, Facing North: A Century of Australian Engagement with Asia, Volume 2: 1970s to 2000, 
Carlton, Vic.: Melbourne University Press, 2003, p. 63.
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of sub-regional relationships.89 The response within ASEAN was 
cautious. As was the case with the proposals for APEC, there were 
concerns about the institutional identity of ASEAN. Roderic Pitty has 
written:
While there was general agreement at the Jakarta meeting on the 
need for increased regional consultation and dialogue, there was also 
concern to avoid creating a proliferation of unnecessary forums in the 
region. The Philippines and Thailand later asked Australia to sponsor 
seminars on regional security, and the Philippines Foreign Secretary, 
Raul Manglapus, commended the Australian sensitivity to ASEAN 
concerns. Australian officials nevertheless remained aware that other 
ASEAN states, particularly Malaysia and Indonesia, remained reluctant 
to support any proposal that might lead to a new institution in which 
ASEAN might be ‘merged into a larger Asia Pacific framework’.90
In the next few months, Australia’s ideas attracted criticism from 
both outside and inside Southeast Asia.91 The US was concerned that 
further multilateral security dialogue would give legitimacy to Soviet 
involvement and inhibit long-standing US relationships and interests. 
The US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific 
Affairs, Richard Solomon, said in October 1990 that it ‘was difficult 
to see how a Helsinki type institution would be an appropriate forum 
for enhancing security or promoting conflict-resolution’. The US 
position, he said, was based on ‘forward deployed forces, overseas 
bases, and bilateral security arrangements’.92 US views were reinforced 
in November 1990 in a private letter by Secretary of State Baker to 
Evans in which Baker argued that there was no need for change and 
that traditional bilateral arrangements and agreements were more than 
adequate to meet regional security needs.93
Several ASEAN leaders criticised the relevance of a European-style 
CSCA. Singapore’s Foreign Minister Wong Kan Seng was quoted in an 
article in October 1990 as saying that ‘there has to be common ground 
before security issues can be discussed’ and this was not the case 
89  Gareth Evans, ‘Statement by Senator Gareth Evans, the Minister for Foreign Affairs and 
Trade, to the 6+6 Session, 23rd ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference, Jakarta’, news release, 
27 July 1990.
90  Pitty, ‘Strategic Engagement’, p. 63.
91  Acharya, The Making of Southeast Asia, pp. 232–3.
92  Quoted in Ball and Kerr, Presumptive Engagement, p. 20.
93  ‘Security, in Letter and Spirit’, Australian Financial Review, 2 May 1991. 
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in Asia where ‘countries are so culturally, ethnically, and politically 
diverse, that perceptions have to be harmonised’. Indonesia’s Foreign 
Minister Alatas stated that ‘we have to be careful not to think that 
certain things that work in one region ought to be transferred to 
another’.94
The strength of the reactions from ASEAN and the US caused Australia 
to pull back from some of its advocacy on the regional security issue. 
In relation to ASEAN perceptions at the time, Dobell observed:
Evans’s effort to promote a new security structure in Asia came at the 
same time that Australia was throwing itself into an intense round of 
diplomatic activity to help create a United Nations solution for the 
Cambodia conflict, and only six months after the first meeting of APEC 
in Canberra. There were sarcastic remarks from ASEAN bureaucrats 
about a sense of ‘initiative fatigue’ over Australia’s activism; if there 
was to be a new regional mechanism, it would be run by ASEAN. 
Australia and Japan had led the way on economic institution-building 
with APEC; Australia would not repeat the formula on security.95
During an informal meeting with ASEAN representatives in Canberra in 
April 1991, Australian officials discussed the Australian Government’s 
security policies. Costello (a deputy secretary of DFAT) said that it 
was ‘tremendously useful’ that the 1990 ASEAN PMC had ‘begun 
the process of addressing’ regional security issues; he hoped that this 
would continue at the next PMC in 1991 but noted that Australia 
‘would not be putting new proposals on the table’. The representatives 
from Singapore and Indonesia both said that the ASEAN PMC was 
‘the right forum’ to explore ‘ways of taking Australia’s ideas on future 
regional security arrangements further’.96 
More positive signs were evident at a regional security seminar held 
in Manila in June 1991. Woolcott noted at the time that ‘it appeared 
to demonstrate that a consensus is emerging among countries in the 
region – including Japan and the United States – that there is a need for 
the development of dialogues, multilateral and otherwise, on regional 
security issues’ based on the ASEAN PMC.97 
94  ‘ASEAN Wary of Pacific Security Plan’, The Australian, 8 October 1990.
95  Dobell, Australia Finds Home, pp. 186–7.
96  Pitty, ‘Strategic Engagement’, p. 66.
97  Ibid.
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At the next ASEAN PMC (in July 1991) it was in fact a proposal from 
Japan that was the focus for debate. Japan’s Foreign Minister Nakayama 
Taro proposed the establishment of a mutual reassurance dialogue, in a 
move that was seen as stemming particularly from Japan’s need to try 
to ameliorate regional sentiments about a plan for Japan to participate 
in UN peacekeeping operations. The Japanese proposal had been 
introduced quickly and it was not accepted by  either ASEAN or 
the US.98 
However, as Acharya has observed, ASEAN had strong motivations 
to be pro-active on security issues:
ASEAN could not ignore the growing calls for multilateralism. Lest the 
outside powers seize the initiative, ASEAN had to come up with an 
‘indigenous’ framework that would enable it to play a central role in 
developing any multilateral framework for regional security. In this 
sense, ASEAN was given an opportunity to project its subregional 
experience in security cooperation onto a larger regional arena and 
thereby enhance its relevance and role as a regional institution in the 
post-Cold War era.99
At the next major ASEAN meeting, the leaders’ summit in January 
1992, the ASEAN countries decided formally to add security issues 
to the PMC. A DFAT ministerial submission at the time described 
this step as having ‘vindicated the efforts Australia has made since 
December 1989’ to encourage formal regional security dialogues. 
There was a change in the position of the US. Prime Minister Keating 
had discussed the issue of security dialogue with President Bush on 1 
January 1992, when Keating had asked Bush to ‘take a more relaxed 
view of the emerging dialogue’ on regional security. By April 1992, it 
was evident that the US was now fully prepared to accept that security 
issues would be discussed at the next ASEAN PMC.100
A consensus developed on the character of a new forum for security 
discussions, based on the ASEAN PMC but with a wider membership. 
This led to the decision by the ASEAN ministerial meeting in Singapore 
in July 1993 that the first ARF would be convened the next year with 
the participation of the ASEAN six and the seven ASEAN dialogue 
98  ‘ASEAN Opens up on Security’, Canberra Times, 21 July 1991; Pitty, ‘Strategic Engagement’, 
p. 67. 
99  Acharya, The Making of Southeast Asia, p. 233.
100  Pitty, ‘Strategic Engagement’, p. 67.
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partners – Australia, Canada, the EU, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea 
and the US – along with China, Russia, Vietnam, Laos and Papua New 
Guinea.101 
Australia was keen to promote and advance the new forum. 
In  preparing for the first ARF meeting in Bangkok in July 1994, 
Australia’s main objective was to see the ARF ‘firmly established as 
a regular, inclusive, Asia-Pacific wide security dialogue’ that would 
be a venue for ‘substantive discussion of specific security issues’ 
such as tensions on the Korean peninsula.102 Australia presented a 
discussion paper in early 1994 on the agenda for the ARF, prepared 
at the request of Thailand. Indonesia, however, responded that the 
paper ‘provided too comprehensive a range of areas for discussion’ in 
the time available. Australian officials considered that Indonesia was 
concerned that the ARF might become too institutionalised and that 
the Indonesian military feared the ARF might act as a watchdog over 
their activities.103
The ARF proceeded to develop in a cautious manner. At the second 
meeting of the ARF in Brunei in August 1995, it was stated that ‘ARF 
meetings shall be based on prevailing ASEAN norms and practices’, 
with no voting and all decisions ‘made by consensus after careful and 
extensive consultations’. The agenda adopted suggested that the ARF 
would first focus on confidence-building and then on preventative 
diplomacy. The task of resolving specific conflicts was postponed, 
and was regarded as an ‘eventual goal’ to be addressed only when 
the reluctance of ASEAN members to consider ‘intrusive’ mechanisms 
was overcome.104
As with APEC, a significant feature of the development of the ARF 
was the role of non-governmental and semi-official groups. Research 
institutes in the ASEAN members were one of the sources of ideas for 
the process of inauguration and early development of the ARF. These 
institutes supported some of the activities of the ARF, for example, 
the meetings of senior officials between the annual formal sessions. 
In  November 1992, the role of non-governmental ‘second track’ 
activities was extended with a proposal for the development of the 
101  ‘Evans Endorses Defence Forum’, Canberra Times, 26 July 1993.
102  Pitty, ‘Strategic Engagement’, p. 69.
103  Ibid.
104  Ibid., p. 70.
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Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP). CSCAP 
was duly established in Kuala Lumpur in June 1993. It was designed 
to link-up and focus the research activities of non-governmental 
bodies devoted to work on security issues in the Asia-Pacific and 
to be a  bridge between the second track and the official dialogues. 
Australian academic institutions and individuals from the outset played 
a major role in the CSCAP processes. Ball and Kerr have suggested 
that CSCAP represented ‘a major achievement in the development of 
multilateralism in the region’.105 
By 1994, the regional and international discussions about security 
had resulted in the inauguration of a new dialogue and Australia’s 
interactions with ASEAN had played a substantial role in this process. 
The new dialogue would be convened by ASEAN and was based 
on ASEAN’s style of consensus decision-making and informality. 
It  included all the major powers with interests in the Asia-Pacific 
region and it was, in fact, the first regional security dialogue to include 
all of the major powers, including not only the US and Japan, but also 
China, India and Russia.106 
These were important achievements but it would prove difficult 
to try to advance the ARF beyond the first stage of discussion and 
promotion of confidence-building. A key issue with the ARF was that 
while ASEAN’s style of consensus-based cooperation was congenial 
to its major power participants, this style simultaneously limited its 
potential for activity and influence. Evelyn Goh has observed that:
The ASEAN style of multilateral institutionalism brought the United 
States, China, and other major powers to the table because they 
were reassured that membership in the ARF would be a relatively 
nondemanding, low-cost, and low-stakes undertaking … In spite of 
their rhetorical ascriptions to TAC [Treaty of Amity and Cooperation], 
the informal character of the ARF assured the United States and 
China especially that they would not have to be bound by formal 
agreements; consensual decision-making procedures meant that they 
could prevent discussion or action on issues against their interest; and 
the lack of any enforcement mechanism essentially left them with a 
free hand to pursue unilateral policies when necessary. For instance, 
Beijing has not felt itself constrained by ARF norms in maritime 
105  Ball and Kerr, Presumptive Engagement, p. 31.
106  Acharya, The Making of Southeast Asia, p. 233.
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confrontations with the Philippines, Vietnam, and the United States in 
the South China Sea; and neither China nor the United States adhered 
to the noncoercive spirit of TAC during the 1996 Taiwan strait crisis.107
The limitations of the ARF were to contribute to ongoing interest 
in avenues for developing further dialogue about regional security, 
interest that was reflected in the later development of the East Asia 
Summit after 2005 and Australia’s discussion of proposals for an Asia 
Pacific Community from 2008.
Towards an ‘Asia Pacific Community’?
By 1995, Evans considered the advent of both APEC and the ARF could 
be seen in parallel as dialogues that could provide the basis for longer-
term cooperation in the Asia-Pacific. In October 1994, Evans said that 
the APEC leaders’ summit in Bogor and the first meeting of the ARF 
had put in place ‘the key elements of a new regional architecture: 
two institutional structures, dealing with economic relations and 
security issues, within the overarching concept of an Asia-Pacific 
community’.108 In the previous year, Evans had suggested that there 
was a sense of ‘community’ emerging in the Asia-Pacific in which:
nations that increasingly see and do things the same way – 
economically, politically and socially – are nations which should find it 
easier to talk together, to build processes and institutions together and 
advance common interests or resolve common problems. I believe that 
the gradual emergence of a sense of community in our own region … 
is a striking and exciting development, and one we should nourish.109 
It was also evident, however, that there continued to be contending 
notions of what was the most appropriate definition of ‘region’ for the 
pursuit of cooperation and community-building.110 In his comments, 
Evans had referred to the Asia-Pacific as ‘our own region’, but there 
was ongoing interest in East Asia in developing cooperation that could 
be based on a different and more specifically ‘Asian’ conception of 
107  Evelyn Goh, ‘Southeast Asia’s Evolving Security Relations and Strategies’, in Saadia M. 
Pekkanen, John Ravenhill and Rosemary Foot, eds, The Oxford Handbook of the International 
Relations of Asia, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014, p. 475.
108  Quoted in Keith Scott, Gareth Evans, St Leonards, NSW: Allen & Unwin, 1999, p. 287.
109  Quoted in ibid., p. 288.
110  See Anthony Milner’s discussion of these issues in Anthony Milner, ‘Regionalism in Asia’, 
in Juliet Love, ed., The Far East and Australasia 2014, 45th edn, Abingdon: Routledge, 2013.
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‘region’. In the case of the ARF, ASEAN had accepted and assumed 
leadership of a group that involved both East Asian states and a 
wider participation including Australia, India and the US as founding 
members. However, in the realm of economic cooperation, as previously 
noted, while Australia’s favoured vehicle for cooperation was APEC, 
Dr Mahathir had proposed in 1990 an alternative cooperation model, 
the EAEG, based on an East Asian identity that would by design 
restrict its participants to those in East Asia. While the EAEG had 
not received strong acceptance and had been pursued in a more mild 
form as a caucus under the aegis of APEC, the idea of ‘East Asia-
focused’ cooperation had strong attractions for many in East Asia. 
The basis for such a group was reasserted when a number of countries 
in East Asia moved to establish a dialogue with Europe, as the Asia–
Europe Meeting (ASEM), which met for the first time in March 1996. 
A significant feature of the development of ASEM was that the ‘Asian’ 
side comprised countries that Dr Mahathir had envisaged as being the 
basis for an EAEG; that is, the ASEAN members along with China, 
Japan and South Korea. In the lead-up to the first ASEM (held in 
March 1996), Malaysia had made it clear that Australia would not be 
invited to participate on the Asian side.111 
Australia’s exclusion from the emerging ASEM was discussed widely at 
the time. One senior Australian analyst, Stephen Fitzgerald, described 
the exclusion as a matter of the ‘utmost gravity’, not necessarily 
because the meeting itself was highly important, but because ASEM 
was shorthand ‘for a closed coalition of East Asian states which began 
in 1996 and which excluded Australia’.112 ASEM did not evolve into a 
gathering of high regional or international importance.113 Nonetheless, 
the advent of ASEM had emphasised that the concept of Asia-Pacific 
as a basis for cooperation and possible community building would be 
challenged by countries and leaders who considered the conception of 
East Asia as a more relevant and desirable cooperation focus. The East 
Asia cooperation model was to be reasserted more strongly after 1997 
with the advent of the ‘ASEAN Plus Three’ grouping of ASEAN along 
111  David Goldsworthy, ‘Regional Relations’, in Peter Edwards and David Goldsworthy, eds, 
Facing North: A Century of Australian Engagement with Asia, Volume 2: 1970s to 2000, Carlton, 
Vic.: Melbourne University Press, 2003, p. 138.
112  Quoted in Scott, Gareth Evans, p. 294.
113  For an assessment of ASEM see Julie Gilson, ‘The Asia‒Europe Meeting (ASEM)’, in 




with China, Japan and South Korea. It was evident that Australia would 
need to continue to contend with multiple and competing models of 
wider cooperation and that this would be an important context for 
Australia’s relations with ASEAN. 
‘Partnership’ with Southeast Asia and ASEAN
The early 1990s was an important period in ASEAN’s evolution. 
ASEAN had played a substantial role in shaping the development of 
APEC and it had assumed responsibility for convening a new security 
dialogue in the ARF. ASEAN at the same time was moving to widen 
and deepen its own cooperation. As has been noted, the end of the 
conflict over Cambodia opened the way for ASEAN to embrace the 
whole of Southeast Asia. A crucial step was taken when Vietnam joined 
as a full member in July 1995, which both ended the divide between 
ASEAN and the region’s second largest country, and paved the way 
for the expansion of the Association to include Laos, Myanmar and 
Cambodia. 
The ASEAN members also felt the need to deepen economic 
cooperation among their own members. It was noted earlier that one of 
the factors that had led regional states to develop interest in economic 
cooperation in the Asia-Pacific was progress being made towards 
greater integration in other regions. The EU was in the process of 
being established through development of the Maastricht Treaty; the 
North American Free Trade Agreement was being negotiated (leading 
to its inauguration in December 1992); and South American states had 
joined together in MERCOSUR (Southern Common Market). China and 
India were developing massive domestic markets. In this environment, 
ASEAN’s members saw a need to promote their own integration; as 
Rodolfo Severino has written, ASEAN members considered that their 
‘ability to compete for markets and investments would be severely 
hampered unless they achieved the efficiencies of a large, integrated 
market’.114 ASEAN therefore introduced a new phase of economic 
cooperation by agreeing to develop an ASEAN Free Trade Area, 
114  Rodolfo C. Severino, Southeast Asia in Search of an ASEAN Community: Insights from the 
Former ASEAN Secretary-General, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2006, p. 223.
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announced in 1992, with the aspiration of reducing trade barriers 
within the Association in parallel with the wider efforts being sought 
through APEC.115
Australia welcomed ASEAN’s expansion. The rapprochement between 
ASEAN and Vietnam, which saw Vietnam accede to ASEAN’s TAC 
in 1992 and then gain full membership in 1995, was in line with 
the interests expressed by successive Australian governments 
since Gough Whitlam’s period. Australia also welcomed ASEAN’s 
acceptance of other Southeast Asian countries into the Association. 
In the case of Myanmar, Australia hoped that the prospect of ASEAN 
membership might provide some potential for ASEAN to encourage 
political liberalisation in the wake of the traumatic period after 1988 
when the dominant military had suppressed dissent and refused to 
accept the results of the 1990 elections, which had been won by the 
National League for Democracy, led by Aung San Suu Kyi.116 Australia 
pursued efforts to encourage change in Myanmar but without evident 
impact.117 Evans commented later that: 
[U]p to 97 my strategy was really for ASEAN to use the leverage of 
membership to actually get some change to not let … [Myanmar] in 
without there having been fundamental institutional change or at 
least the realistic promise of it and when that particular bit of leverage 
was gone … when they nonetheless decided to let them in that was 
really the end of the road but that was after the end of my period 
as foreign minister … So that was my strategy during that period; 
a failed strategy I have to say but it was I think worth pursuing.118
ASEAN pressed ahead with plans to incorporate Myanmar and 
it joined the Association in 1997.119 
In this phase of change and development in ASEAN in the early 
1990s, there was considerable optimism in Australia about the ASEAN 
relationship. Writing about this period, Nancy Viviani observed:
115  Ibid., pp. 222–31.
116  Lindsay Murdoch, ‘Australia’s Hard Line on Burma Softens’, The Age, 11 October 1993. On 
ASEAN’s approaches to Myanmar, see Christopher Roberts, ASEAN’s Myanmar Crisis: Challenges 
to the Pursuit of a Security Community, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2010.
117  Ian McPhedran, ‘ASEAN Asked to Press Burma Harder Towards Democracy’, Canberra 
Times, 4 May 1994; Cameron Stewart, ‘Evans to Urge Tougher ASEAN Stand on Burma’, 
The Australian, 25 July 1995. 
118  Evans, interview with the author, July 2014.
119  Mark Baker, ‘ASEAN Leaders Resist Push to Isolate Burma’, The Age, 16 December 1995.
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[T]he construction of the ARF, and the Bogor outcome of APEC, showed 
an expanded ASEAN, now a truly Southeast Asian community, at 
its most influential. It also showed a special place for Australia – as 
constructive co-operator with Southeast Asia, and as sometimes in 
front with the ideas, reaping both the rewards and costs of such policy 
innovation.120 
By 1995, Evans argued that relations with ASEAN had moved into 
a  phase of ‘partnership and integration’ and said that there was 
greater reciprocity and commitment between the parties. ‘Partnership 
and integration implies a degree of mutual dependency, a degree of 
reliance upon each other, and a high degree of trust. I would suggest 
that we are now moving into that phase.’121 
Alongside this optimism, major bilateral relations with ASEAN 
members continued to exhibit some variation in cooperation and 
degree  of concord. As has been noted, the political relationship 
with Malaysia in the early 1990s was affected by issues including 
Dr  Mahathir’s reservations about the direction of APEC and his 
irritation over Keating’s use of the term ‘recalcitrant’ in 1993. 
Dr  Mahathir continued to be unenthusiastic about Australia’s 
credentials for regional involvement (see Chapter 4).122
Relations with Indonesia during the Hawke and Keating period 
underwent considerable change and development. The ongoing 
potential for misunderstanding and distrust was illustrated in 1986 
when a dispute developed over a newspaper article in Australia on 
the wealth of the Suharto family.123 There was also ongoing concern 
in Australia at the situation in East Timor, which was heightened in 
December 1991 when Indonesian troops attacked mourners at the 
Santa Cruz cemetery in Dili and between 200 and 500 people were shot 
or disappeared. There was a strongly critical reaction within Australia 
120  Nancy Viviani, ‘Australia and Southeast Asia’, in James Cotton and John Ravenhill, eds, 
Seeking Asian Engagement: Australia in World Affairs, 1991–95, Melbourne: Oxford University 
Press, 1997, pp. 159–60.
121  Dobell, Australia Finds Home, pp. 80–1.
122  Barry Wain, Malaysian Maverick: Mahathir Mohamad in Turbulent Times, 2nd edn, 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, pp. 235–41.
123  David Jenkins, ‘After Marcos, Now for the Suharto Billions’, Sydney Morning Herald, 
10 April 1986.
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and additional bilateral strains resulted.124 Alongside these areas of 
tension, the extensive interactions between Evans and Alatas from the 
late 1980s on Cambodia, APEC and the ARF, brought an added degree 
of cooperation and communication to the relationship. 
From 1992, Prime Minister Keating gave added emphasis to the 
importance of Indonesia. A notable point was when the two countries 
concluded the secretly negotiated Australia–Indonesia Agreement on 
Maintaining Security in 1995. It committed both parties to consult 
regularly on matters affecting their common security and ‘to develop 
such cooperation as would benefit their own security and that of the 
region’, to consult each other ‘in the case of adverse challenges to 
either party or to their common security interests and, if appropriate, 
consider measures which might be taken individually or jointly’, 
and ‘to promote … mutually beneficial cooperation in the security 
field’. The agreement was the first bilateral security arrangement 
between Australia and any Southeast Asian country and Indonesia’s 
first bilateral security agreement with any country. While the secrecy 
of the negotiation process was contentious, the agreement itself 
was endorsed widely in Australia, including by the Opposition.125 
The utility of the agreement, however, depended on the maintenance 
of cooperative relations and these came under serious strain in the 
next four years over East Timor (see Chapter 4).
Other developments in bilateral relations bolstered Australia’s 
interactions with ASEAN. While multilateral security dialogue 
through the ARF proceeded at a cautious pace, there was a rapid 
expansion of bilateral military contacts. By the mid-1990s, the 
Australian Defence Forces were involved in more joint exercises with 
ASEAN member forces than they were with the US, while most of the 
ASEAN states involved (notably Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia) 
were ‘more engaged with Australia with respect to cooperative defence 
activities than with any other country, including their own ASEAN 
neighbours’.126 
124  Jamie Mackie, ‘Australia and Indonesia: Current Problems, Future Prospects’, Lowy 
Institute Paper 19, Sydney: Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2007, p. 58; James Cotton, 
East Timor, Australia and Regional Order: Intervention and its Aftermath in Southeast Asia, 
London: Routledge, 2004, p. 53.
125  Viviani, ‘Australia and Southeast Asia’, pp. 159–60; see also Mackie, ‘Australia and 
Indonesia’, pp. 55–7.
126  Ball and Kerr, Presumptive Engagement, p. 64.
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There were also efforts in the early 1990s to consider and explore 
further  developments in Australia’s multilateral ASEAN linkages. 
At  the beginning of the 1990s, when Australia was interested in 
enhancing security relations and dialogue with ASEAN on both 
a multilateral and bilateral basis, some consideration was given in 
Canberra to whether Australia should sign ASEAN’s TAC. Evans later 
recalled that ‘I wanted to move in that direction … but we didn’t 
succeed in pulling it off’.127 In January 1991, a draft ministerial 
submission said that ‘accession to the treaty by Australia would 
have considerable symbolic value’. However, the ASEAN members 
decided at their January 1992 leaders’ summit in Bangkok that other 
states would not at that stage be invited to accede to the treaty so for 
Australia this matter lapsed for the next decade.128
A further area of potential cooperation was opened for discussion in 
1993. In November 1993, Thailand’s Deputy Prime Minister Supachai 
Panitchpakdi suggested that Australia could be invited to join the 
nascent ASEAN Free Trade Area and even the East Asia Economic 
Caucus.129 The Australian Government was interested in the idea of 
closer economic relations with ASEAN and in 1994 suggested that 
there could be a linkage between the ASEAN Free Trade Area and 
the Australia–New Zealand Closer Economic Relations agreement.130 
The idea did not progress beyond the discussion stage, partly because 
Malaysia was opposed.131 However, the concept continued to be 
considered and was later taken up in detail by both sides under John 
Howard’s government after Dr Mahathir’s departure from office in 
Malaysia (see Chapter 4). 
At a time when Australia and ASEAN were moving closer, there 
was even some discussion about Australia’s possible membership 
in the Association. In February 1994, President Fidel Ramos of the 
Philippines, in an interview with an Australian journalist, spoke about 
the possibility in the long-term of Australia joining ASEAN, and said, 
127  Evans, interview with the author, July 2014.
128  Pitty, ‘Strategic Engagement’, p. 75.
129  Greg Earl, ‘Asian Trade Club Opens Up to Aust’, Australian Financial Review, 26 November 
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‘[t]hat kind of thing could be encouraged’.132 In January 1996 the issue 
of Australia’s institutional relationship with ASEAN was raised again, 
by Singapore’s Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong. At the time of a visit 
by Keating to Singapore and Malaysia, Goh said in an interview that 
‘[w]e see Australia playing an important role [in ASEAN] and certainly 
we would like to encourage Australia to do so’. Goh continued: 
If you asked me now is it possible that Australia and New Zealand 
may one day join ASEAN, I would say that both countries are small 
enough to be considered as possible members one of these days … But 
it depends again on the coinciding of interests, if there is more trade 
between Australia and New Zealand with ASEAN countries, more 
investments, more to-ing and fro-ing culturally, people to people, then 
it is an idea which is thinkable ... to be put into the debate.133
Goh soon downplayed these comments. At a subsequent press 
conference he said that the concept of Australian membership was 
an ‘over the horizon’ idea that had not been raised or discussed 
formally.134 Keating’s visit was followed shortly afterwards by the 
Australian elections on March 1996 in which a new government led 
by Howard was elected with a large majority. Prime Minister Goh’s 
comments were, however, an interesting indication that Australia 
after two decades of cooperation could be considered, albeit in a very 
speculative manner, as a possible member of ASEAN.
Conclusion 
The period of the Hawke and Keating governments from 1983 to 1996 
was one of intense interaction between Australia and ASEAN. A key 
factor in the context for these interactions was the profound changes 
to the international environment among the major powers from the late 
1980s as the patterns of Cold War tensions altered sharply, even if they 
did not disappear altogether in East Asia. These changes opened the 
way for a settlement of the Cambodian conflict. In this environment, 
Australia was able to extend the interest of the Whitlam and Fraser 
132  Eric Ellis, ‘Ramos to Australia: Join Us in ASEAN’, Australian Financial Review, 23 February 
1994.
133  Eric Ellis, ‘Goh: Australian Role in ASEAN’, Australian Financial Review, 16 January 1996. 
134  Goh Chok Tong and Paul Keating, ‘Joint Press Conference at the Shangri La Hotel, Singapore, 
17 January 1996: Transcript’.
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governments in encouraging détente between ASEAN and the states 
of Indochina. The diplomatic cooperation between Australia and 
ASEAN, and especially with Indonesia, was a highpoint in Australia’s 
post-Second World War foreign relations and contributed both to 
a Cambodian settlement and to wider cooperation in Southeast Asia.
The decline of Cold War confrontation also stimulated new regional 
thinking. Australian cooperation with ASEAN played an important role 
in the creation of APEC and the ARF. In these diplomatic interactions 
several elements were notable. ASEAN was highly concerned about 
its identity and institutional distinctiveness and was sensitive about 
the potential for additional wider groupings to dilute or weaken this. 
Australia’s interest in contributing ideas had to accommodate ASEAN’s 
interests. A key factor in Australia’s capacity to pursue cooperation 
with ASEAN overall continued to be its relations with Indonesia, 
a relationship that was vital to the Cambodian peace process and to 
the development of APEC and the ARF. The diplomatic interactions 
in this period carried cooperation between Australia and ASEAN to 
a new level and made this multilateral relationship one of the most 
important in Australia’s foreign relations.
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The Asian financial crisis, 
multilateral relations and the 
East Asia Summit (1996–2007)
The Australian elections on 2 March 1996 ushered in a period in 
which  the new John Howard Government emphasised promoting 
bilateral relationships and appeared for some time to reduce emphasis 
on multilateral cooperation, including with the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The diplomatic climate was also 
influenced greatly by the Asian financial crisis and by the traumatic 
transition of East Timor from Indonesian rule to independence. 
By the end of the 1990s, Australia’s multilateral relations with ASEAN 
appeared to have cooled substantially. The latter period of the Howard 
Government, however, brought a renewal of cooperation with ASEAN 
after 2001. This chapter discusses these issues by looking in turn at 
the Howard Government’s approach to Asia, the challenges posed to 
Southeast Asia and ASEAN by the Asian financial crisis, East Timor’s 
transition to independence, the hiatus in Australia–ASEAN relations 
in the late 1990s, and developments after 2001 that included two 
major advances: a trade agreement between ASEAN and Australia and 
New Zealand, and ASEAN’s invitation to Australia to accede to the 




The Howard Government and Asia
The Howard Government came to office committed to what it saw as 
a pragmatic pursuit of the national interest.1 In a speech in August 
2001, Howard characterised his approach as one of ‘positive realism’ 
that involved ‘a realistic appreciation of the differences between ... 
societies and cultures, but positively focused on ... shared interests 
and on a mutual respect’.2 Howard emphasised that nations should 
respect each other’s differences: he said in April 2003 that ‘good 
neighbours recognise each other’s values and beliefs’.3 
The Howard Government reaffirmed a strong commitment to 
Australia’s  relationship with the US. The relationship deepened 
further after the terrorist attacks in the US on 11 September 2001. 
In the immediate aftermath of these attacks, Howard (who was visiting 
the US at the time) offered Australia’s full support to the US and on 
14 September 2001 the Australian Government formally invoked 
the ANZUS (Australia, New Zealand, United States) Treaty for the 
first time. Australia went on to support and contribute to the US-led 
military involvements in Afghanistan and in Iraq.4 
In relations with Asia, the government placed special emphasis 
on China and Japan. After initial tensions in 1996 over China’s 
confrontation of Taiwan, Australia’s China relationship expanded 
greatly, including through enhanced economic interactions and new 
areas of regular dialogue.5 The Howard Government pursued a closer 
relationship with Japan and inaugurated a new trilateral dialogue 
with the US and Japan.6 
1  Stewart Firth, Australia in International Politics: An Introduction to Australian Foreign 
Policy, 3rd edn, Crows Nest, NSW: Allen & Unwin, 2011, p. 53.
2  Quoted in Allan Gyngell and Michael Wesley, Making Australian Foreign Policy, 2nd edn, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 276.
3  Quoted in ibid., p. 277.
4  Paul Kelly, ‘Howard’s Decade: An Australian Foreign Policy Reappraisal’, Lowy Institute 
Paper 15, Sydney: Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2006, pp. 47–63.
5  Gyngell and Wesley, Making Australian Foreign Policy, p. 313.
6  Rowan Callick, ‘Beijing Attacks Curbs on N Korea’, The Australian, 21 September 2006.
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The Howard Government came to office with a commitment to 
engagement with Southeast Asia and to ASEAN that was asserted 
by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Alexander Downer, in some of 
his early statements in office. On 11 April 1996, Downer said that 
‘[t]here is a national consensus on the importance of Australia’s 
engagement with Asia and there is a strong recognition that no side 
of Australian politics owns the Asia vision’. Downer declared that the 
government would base its Asian engagement on three approaches: 
regional economic dialogue through the Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC) grouping, regional security cooperation within 
the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and strengthening the focus on 
bilateral relations. On the future of the regional ‘architecture’, Downer 
said that APEC and ASEAN were ‘central to building the trust’ and 
‘sense of shared interests’ that were the basis of the region’s security 
and economic future.7 In May 1996, Downer re-emphasised the 
government’s commitment to the ARF, which he said ‘should continue 
to develop regional dialogue on issues such as defence planning and 
acquisition’.8
While endorsing the role of regional institutions, the government 
emphasised the primacy of bilateral relationships. There was also 
commensurately less emphasis on ‘big picture’ concepts of multilateral 
and regional cooperation. The overall approach was affirmed in the 
government’s foreign policy White Paper released in 1997: 
Preparing for the future is not a matter of grand constructs. It is about 
the hard headed pursuit of the interests which lie at the core of foreign 
and trade policy: the security of the nation and the jobs and standard 
of living of the Australian people. In all that it does in the field of 
foreign and trade policy, the Government will apply the basic test 
of national interest.9
7  Don Greenlees, ‘Downer Assigns Asia Top Priority’, The Australian, 12 April 1996.
8  Michael Dwyer, ‘Downer Calls for ARF to Arbitrate Regional Disputes’, Australian Financial 
Review, 3 May 1996.
9  Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, In the National Interest: Australia’s 
Foreign and Trade Policy White Paper, Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 1997, p. iii.
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ASEAN, the Asian financial crisis and 
East Timor’s independence: 1996–2001
From mid-1997, ASEAN encountered several issues that challenged 
it as an institution and that had significant implications for Australia.
ASEAN under challenge: Enlargement issues and the 
Asian financial crisis
ASEAN from the mid-1990s had been pursuing a policy of 
incorporating, as members, the other states considered widely to 
be part of ‘Southeast Asia’: Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar (Burma) and 
Vietnam. Vietnam entered the Association in 1995 and Laos and 
Myanmar followed in 1997. While the government (like the preceding 
Labor administration) had reservations about internal conditions in 
Myanmar, Australia supported its membership in ASEAN. In overall 
terms, Downer considered that there was a strong case for Myanmar’s 
entry: ‘it was driven by Dr Mahathir Mohamad and President Suharto 
who both thought that it made more sense to get Burma into ASEAN 
than leave it in the Chinese orbit … I thought that was a pretty damn 
good argument’.10
It had been envisaged that Cambodia would also join in 1997. However, 
on 5–6 July 1997, this timetable was derailed by the outbreak of conflict 
between the two parties in the Coalition Government (the National 
United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative 
Cambodia (FUNCINPEC) led by Prince Norodom Ranariddh and the 
Cambodian People’s Party led by Hun Sen). After a period of extensive 
tensions between the parties, the Cambodian People’s Party forces led a 
coup on 5 July 1997 against its partner in the coalition administration, 
FUNCINPEC, which resulted in over 40 deaths and hundreds of arrests: 
Ranariddh and a number of senior figures in his party had left the 
country a few days earlier. Subsequently there were some executions, 
particularly by the Cambodian People’s Party forces of FUNCINPEC 
members. These events left Hun Sen as the dominant leader in 
Cambodia.11 Australia condemned the violence and expressed concern 
10  Alexander Downer, interview with the author, Adelaide, 15 April 2014.
11  MacAlister Brown and Joseph J. Zasloff, Cambodia Confounds the Peacemakers, 1979–1998, 
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998, pp. 259–68.
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at the overthrow of Ranariddh by military means. The government 
pursued its approach in association with ASEAN, which Downer 
saw as ‘the first and most important point of influence’ in relation to 
Hun Sen.12 In response to these events, the ASEAN foreign ministers 
decided on 10 July to delay Cambodia’s entry.13 The developments in 
Cambodia were a setback for ASEAN’s desired image of a group able to 
sponsor peaceful cooperation, but the enlargement process continued: 
Cambodia ultimately was admitted to ASEAN in 1999.
A further set of issues confronted ASEAN members, and other states 
in East Asia, from mid-1997. In early July 1997, speculative pressure 
forced a devaluation of the Thai currency and began to inflict major 
pressure on the Thai economy. By early September, the Malaysian 
ringgit had fallen to its lowest level of value vis-à-vis the US dollar 
since 1971, and in a period of six months the Thai stock market 
had lost 38 per cent of its value, while Malaysia’s lost 44 per cent, 
the Philippines’ lost 35 per cent, Indonesia’s lost 17 per cent and 
Japan’s lost  4 per cent. By the end of the year, severe damage had 
been sustained by both the Indonesian and South Korean economies; 
in 1998, Indonesia’s economy declined by about 14 per cent of 
gross domestic product. A number of ASEAN members experienced 
a  rise in unemployment, which increased pressures on incumbent 
governments.14 
The crisis had a substantial political impact in the ASEAN region. 
Thailand and the Philippines saw governments replaced through 
elections. The political impact was greatest in Indonesia, where 
ASEAN’s  senior statesman President Suharto was forced to resign 
in May 1998, amid substantial social unrest and political protest. 
The  departure of  Suharto was followed by profound changes 
in Indonesia’s political processes, which included the advent of 
democratic elections and a sharp change in policy towards East Timor 
in 1999.
12  Moreen Dee and Frank Frost, ‘Indochina’, in Peter Edwards and David Goldsworthy, eds, 
Facing North: A Century of Australian Engagement with Asia, Volume 2: 1970s to 2000, Carlton, 
Vic.: Melbourne University Press, 2003, p. 212.
13  Mark Baker, ‘Hun Sen Defies His Critics’, The Age, 11 July 1997.
14  Michael Wesley, ‘Australia and the Asian Economic Crisis’, in James Cotton and John 
Ravenhill, eds, The National Interest in a Global Era: Australia in World Affairs 1996–2000, South 
Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2001, pp. 302–3. See also Andrew MacIntyre, T. J. Pempel 




The financial crisis abruptly interrupted the development of the 
ASEAN economies and had an adverse impact on the image of 
economic progress and stable development in ASEAN members and in 
East Asia more widely. Investor confidence declined and funds were 
withdrawn from many economies.15 ASEAN’s image in this period 
was also affected adversely by the emergence of major environmental 
problems arising from annual patterns of burning of large areas 
of forest and agricultural lands particularly in Indonesia, which 
produced a ‘haze’ that caused major health and pollution problems 
for neighbouring states including Malaysia and Singapore. ASEAN 
discussed the issue but was not able to pursue cooperation that could 
alleviate the problem.16 ASEAN’s challenges in this period prompted 
some internal debate on whether the Association needed to revise its 
approach to cooperation and modify the doctrine of non-interference 
in internal affairs to acknowledge the fact that developments within 
member states could affect the interests of others, as the haze had 
illustrated. Despite advocacy by Thailand and the Philippines, ASEAN 
did not adopt a major change in approach, but the debate highlighted 
the climate of uncertainty in ASEAN that had been triggered by the 
financial crisis.17
Australia, ASEAN and the financial crisis
The impact of the Asian financial crisis was all the more sharp 
because the setbacks were largely unexpected. In Australia, the 
Howard Government’s foreign policy White Paper (which had been 
prepared before the onset of the economic crisis and was released in 
August 1997) had assumed continuing growth in East Asia. The paper 
said that ‘the Government’s judgement is that economic growth in 
industrialising East Asia will continue at relatively high levels over 
the next fifteen years’, and that ‘the countries of East Asia will become 
even more important to Australia as trade and investment partners, 
15  Wesley, ‘Australia and the Asian Economic Crisis’, pp. 302–3.
16  Simon S. C. Tay, ‘Blowing Smoke: Regional Cooperation, Indonesian Democracy, and the 
Haze’, in Donald K. Emmerson, ed., Hard Choices: Security, Democracy, and Regionalism in 
Southeast Asia, Stanford, CA: Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center Books, 2008.
17  Christopher B. Roberts, ASEAN Regionalism: Cooperation, Values and Institutionalization, 
Abingdon: Routledge, 2012, pp. 102–9.
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and in security terms’.18 This was a reasonable long-term projection, 
but in the short term many regional economies had major problems 
and the situation was of substantial concern to Australia.
Australia gave significant support to efforts to alleviate the crisis. 
By February 1998, Downer noted that Australia was contributing 
over A$4 billion to the packages of assistance being provided by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) to Indonesia, Thailand and South 
Korea. He observed that apart from Japan, Australia was the only 
country to be involved in all three packages. Downer had commented 
earlier (in November 1997) on the positive impact of Australia’s 
assistance when he said that ‘by proving we are a partner and a 
neighbour for the long haul’, Australia’s image had changed decisively 
‘from something close to regional mendicant to a regional mate’.19 
Another element in Australia’s response was support to Indonesia by 
making representations to the Bill Clinton administration to encourage 
the US to support more sympathetic and favourable treatment for 
Indonesia from the IMF, whose terms of assistance were seen as harsh 
and demanding.20
The Asian financial crisis had a significant influence on the Howard 
Government’s approach to relations with Asia and its appraisal of 
Australia’s role. Australia’s economic performance during the period of 
the crisis brought a sense of increased assurance. Australia’s economy 
continued to grow despite the adverse developments in East Asia. 
This was striking validation of Australia’s extensive economic reform 
since the 1980s and the value in Australia’s wide-ranging international 
economic linkages.21 
These perceptions were reflected in statements by the Howard 
Government that expressed confidence that Australia after the financial 
crisis was more accepted and influential. Downer said in July 1999 
that ‘our advice has carried particular weight for two reasons: because 
it comes from a country that has prospered when others have been 
18  Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, In the National Interest: Australia’s 
Foreign and Trade Policy White Paper, Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 1997, p. v. 
19  Roderic Pitty, ‘Regional Economic Co-operation’, in Peter Edwards and David Goldsworthy, 
eds, Facing North: A Century of Australian Engagement with Asia, Volume 2: 1970s to 2000, 
Carlton, Vic.: Melbourne University Press, 2003, p. 42.
20  Paul Kelly, The March of Patriots: The Struggle for Modern Australia, Carlton, Vic.: 




doing it tough, and because we have shown that we are prepared to 
take our own advice. It has been a case of “do as we say, and do as we 
do”’. Prime Minister Howard noted in September 1998 that ‘Australia 
is more respected in Asia now than it was five years ago because 
we’ve done well and we’ve been able to help … Australia is relatively 
speaking stronger now and has got more influence than it had before’. 
Downer argued that Australia’s image had changed in the wake of 
the crisis. He argued in July 1998 that ‘[w]e have ceased being the 
region’s “demandeur”, badgering our neighbours for attention and 
recognition. Australia is now a genuinely close partner and regional 
friend, a country that can be relied on in good times and bad’.22 
These responses were understandable in relation to Australia’s 
comparative economic performance and substantial assistance to 
neighbouring states. However some analysts saw complexity in 
Australia’s response to the financial crisis as conveyed in the messages 
presented to the domestic audience and to Southeast and East Asia. 
The assertions of confidence in Australia’s own capacities and success 
could have negative aspects. Anthony Milner commented that:
Ministers were catering to the needs of what Howard called 
‘the  Australian psyche’ when they began to speak of Australia as 
‘the  strong man of Asia’ … In doing so, however, they helped to 
promote the type of swagger that the government’s own White Paper 
had warned against: the White Paper had insisted that Australians 
must be prepared to face the fact that their country would become 
less not more powerful in regional terms over the coming years. It was 
a swagger that was also likely to be remembered for many years in the 
region itself.23
The policies pursued by the Australian Government in response to 
the Asian financial crisis had involved bilateral assistance rather 
than cooperation with ASEAN as a collectivity. But by providing 
assistance to key member countries, Australia had underscored the 
importance of relationships with Southeast Asia. The financial crisis, 
however, also had some significant influences on patterns of regional 
cooperation with potential implications for Australia. 
22  Quoted in Wesley, ‘Australia and the Asian Economic Crisis’, p. 311.
23  Anthony Milner, ‘Balancing “Asia” Against Australian Values’, in James Cotton and John 
Ravenhill, eds, The National Interest in a Global Era: Australia in World Affairs 1996–2000, 
South Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 41.
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As noted in Chapter 3, debate had been developing about the 
desirability of cooperation that could be pursued by East Asian states 
themselves without the participation of countries not considered to be 
‘Asian’. These views were reflected in Malaysia’s proposal in December 
1990 for an ‘East Asian Economic Group’, a concept that had been 
pursued as a caucus under the aegis of APEC. The impact of the financial 
crisis led to renewed interest in ‘East Asian-focused’ cooperation that 
could help forestall any future crisis and add greater ‘weight’ for 
Asia in dealing with international financial institutions such as the 
IMF. These views helped create support for a meeting of the ASEAN 
members along with Japan, China and South Korea in Kuala Lumpur in 
December 1997 that led to the inauguration of the ‘ASEAN Plus Three’ 
forum.24 Australia had been able to participate as a founding member 
in the security grouping that ASEAN had sponsored, the ARF, but 
Australia was not a member of this new group. 
The advent of ASEAN Plus Three clearly challenged Australia’s 
view of its Asian role and how best to approach emerging patterns 
of cooperation involving ASEAN and Northeast Asia. The Howard 
Government ultimately adopted a cautiously positive approach to the 
new group.25 The government’s second foreign policy White Paper, 
released in 2003, stated:
While the process still has a long way to go before its full significance 
can be determined, it is reasonable to assume that there will be a 
benefit to the region and to partners such as Australia in a process 
which fosters dialogue and co-operation among the countries of East 
Asia and thereby contributes to stability and harmony … Australia 
would be pleased to be involved in the ASEAN+3 process. We have 
registered our interest in joining the grouping if invited at some later 
stage.26
24  Richard Stubbs, ‘ASEAN Plus Three: Emerging East Asian Regionalism?’ Asian Survey, 42(3) 
2002: 441–8.
25  The issue of how Australia should approach ASEAN Plus Three was discussed by Downer 
and the members of his foreign affairs council of academic and private sector advisors. Milner 
considers that the council’s views were an important influence on the government’s thinking on 
the issue; Anthony Milner, personal communication, 30 November 2014.
26  Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Advancing the National Interest: 




Although Australia did not gain entry to the ASEAN Plus Three 
grouping, it was later able to participate in a dialogue that grew out 
of this grouping, the East Asia Summit (see below).
East Timor’s independence
A further significant issue for Australia and Southeast Asia in this 
period was the process of conflict and change that led to independence 
for the territory of East Timor.27 This process can be seen partly as 
another major outcome of the Asian financial crisis, which had led to 
the resignation of President Suharto and the potential for new policy 
avenues for Indonesia and for East Timor. 
The status of East Timor had been a focus of strain and tension 
in Australia–Indonesia relations since 1975. Australia after 1979 
under successive governments had maintained de jure recognition 
of Indonesia’s incorporation of the territory. When the Howard 
Government came to office there was no sign that Australian 
policymakers expected any change to the territory’s status: Downer 
commented in April 1996 in relation to the condition of human rights 
in East Timor, that the issue was a ‘pebble in the shoe’ of the Australia–
Indonesia relationship and that little would be achieved by making an 
‘enormous amount of noise’.28
In the years after 1975, however, it was clear that Indonesia’s 
incorporation of East Timor had not been accepted by the great 
majority of the East Timorese people and ongoing conflict in the 
territory, which had involved the loss of as many as 200,000 lives, had 
been highlighted again by the Santa Cruz massacre in November 1991 
(in which between 200 and 500 people were shot or disappeared).29 
The end of the Suharto regime opened the way for revision of attitudes 
towards the territory in Australia and the Howard Government altered 
Australian policies. Howard sent a letter in December 1998 to President 
B. J. Habibie (Suharto’s successor), proposing that Indonesia review 
its position and consider a transition to autonomy for the territory. 
When  President Habibie announced in January 1999 a change of 
27  For a comprehensive analysis, see James Cotton, East Timor, Australia and Regional Order: 
Intervention and its Aftermath in Southeast Asia, London: Routledge, 2004.
28  Greenlees, ‘Downer Assigns Asia Top Priority’.
29  Cotton, East Timor, p. 53.
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policy that would review the status of the territory, a process was 
initiated that led to a ballot on 30 August 1999 on a proposal for a 
revised status of ‘special autonomy’ for East Timor within Indonesia.30 
The voters decided by a majority of 78.5 per cent to reject the proposed 
special autonomy and to separate from Indonesia.31 The lead-up to the 
ballot was accompanied by substantial violence, particularly by pro-
Indonesian militias, and further serious violence occurred after the 
ballot. In this circumstance, Australia took a leading role in seeking to 
facilitate an intervention authorised by the United Nations (UN) and 
accepted by the government of Indonesia.32
In the years after 1975, ASEAN members had not criticised Indonesia’s 
policies in East Timor because of ongoing sensitivities in the region 
in relation to the principle of non-interference in internal affairs and 
the members’ reluctance to criticise Indonesia, given its central role 
in ASEAN.33 In the period up to the 30 August ballot, neither ASEAN 
nor the ARF – which operated on the basis of consensus in discussion 
and decision-making – played any major role in deliberating on 
or attempting to influence the process of change in East Timor.34 
In relation to regional groupings, it was a summit of APEC (in Auckland 
in September 1999) where a number of bilateral discussions were 
held on the sidelines of the summit meetings, with Australia playing 
a leading role, which helped develop a multilateral response to the 
crisis. James Cotton has observed that ‘[w]hen confronted by the 
post-ballot bloodshed and the Indonesian Government’s clear inability, 
or disinclination, to discharge its obligations to the United Nations 
and to the East Timorese to maintain order, ASEAN as an organisation 
could find no mechanism through which to influence developments’.35
30  Ibid., pp. 49–67.
31  The ballot presented two options to voters: ‘Do you accept the proposed special autonomy 
within the unitary state of the Republic of Indonesia?’ and ‘Do you reject the proposed special 
autonomy for East Timor, leading to East Timor’s separation from Indonesia?’ See ‘Question 
of East Timor: Report of the Secretary-General’, New York, United Nations, 5 May 1999, in 
Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, East Timor in Transition 1998–2000: 
An Australian Policy Challenge, Canberra: Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 
2001, p. 206.
32  Cotton, East Timor.
33  Alan Dupont, ‘ASEAN’s Response to the East Timor Crisis’, Australian Journal of International 
Affairs, 54(2) 2000.
34  Amitav Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the 
Problem of Regional Order, 3rd edn, Abingdon: Routledge, 2014, pp. 152–3.
35  Cotton, East Timor, pp. 82–3.
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Subsequently, four ASEAN members (Thailand, the Philippines, 
Malaysia and Singapore) took part on an individual basis in 
INTERFET (International Force for East Timor), which entered East 
Timor to promote stabilisation, with Thailand providing the deputy 
commander for the force. The participation of the four ASEAN 
members was important to the success of INTERFET; of the total force 
of 9,900 deployed in late September 1999, about 2,500 were from the 
four ASEAN members, with Australia providing 5,500 personnel. 
Alan Dupont has observed that ‘[w]ithout ASEAN participation 
Australia would have been dangerously isolated regionally and even 
more stretched militarily on the ground in East Timor’.36 
Australia played a very substantial role in INTERFET and provided the 
commander, Major-General Peter Cosgrove, who became the second 
Australian military leader in a decade to lead a multinational force 
to promote security and stabilisation in a UN-authorised operation 
in Southeast Asia. The Australian-led intervention succeeded in 
stabilising conditions and helped initiate a process of UN-sponsored 
assistance that led to East Timor gaining formal independence in 
May 2002. In the period leading up to the intervention and in the 
aftermath, Australia’s relations with Indonesia experienced severe 
strain. Indonesia abrogated the Australia–Indonesia Agreement on 
Maintaining Security that had been negotiated by Paul Keating’s 
government in December 1995.37 In the longer term, however, the 
process of independence for East Timor gradually removed an issue 
that had been a major obstacle and cause of tension in the Australia–
Indonesia relationship since the 1970s and this assisted in improving 
the climate for Australia’s ASEAN relations.
Hiatus in ASEAN relations
At the end of the 1990s there were indications of a sense of hiatus 
in Australia’s engagement with ASEAN. Australia had played a 
substantial role in contributing to efforts to alleviate the effects of 
the Asian financial crisis but Australia’s multilateral relationships 
with Southeast Asia experienced some setbacks. Several factors 
contributed to this. Australia’s image had been compromised by the 
36  Dupont, ‘ASEAN’s Response’, p. 166.
37  Jamie Mackie, ‘Australia and Indonesia: Current Problems, Future Prospects’, Lowy Institute 
Paper 19, Sydney: Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2007, pp. 59–62.
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controversy in Australia over the policies and approaches of Pauline 
Hanson, a controversial parliamentary candidate who had lost Liberal 
Party endorsement but had won a seat in Federal Parliament as an 
independent in the March 1996 elections: she went on to form the 
One Nation Party. In her inaugural speech in Federal Parliament in 
September 1996, Hanson had expressed concern at the level of Asian 
immigration to Australia and her popularity after 1996 was seen 
as harking back to earlier phases of Australian reservations about 
engagement with Asia. Although her party held only one seat in the 
national parliament, extensive media coverage in Australia and Asia 
gave the impression she represented a major new political force. Prime 
Minister Howard was perceived as having been slow to react to the 
rise of Hanson and his response drew some criticism both in Australia 
and in Southeast Asia.38
Further controversy was aroused by comments associated with 
Howard during the early phase of Australia’s involvement in East 
Timor after the 30 August 1999 ballot. In an article in September 1999 
in The Bulletin magazine in which he was interviewed by the journalist 
Fred Brenchley, Howard commented in positive terms about his 
government’s approach to Asian relations.39 He argued that the former 
Labor Government’s approach towards Asia made Australia look as 
though ‘we were knocking on their door saying “please let us in”: 
instead we were always somebody they would want to have in because 
of our particular strengths’. In the East Timor intervention, Howard 
suggested, Australia was playing an ‘influential, constructive and 
decisive role in the affairs of the region’. In the same article, however, 
Brenchley introduced the term ‘deputy’ to refer to Australia’s position 
vis-à-vis the United States in its approach to regional involvements.40 
Although Howard himself had not used the word ‘deputy’ and soon 
after disavowed it, the notion of Australia as a ‘deputy sheriff’ to the US 
gained considerable currency in Southeast Asia and attracted critical 
comments.41 Thailand’s Deputy Foreign Minister Sukhumbhand 
Paribatra compared Howard’s reported comments unfavourably 
38  Kelly, The March of Patriots, pp. 363–76. 
39  Fred Brenchley, ‘The Howard Defence Doctrine’, The Bulletin, 28 September 1999.
40  Ibid.
41  More than a decade later, a study found that the term ‘deputy sheriff’ was widely cited 
by analysts and officials in ASEAN members in relation to Australia–US relations; see Anthony 
Milner and Sally Percival Wood, eds, ‘Our Place in the Asian Century: Southeast Asia as 
“The Third Way”’, Melbourne: Asialink, University of Melbourne, 2012, p. 29. 
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with President Theodore Roosevelt’s recommendation to ‘talk softly 
and carry a big stick’. Dr Mahathir labelled Howard’s comment as 
‘unmitigated arrogance. When Australians claim to be Asian, they see 
only themselves lording it over [Asia].’ Malaysia’s Foreign Minister 
Syed Hamid denied that Australia had a leadership role: ‘We feel that 
regional affairs should be handled by the countries of the region. 
We do not need a supervisor or police inspector or anything of the 
sort to oversee our activities.’42 
Comments and reactions by the government also seemed to reflect 
reservations about the potential for regional institutions and for 
Australian involvement in them. In a speech in Beijing in April 2000, 
Downer appeared to place limits on the potential for Australia’s 
regional institutional ties. He suggested that Australia could not 
expect to take part in the ‘cultural’ and ‘emotional’ dimensions of 
East Asian regionalism and that its role would appropriately be in 
functional realms:
If we describe regionalism on the basis of what you might broadly 
describe as an emotional community of interests, then Australia 
doesn’t have those types of emotional association with the region, and 
ethnic and cultural associations very obviously … For us, regionalism 
is always going to be practical regionalism looking at ways that we 
can work with our region to secure our own economic and security 
objectives.43 
In July 2001, Downer expressed some frustration at the Asian 
(and  ASEAN) way of diplomacy in a speech in Singapore when he 
said, ‘ASEAN has a culture of working around problems rather than 
confronting them. The limits of this approach have been exposed by 
the financial crisis, and by the way in which expansion has increased 
ASEAN’s political and economic diversity’.44
These comments were perceived at the time as indicating that the 
government was stepping back from the challenges of institutional 
engagement in Asia.45 Milner observed about this period in Australian 
42  Quoted in Wesley, ‘Australia and the Asian Economic Crisis’, p. 316.
43  Paul Kelly, ‘One Club We Won’t Be Joining’, The Australian, 26 April 2000.
44  Alexander Downer, ‘What Australia Wishes for ASEAN’, Speech to the Singapore Institute 
for International Affairs, Singapore, 23 July 2001.
45  Greg Sheridan, ‘Inept Downer a Regional Flop’, The Australian, 28 April 2000.
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foreign relations that many of those Australians who had been deeply 
committed to developing Asian engagement, including members 
of the Coalition Government, were anxious:
They worried about the impact on the region of Australian talk about 
being the ‘strong man’ of Asia, and of the widely publicised suggestion 
that its special security role was that of a US ‘Deputy’. They were 
concerned also that Australians, in gaining a new confidence in their 
country and its values, were conveying an element of complacency 
and even belligerence in handling regional sensitivities.46
Against this background, it was notable that Australia’s long-standing 
efforts to increase dialogue and cooperation with ASEAN met some 
setbacks after 2000, on economic and political levels.
From 1993 Australia had sought an association between the Australia–
New Zealand Closer Economic Relations (CER) and the ASEAN Free 
Trade Agreement (AFTA). In October 1999, ASEAN and Australian 
and New Zealand ministers decided to establish a task force to explore 
a free trade linkage. ASEAN was willing to consider the proposal 
although it was known that Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines 
were not as keen on the concept as were Singapore, Thailand and 
Brunei, and that the Indochina countries were at best non-committal.47
At a meeting of ASEAN and the Australian and New Zealand ministers 
in Chiang Mai in Thailand in early October 2000, the task force 
recommended the establishment of a free trade area between AFTA 
and CER as desirable and feasible. However, the Chiang Mai meeting 
decided against pursuing any direct linkage between the two trade 
arrangements. Instead, the ministers decided to deflect the proposal 
by asking senior officials to study the scope for a ‘closer economic 
partnership’ to pursue trade facilitation and capacity-building. At a 
time when economic recovery was still not assured, some ASEAN 
members were reluctant to support further trade barrier cuts. However, 
it was significant that the countries opposing the linkage included not 
only Malaysia but also Indonesia, which in the early 1990s had been 
a key partner with Australia in pursuing regional trade liberalisation 
through APEC.48 
46  Milner, ‘Balancing “Asia”’, p. 46.




The rebuff for Australia highlighted the close inter-relationship 
between political and economic issues in ASEAN’s cooperation and 
external relations. The importance of political factors in any such 
negotiations was stated clearly by Malaysia’s Trade Minister Rafidah 
Aziz in a notable comment during the Chiang Mai meetings. Rafidah 
said that the free trade proposal ‘had to be looked at in its totality … 
It has to be a political decision and then we have to have the right 
environment. It’s not simply an economic thing, its political.’49 
Australia had a further setback in 2002 when it sought to gain dialogue 
status for Australia’s head of government at ASEAN’s leadership 
summit meetings (now held annually). At the summit in Phnom Penh 
in November 2002, Australia’s bid was supported by Brunei, Singapore 
and Cambodia, was opposed by Malaysia, and received only lukewarm 
support from Indonesia and Thailand.50 At the 2003 Bali meetings it was 
reported that Australia did not renew its efforts to gain representation 
and that the issue of Australian representation had been dropped from 
the agenda for discussion and had been shelved indefinitely.51 It thus 
seemed at this point as if Australia had little prospect of extending its 
interactions with ASEAN at the leadership level.
Renewal of progress: 2001–04
While Australia’s multilateral ASEAN relations had appeared to 
be at a low point at the beginning of the decade, several factors in 
the international and regional environment emerged after 2001 and 
contributed to a new and more positive context for the relationship. 
The key developments were the global and regional impact of the 
terrorist attacks in the US on 11 September 2001 and in Bali on 
12  October 2002, regional responses to China’s increasing role and 
profile, and leadership changes in two key members of ASEAN, 
Malaysia and Indonesia, which had significant implications for both 
bilateral relations and Australia’s relations with ASEAN overall. 
49  Tim Dodd, ‘ASEAN Stifles New Merger Deal’, Weekend Australian Financial Review, 
7–8 October 2000.
50  Mark Baker, ‘Beyond the Pale’, Sydney Morning Herald, 9 November 2002.
51  Mark Baker, ‘Australia Drops Bid to Join Summit’, The Age, 7 October 2003.
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The political context was clearly affected by the terrorist attacks 
in the US on 11 September 2001 (including the destruction of the 
World Trade Center in New York and the attack on the Pentagon in 
Washington) and the increased international and regional concerns 
about terrorism that followed. From late 2001, attention focused 
intensely on the threats perceived to be posed to the countries in the 
ASEAN region by terrorist movements of which Jemaah Islamiyah was 
the most prominent. Attention was heightened after the bombings in 
Bali in October 2002 (in which 88 Australians were among the 202 
persons killed), at the Marriott Hotel in Jakarta in August 2003 and 
outside the Australian Embassy in Jakarta in September 2004.52 
Australia after 2001 expanded cooperation on counter-terrorism, 
signing bilateral agreements with a number of ASEAN members and 
a multilateral declaration with ASEAN itself. The Australian Federal 
Police (AFP) developed close contacts with their regional counterparts. 
One reflection of this was an invitation to AFP Commissioner Mick 
Keelty to attend a meeting of ASEAN police chiefs as an observer in 
August 2004.53 
While security cooperation developed extensively, the issue of 
terrorism in Southeast Asia caused some tensions between Australia 
and ASEAN members. There was concern in Indonesia and Malaysia 
at raids by Australian security authorities within Australia against 
suspected supporters of Jemaah Islamiyah: Malaysia’s Prime Minister 
Mahathir accused Australia in November 2002 of being ‘unsafe for 
Muslims’.54 In December 2002, controversy arose when Howard 
was asked by a journalist whether he would consider launching 
‘pre-emptive’ strikes against terrorist bases overseas. Howard 
responded that ‘[i]t stands to reason that if you believe somebody was 
going to launch an attack on your country, either of a conventional 
kind or of a terrorist kind, and you had the capacity to stop it, and 
there was no alternative other than to use that capacity, then of course 
you would have to use it’.55 
52  Michael Wesley, ‘Rebuilding Engagement: Australia and South-East Asia’, in James Cotton 
and John Ravenhill, eds, Trading on Alliance Security: Australia in World Affairs 2001–2005, 
South Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2007, pp. 61–5.
53  ‘Building Trust with ASEAN’, Daily Telegraph, 14 August 2004.
54  Greg Sheridan, ‘ASEAN Thumbs Down Caps Our Bad Week in Asia’, The Australian, 
7 November 2002.
55  Steve Lewis, ‘Howard Runs the Gauntlet of Asia’, The Australian, 2 December 2002.
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Howard’s comments on ‘pre-emptive strikes’ had been made in the 
context of discussion in the US about pre-emption as a tool in foreign 
and security policy (including in the George W. Bush administration’s 
National Security Strategy in September 2002) and at a time when 
there was widespread debate in the US about a possible strike against 
the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq. They aroused regional sensitivities 
about interference in internal affairs and were criticised in several 
ASEAN member countries. Mahathir said that any pre-emptive 
strikes against Malaysian targets would be considered ‘an act of war’. 
Malaysia and the Philippines threatened to suspend bilateral counter-
terrorism cooperation with Australia and there were also critical 
editorials in the media in Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia 
and the Philippines.56 
Despite these arguments, Australia pursued extensive cooperation 
with ASEAN members on counter-terrorism after 2001. Most of the 
cooperation on terrorism in Southeast Asia was bilateral. However, 
this increased contact extended the sense of mutual interest between 
Australia and many ASEAN members, as ASEAN’s Secretary-General 
Ong Keng Yong emphasised in comments during a visit to Australia in 
April 2004. Ong noted that:
We have to talk about what are the substantial issues for us, and there 
are many shared challenges. One example is terrorism. Australia is 
a peaceful and stable country. It has a great influence in counter-
terrorism initiatives and, in this area at least, we are working together 
and through that we can socialise more and be more comfortable 
together.57 
A second key development in this period was ASEAN’s perceptions 
of  the rising economic and strategic presence of China in Southeast 
Asia. China had been involved increasingly in ASEAN-sponsored 
regional cooperation since the mid-1990s, particularly in the ARF. 
Its  economy continued to perform strongly through the period 
of the Asian financial crisis. In the wake of the crisis, China was 
participating in the ASEAN Plus Three process and it expanded 
interactions with ASEAN by the development of a China–ASEAN 
56  Wesley, ‘Rebuilding Engagement’, pp. 58–9. 
57  Tony Parkinson, ‘ASEAN Ready to Strengthen Australian Ties’, The Age, 14 April 2004.
125
4 . ThE ASIAN FINANCIAl CrISIS, mulTIlATErAl rElATIoNS ANd ThE EAST ASIA SummIT
Free Trade Agreement.58 While welcoming many aspects of China’s 
involvement, ASEAN members were also keenly aware that they 
were competing with it for access to foreign direct investment. This 
perceived competition was a stimulus for ASEAN to move to deepen 
its own cooperation through development of an ‘ASEAN community’, 
agreed at the Bali meetings in 2003 (see below).59 ASEAN members 
were also sensitive to China’s increasing strategic weight in Southeast 
Asia, which had been reflected in its growing emphasis on asserting 
its claims in the South China Sea (see Chapter 5).60
ASEAN members wanted to avoid an over-dependence on the Chinese 
market and maintain a diversity of international partnerships. ASEAN 
concluded an Economic Partnership Agreement with Japan in 2002. 
ASEAN also moved to increase interest in associations with Australia 
and New Zealand. As has been noted, ASEAN had reasserted interest 
in considering an economic linkage with Australia and New Zealand in 
2002 and this was affirmed the following year. ASEAN also expressed 
interest in enhancing political dialogue with Australia. ASEAN’s 
Secretary-General Ong commented that ‘[w]e cannot just be focused 
on China or Japan or India. Australia is our neighbour and it’s been 
around South-east Asia for so long and its logical for us to try to find 
ways to strengthen the political relationship through more formal 
exchange’.61
A third key development in Australia’s regional relations after 2001 
was leadership transitions in Malaysia and Indonesia. In Malaysia, 
Mahathir had been a critic of Australia’s policies and had advocated 
a mode of regional cooperation with an explicit focus on East Asia, 
which would not include Australia. Malaysia had been a leading 
force in blocking consideration of a formal trade agreement with 
Australia in October 2000.62 Prime Minister Mahathir retired in 
November 2003 and his successor, Abdullah Badawi, adopted a more 
favourable attitude towards Australia. During a visit by Minister for 
58  Ian Storey, Southeast Asia and the Rise of China: The Search for Security, London: Routledge, 
2011, pp. 64–98.
59  Roberts, ASEAN Regionalism, pp. 88–101; Etel Solingen, ‘ASEAN Cooperation: The Legacy 
of the Economic Crisis’, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, 5(1) 2005: 20.
60  Michael Wesley, The Howard Paradox: Australian Diplomacy in Asia, 1996–2006, Sydney: 
ABC Books, 2007, pp. 91–8.
61  Parkinson, ‘ASEAN Ready’.
62  John Funston, ‘The Legacy of Dr Mahathir’, Australian Financial Review, 30 July 2004.
ENgAgINg ThE NEIghBoURS
126
Foreign Affairs Downer to Kuala Lumpur in April 2004, the two sides 
announced a new annual dialogue between their foreign ministries, 
annual consultations between senior officials on regional security 
issues and plans for a state visit by Prime Minister Badawi to Australia 
(which would be the first by a Malaysian prime minister since Dr 
Mahathir visited in 1984). It was made clear that Malaysia would 
now not block closer economic associations between Australia and 
ASEAN.63
Relations with Indonesia had been tense in the aftermath of the East 
Timor intervention and discord continued during the period of the 
presidency of Megawati Sukarnoputri (July 2001 – October 2004). 
However, new areas for dialogue and cooperation were developed, 
particularly after the Bali bombings in October 2002. Extensive 
cooperation developed in counter-terrorism activities, with AFP 
Commissioner Keelty and his counterpart General Da’i Bachtiar playing 
important roles. A component of AFP personnel was based in Jakarta 
and worked well with their Indonesian partners; dialogue between 
intelligence agencies was extensive.64 Counter-terror cooperation was 
a focus for increased numbers of ministerial visits; it was reported 
in December 2004 that there had been 42 such visits in the past two 
years, including nine by Downer.65
Australia sought to extend its cooperation with Indonesia through 
new multilateral dialogue. Australia and Indonesia co-hosted four 
workshops on counter-terrorism and illegal immigration in Bali 
between February 2002 and February 2004. The workshops were 
designed to pursue broader dialogue and cooperation on issues that 
had been the focus of discord in Australia’s regional relations. Tensions 
had developed over aspects of counter-terrorism policies (as  noted 
above). 
63  Mark Baker, ‘Malaysia’s New PM Leaves Mahathir’s Acrimonious Legacy at the 19th Hole’, 
The Age, 12 June 2004.
64  Patrick Walters, ‘Framework for Close Ties First Imperative’, The Australian, 12 November 
2004.
65  Andrew Burrell, ‘Downer Enjoys A Warmer North’, Australian Financial Review, 
8 December 2004.
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There had also been considerable disagreement over approaches towards 
illegal migration. From 1998, Australia had faced an increasing flow 
of asylum-seekers, who had come from countries outside Southeast 
Asia and transited through states in that region (particularly Malaysia 
and Indonesia) before travelling by boat to seek entry to Australia. 
Many boat journeys were organised by people-smugglers and the 
unauthorised arrivals were unpopular in Australia. The asylum-seeker 
issue was a focus of tension in key bilateral relationships, especially 
with Indonesia.66 The issue was highlighted further when Australia 
came into dispute with Indonesia in August 2001 over the issue of 
the MV Tampa, which Australian authorities had prevented from 
entering Australian waters while carrying asylum-seekers and which 
the government had tried to divert to Indonesia, the country through 
which the asylum-seekers had transited.67 
The Bali workshops sought to recast the issues of illegal migration 
and terrorism as ‘common management problems rather than the sites 
of rival responsibilities and prerogatives’ and helped defuse these 
issues as irritants in bilateral relations.68 The first Bali workshop (on 
people smuggling, trafficking in persons and related transnational 
crime) involved 38 countries, including all the ASEAN members. 
Michael Wesley has argued that the ‘Bali process’ of discussion 
achieved considerable success in this period in building increased 
cooperation in the areas addressed: ‘Australian officials realised from 
their experiences in gaining regional support for APEC and the 
ASEAN Regional Forum over a decade earlier, that a proposal strongly 
supported by significant regional countries would carry more weight 
than a proposal made by Canberra alone.’69 It was clear that Australia–
Indonesia cooperation was integral to the development of the Bali 
process. In another multilateral collaboration, Australia and Indonesia 
in December 2004 co-hosted the first of what became a series of inter-
faith dialogues in Jakarta to build understanding between Muslims 
and non-Muslims.70
66  Kelly, The March of Patriots, pp. 541–5.
67  For a detailed account of the issues in relation to the MV Tampa, see ibid., pp. 541–65.
68  Wesley, ‘Rebuilding Engagement’, p. 61. See also Wesley, The Howard Paradox, pp. 174–212.




The election of former general Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono as president 
in September 2004 brought to office a leader familiar with Australia 
(he had a son studying at university in Perth). Howard made a special 
visit to attend Yudhoyono’s inauguration, and was well received 
at the inauguration. He described his meeting with the president 
as ‘a wonderful opportunity to reaffirm the importance of the 
relationship’.71 Plans for further senior-level dialogue were developed 
and the potential for a new security agreement between the parties 
was foreshadowed. 
An unexpected and major additional basis for cooperation emerged 
after the tsunami that struck Indonesia and other countries in South and 
Southeast Asia on 26 December 2004, causing widespread destruction 
and the loss of over 200,000 lives. The Australian Government 
subsequently announced a A$1 billion aid package for Indonesia 
and the Australian public also contributed substantially. As well as 
extensive bilateral cooperation, Howard took part in a special ASEAN 
leaders’ meeting in Jakarta on 6 January 2005 attended by 23 countries 
to help co-ordinate relief.72 Following a visit to Australia by President 
Yudhoyono in March 2005, consideration was given to developing a 
formal security treaty and in November 2006 the Agreement between 
the Republic of Indonesia and Australia on the Framework for Security 
Cooperation (known widely as the Lombok Treaty) was unveiled, and 
was ultimately brought into effect in 2008.73 All these developments 
contributed greatly to bilateral relations and to Australia’s position in 
the ASEAN region overall. 
A fourth development in this period that aided Australia’s position 
in relation to ASEAN was an increased awareness of the depth and 
breadth of Australia’s interactions with Southeast Asia. A report 
issued by the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS) in 2004 
observed that:
71  Andrew Burrell, ‘PM Hails Stronger Ties with Jakarta’, Australian Financial Review, 
21 October 2004.
72  Patrick Walters and Roy Ecclestone, ‘PM to Fly to Jakarta Summit’, Weekend Australian, 
1 January 2005; John Howard, ‘Statement at the Special ASEAN Leaders’ Meeting on the 
Aftermath of the Tsunami, Jakarta Convention Centre, Indonesia’, Transcript, 6 January 2005.
73  Ian McPhedran, ‘Underlying Fears as Australia Strengthens Ties with Indonesia’, Adelaide 
Advertiser, 18 November 2006.
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[I]n recent years much of the real substance in the relationship between 
ANZ [Australia and New Zealand] and Southeast Asia has developed 
without the direct assistance or guidance of governments as private 
business, education and travel have mushroomed. From being largely 
government-fostered in the 1970s, the links between ANZ-Southeast 
Asia have become more broadly based and oriented towards closer 
contacts between people from the two areas.74 
The ISEAS report noted, for example, that in 2003 over 625,000 
Southeast Asians visited Australia, more than three times the numbers 
a decade earlier; in the same year, 722,000 Australians visited Southeast 
Asia, close to double the numbers in the early 1990s. Since 1991, over 
186,000 Southeast Asians had settled in Australia and in 2003 nearly 
76,000 Southeast Asians were studying in educational institutions in 
Australia (secondary and tertiary), up from 12,690 in 1990.75
Looking back at this period, Downer considered that Australia’s 
standing in ASEAN had increased substantially in the wake of the 
Asian financial crisis:
Their slightly patronising attitude towards Australia changed, and 
I’ve not seen it re-emerge … They learnt something between 1998 and 
2004, in those six years … they learnt something new about Australia 
they hadn’t known before; that is how big the Australian economy 
was and how capable Australia is … What Australia demonstrated 
between 1998 and the end of 2004–early 2005 was capability, it could 
do things. It was solid through the Asian economic crisis and it won a 
degree of respect for its solidity and stability. And then there was East 
Timor when they suddenly could see Australia could act decisively to 
make things happen … [T]he response to the tsunami by Australia was 
massively beyond their expectations.76
74  Michael Richardson, ‘Shared Perceptions’, in Michael Richardson and Chin Kin Wah, 
Australia–New Zealand & Southeast Asia Relations: An Agenda for Closer Cooperation, Singapore: 
ISEAS Publications, 2004, pp. 35–6.
75  Ibid., p. 38.
76  Downer, interview with the author, April 2014.
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The Vientiane Commemorative Summit: 
November 2004
Opportunities now opened up for further multilateral linkages between 
ASEAN and Australia. ASEAN had been taking steps to deepen its 
own cooperation and these had implications for its major dialogue 
partners, including Australia. In the wake of the Asian financial crisis, 
ASEAN members had realised that if the Association was to retain 
credibility and momentum, it needed to deepen its economic and 
political cooperation. For example, ASEAN members were competing 
with China for foreign direct investment, but they were doing so as 
10 separate economies with many different sets of rules in economic 
activity. 
In October 2003, at a leaders’ summit in Bali (referred to as the 
‘second Bali  conference’, or ‘Bali II’, after the one held in 1976), 
ASEAN committed  itself to developing an ‘ASEAN Community’. 
The  members  endorsed the ‘Declaration of ASEAN Concord II’, 
which stated that ‘[f]or the sustainability of our region’s economic 
development we affirmed the need for a secure political environment 
based on a strong foundation of mutual interests generated by 
economic  cooperation’. To  pursue ASEAN’s goals, the members 
declared ‘[a]n ASEAN Community shall be established comprising 
three pillars, namely political and security cooperation, economic 
cooperation, and  socio-cultural cooperation that are closely 
intertwined  and mutually reinforcing for the purpose of ensuring 
durable peace, stability and shared prosperity in the region’.77
The ASEAN Bali Concord II declaration also reaffirmed ASEAN’s 
commitment to foster ASEAN competitiveness and a favourable 
investment environment, to enhance ‘economic linkages with the 
world economy’, and advance adherence to TAC as a functioning 
and effective code of conduct for the region.78 The target date set for 
achieving an ASEAN Community was the year 2020, but this was later 
brought forward to 2015. 
77  ASEAN, ‘Declaration of ASEAN Concord II (Bali Concord II)’, Bali, 7 October 2003.
78  Solingen, ‘ASEAN Cooperation’, p. 20. 
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Progress had been made by 2004 on a free trade deal between ASEAN 
and Australia and New Zealand. A meeting between ASEAN trade 
ministers and their Australian and New Zealand counterparts held in 
Brunei on 14 September 2002 declared support for expanding trade and 
investment and fostering closer economic integration. In August 2004, 
ASEAN economics ministers agreed with their Australian and New 
Zealand counterparts to begin negotiations on a free trade agreement 
in early 2005 with completion to be reached within two years.79
In this positive atmosphere, Australia and New Zealand were invited 
to attend a special summit meeting with the ASEAN members to 
commemorate 30 years of the multilateral relationship; the ASEAN–
Australia and New Zealand Commemorative Summit was held in 
Vientiane, Laos, on 30 November 2004. The meeting reviewed the 
wide areas of cooperation being pursued and the ASEAN members 
expressed their appreciation of Australia and New Zealand’s ongoing 
assistance to economic and social progress in ASEAN and to the 
bridging of the development gaps among ASEAN member states. 
The  ASEAN leaders also invited both Australia and New Zealand 
to extend their association with ASEAN. The meeting endorsed the 
proposal by economics ministers of the 12 countries and agreed to 
deepen economic relations through negotiations for an ASEAN–
Australia–New Zealand Free Trade Agreement. The chairman’s 
statement for the meeting reaffirmed the importance of the ASEAN 
TAC in building peace and stability in the region and strengthening 
ASEAN’s relations with its dialogue partners. The statement added:
In this connection, the ASEAN Leaders encourage Australia and New 
Zealand to positively consider acceding to the Treaty in the near future 
in the spirit of the strong trust and friendship between ASEAN and 
Australia and New Zealand, and their common desire to contribute to 
regional peace and stability.80
The ASEAN leaders at the Vientiane summit took another decision of 
major relevance to Australia. The leaders discussed the convening of a 
new dialogue, the East Asia Summit, and ‘agreed to hold the first EAS 
79  Chin Kin Wah, ‘Background to an Evolving ASEAN‒ANZ Relationship’, in Michael 
Richardson and Chin Kin Wah, Australia–New Zealand & Southeast Asia Relations: An Agenda 
for Closer Cooperation, Singapore: ISEAS Publications, 2004, pp. 22–3.
80  ASEAN, ‘Chairman’s Statement of the ASEAN–Australia and New Zealand Commemorative 
Summit’, Vientiane, 30 November 2004’.
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[East Asia Summit] in Malaysia in 2005, and in this connection tasked 
our foreign ministers to work out the details concerning its modality 
and participation’.81
The way was now open for a significant advance in Australia’s ASEAN 
association. In addition to the negotiations for an economic agreement, 
the East Asia Summit would bring together ASEAN and key dialogue 
partners. This was clearly of major interest to Australia, but the issue 
of the new summit became inter-linked with the question of ASEAN’s 
TAC and of whether Australia would accede to the treaty. This became 
a significant area of debate.
The TAC issue and the East Asia Summit 
The more favourable climate for Australian relations with ASEAN by 
2004 saw increased attention on whether and how Australia might 
be able to be more closely associated with ASEAN as an institution. 
In  this context, TAC gained greater attention. The original five 
ASEAN members had unveiled TAC at the Bali summit in February 
1976 (see Chapter 2) and it had been a central declaratory statement 
of principles of ASEAN cooperation. 
TAC was originally an agreement for ASEAN members and for other 
potentially interested countries in Southeast Asia. However, the treaty 
was amended in 1987 and again in 1998 to enable states beyond those 
considered to be ‘Southeast Asian’ to sign. Accession to TAC was seen 
by ASEAN as a central requirement for potential new members of the 
Association.82 Accession also became a way for non-ASEAN members 
to indicate formally their support for the Association and for its goals 
and policies. China in 2003 became the first non-potential member to 
sign TAC and other states followed suit including India, Japan and 
South Korea. By 2004, accession to TAC was therefore ‘on the agenda’ 
for countries seeking to advance interactions with ASEAN.83
81  ASEAN, ‘Chairman’s Statement of the 10th ASEAN Summit’, Vientiane, 29 November 2004.
82  Papua New Guinea became the first non-ASEAN member to accede to TAC in 1989.
83  Rodolfo C. Severino, Southeast Asia in Search of an ASEAN Community: Insights from 
the Former ASEAN Secretary-General, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2006, 
pp. 167–8.
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Hawke’s government had considered the possibility of Australian 
accession to the treaty in 1991 but, as noted in Chapter 3, ASEAN at 
that stage had not wanted other non-regional states to accede to the 
treaty and the issue had not been pursued further. The issue gained 
attention in the lead-up to the Vientiane summit when it was reported 
that a number of ASEAN members now considered that Australia 
should sign the treaty. Thai, Filipino and Indonesian officials urged 
Australia to sign and a foreign affairs adviser to President Gloria 
Macapagal-Arroyo stated that ‘[w]e think Australia should sign the 
[treaty] and that is something all the ASEAN leaders will talk about’.84 
The Howard Government’s initial attitude towards the treaty was 
negative. Downer, speaking in Parliament on 29 November 2004 just 
before leaving Australia for the Vientiane summit, invoked memories 
of an earlier era of regional cooperation (the 1955 Bandung Conference 
of Asian and African nations that had been viewed with disfavour by 
Robert Menzies’ government) when he said that:
One of the components of the Bandung Declaration was that 
governments that signed up to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation 
would abstain from the use of arrangements of collective defence to 
serve the particular interests of any of the big powers. Bearing that 
in mind, successive Australian governments … have interpreted that 
particular principle as one that would be inconsistent with the ANZUS 
alliance.85 
Downer noted that the preceding Labor Government had not moved 
to accede to the treaty during its 13 years in office.86 
Prime Minister Howard, in comments at a press conference in Vientiane 
on 30 November 2004, described the treaty as ‘an agreement which 
has its origins, has particular origins at a time when Australia was not 
part of ASEAN and we just don’t, for those reasons, think it’s, at this 
stage, appropriate to sign it’.87 Howard maintained his reservations 
84  Tim Colebatch, ‘Australia May Be Alone On Treaty’, The Age, 30 November 2004.
85  Aleander Downer, ‘Association of Southeast Asian Nations’, Question, in Commonwealth 
of  Australia Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Official Hansard, No. 2, 
29 November 2004, p. 32.
86  Ibid.




into the early part of 2005. At a joint press conference on 7 April 2005 
with the visiting Malaysian Prime Minister Badawi, Howard referred 
to the treaty as ‘of a mindset that we’ve all moved on from’.88 
TAC, however, was a significant issue for Australia in its approaches 
to ASEAN in 2005. At the 2004 Vientiane summit, Badawi suggested 
that Australia might be invited to the next ASEAN summit, to be 
held in Kuala Lumpur. This comment was made in the context of 
ASEAN’s decision in Vientiane to establish a new dialogue, the East 
Asia Summit. The importance of TAC was affirmed when ASEAN 
foreign ministers met in Cebu in April 2005 and clarified the criteria 
that would qualify countries to be considered as members of the East 
Asia Summit. Prospective East Asia Summit members, the ministers 
stated, must have ‘substantive relations with ASEAN, they must be 
a full dialogue partner, and they must accede to the TAC’.89 Australia 
met the first two criteria, but it would have to accede to the treaty to 
qualify fully for membership.
The announcement by ASEAN’s foreign ministers in Cebu necessitated 
a decision by Australia on TAC and stimulated a process of internal 
review in which Downer played a major part. On 12 April 2005, just 
a few days after Howard’s negative comments, Downer made the 
following statement:
[W]e’ve got some problems with the treaty. I mean the thing is in 
this country we do interpret treaties and other legal documents very 
literally. I mean we take the words to mean what they say and so, 
you know, that is obviously a problem for us in terms of some of the 
language of the treaty. But I don’t want to go into it in any more detail 
except to say two things. One, I’m very optimistic that Australia will 
be part of the East Asia Summit process and I think that is very good 
news for Australia in terms of its participation in regional architecture. 
In terms of the Treaty of Amity and Co-operation well, I’ve had 
discussions during President Yudhoyono and Abdullah Badawi’s visits 
about this issue with my counter-parts and further discussions last 
night with the Indonesian foreign minister. I think we can work our 
way through this issue.90
88  Quoted in James Cotton, ‘Asian Regionalism and the Australian Policy Response in the 
Howard Era’, Journal of Australian Studies, 32(1) 2008: 124.
89  ‘ASEAN: Sign the Pact or Stay Away’, The Australian, 12 April 2005.
90  Alexander Downer, media interview, 12 April 2005, quoted in Cotton, ‘Asian Regionalism’, 
p. 124.
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In late June 2005, Downer made it clear that the government realised 
that there was a direct linkage between signing TAC and being able 
to join the nascent East Asia Summit: 
If we can satisfy ourselves about various concerns we have then we 
would be prepared to sign it [TAC], particularly as signing it will 
ensure that Australia can participate in the East Asia Summit process 
and we see the East Asia Summit as the birth of a growing East Asian 
community, so it makes good sense for the region, for Australia to 
be involved. And if the price is signing the Treaty of Amity and 
Cooperation, we’ll do that, if we can sign it without it in any way 
interfering with treaties and other arrangements we have with 
countries outside of the ASEAN region.91
Downer acknowledged later that ‘I did have to persuade John Howard 
that I had to sign this thing … I told him not to worry about it; let me 
sign it and suck it up’.92 
The government had a deadline for its decision. In late July 2005, 
ASEAN was due to hold its annual ministerial consultations and 
would be preparing to launch the East Asia Summit. At the ASEAN 
ministerial meetings, a joint ASEAN–Australia statement on 28 July 
2005 announced that Australia would sign the treaty.93 The basis on 
which the government had acceded to the treaty was clarified by a 
subsequent submission to the Australian Parliament by the Department 
of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT). Under provisions introduced 
by the Howard Government, a parliamentary committee – the Joint 
Standing Committee on Treaties (JSCOT) – had been inaugurated 
to scrutinise all new treaty commitments.94 The DFAT submission 
included the text of the letter that Downer had sent on 13 July 2005 
to Lao Foreign Minister Somsavat Lengsavad (whose country was 
the chair of ASEAN for 2005) on Australia’s approach to the treaty. 
Downer’s letter noted that accession to TAC by Australia would not 
be ‘inconsistent with Australia’s treaty commitments, including on 
security matters’, particularly ANZUS and the Five Power Defence 
Arrangements. Accession would not place any limitation on Australia’s 
91  ‘Australia to Sign ASEAN Treaty’, The World Today, ABC Radio, 22 July 2005.
92  Downer, interview with the author, April 2014.
93  Cotton, ‘Asian Regionalism’, p. 124.
94  Ibid., p. 125.
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rights and obligations as a member of the UN, and it would not have 
any bearing on Australia’s relations with countries outside the ASEAN 
group.95 
Downer’s letter affirmed that the dispute resolution mechanism set 
out in TAC would only come into operation with Australia’s explicit 
approval.96 The government’s submission to JSCOT made clear that 
in accepting the treaty’s provision for the ‘renunciation of the threat 
or use of force’, Australia also retained its rights under the United 
Nations Charter (in Article 51) that recognises the right of states to 
engage in self-help to maintain their collective defence.97 Australia 
was thus explicitly retaining its right to take independent actions in 
foreign and security policy, alongside its accession to the treaty. 
Since discussions about TAC had included the issue of Australia’s 
commitment to the ANZUS alliance, the government evidently 
considered it appropriate to discuss its decision to accede to the treaty 
with the US. Howard raised the issue of the treaty and the advent of 
the new East Asia Summit with Bush in a visit to Washington in late 
July 2005 (which was after Australia had acceded to the treaty). It was 
reported that President Bush said that he would be glad for Australia 
to join the East Asia Summit and to sign TAC. A US official said after 
the meetings that the Bush administration considered that it was in 
the interests of the US for Australia, Japan and other allies to join the 
new Summit to ‘counter’ the presence of China.98 
The process by which Australia signed TAC and set out its explicit 
conditions in so doing had relevance for the US approach towards the 
treaty. A paper prepared by the United States Congressional Research 
Service in May 2009 cited the example of Australia in pursuing 
accession as having relevance for the US as it now moved towards 
95  Ibid.
96  Under TAC, a High Council comprising of ministers (presumably foreign ministers) can 
be convened to ‘take cognizance of disputes or situations likely to disturb regional peace and 
harmony’, and in case the parties to a dispute are unable to settle it through negotiations, make 
recommendations on ‘appropriate means of settlement’. Resort to the High Council and any 
action taken by it needs the consent of all parties to the dispute. The Council has never been 
convened by ASEAN. See Severino, Southeast Asia, pp. 11–12.
97  Cotton, ‘Asian Regionalism’, p. 125.
98  Peter Hartcher and Cynthia Banham, ‘Bush Gives Howard the Nod for Summit’, Sydney 
Morning Herald, 21 July 2005.
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acceding itself. The paper included the text of Downer’s 13 July 2005 
letter to the Lao foreign minister and the Lao minister’s letter of reply 
(the US went on to accede to TAC in July 2009, see Chapter 5).99
With TAC signed, Australia could look forward to joining the new East 
Asia Summit. The process through which the East Asia Summit was 
established, however, illustrated again the difficulties and obstacles 
posed by the sensitivities and competitive tensions among the 
major powers, particularly China and Japan, to efforts at multilateral 
cooperation in East Asia.
Joining the East Asia Summit
The proposal for an East Asia Summit grew out of suggestions made 
by President Kim Dae-jung of South Korea at the second meeting 
of the ASEAN Plus Three grouping, in Vietnam in November 1998, 
that an East Asia Vision Group should explore the prospects for the 
formation of an East Asian community. The vision group comprised 26 
civilian experts and was tasked to research and recommend concrete 
measures that ASEAN Plus Three could take to increase East Asian 
regional cooperation. In 2001 the group released its findings and 
among the conclusions was a proposal for an East Asia Summit. Based 
on its assessments of regional developments, the group envisaged that 
East Asian nations would move towards the development of an East 
Asian community. Such a community, the group suggested, would 
benefit the states in the region and could be achieved by building on 
the existing cooperation processes. The East Asia Summit would be 
a useful way of building community and pre-empting or resolving 
future regional challenges that might arise.100
ASEAN and its partners in the ASEAN Plus Three group did not move 
immediately to develop an East Asia Summit. At their 2002 summit 
in Phnom Penh, the ASEAN Plus Three leaders had ‘expressed their 
willingness to explore the phased evolution’ of the ASEAN Plus 
99  Mark E. Manyin, Michael John Garcia and Wayne M. Morrison, ‘US Accession to 
ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC)’, CRS Report For Congress, Washington, DC: 
Congressional Research Service, 5 May 2009, pp. 19–22.
100  Ralf Emmers, Joseph Chinyong Liow and See Seng Tan, The East Asia Summit and the 
Regional Security Architecture, Maryland Series in Contemporary Asian Studies, No. 3, Baltimore, 
MD: School of Law, University of Maryland, 2010, pp. 22–3.
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Three summit into an East Asia Summit.101 However, at ASEAN’s 
annual summit in December 2004 in Vientiane, Malaysian Prime 
Minister Badawi (as the host of the next ASEAN summit, to be held 
in Kuala Lumpur in 2005) announced that an East Asia Summit 
would be convened during those meetings. The intended participants 
were not specified at the Vientiane summit. This set the scene for 
some  competitive diplomacy about exactly who the participants 
should be.102
The initial reactions to the proposal for an East Asia Summit had been 
cautiously favourable and it was notable that the kind of summit 
suggested would be based on a membership exclusively from East 
Asia itself. However, the sensitivities involved in efforts to pursue 
regional cooperation soon became evident, particularly because of the 
competing interests of China and Japan.103 As Mohan Malik suggested:
The EAS began with a backdrop of intense diplomatic maneuvering 
and shadow boxing, and ended with the power game being played 
out in the open. China and Japan were locked in a bitter struggle for 
supremacy, with Beijing attempting to gain the leadership position 
in the planned EAC (i.e. East Asian Community), and Tokyo trying 
to rein in its rival with the help of other ‘China wary’ nations in the 
Asia-Pacific.104
China was initially enthusiastic about the East Asia Summit proposal 
and argued that it should most appropriately be based on the 
13 member countries of ASEAN Plus Three. In China’s view, ASEAN 
Plus Three could become the East Asia Summit, with the chair rotating 
among the 13 members.105 In the case of Malaysia, initiatives such as 
ASEAN Plus Three and the East Asia Summit were seen as extensions 
of proposals by Prime Minister Mahathir for the creation of an 
exclusively East Asian grouping, proposals that had been supported 
by China.106
101  Severino, Southeast Asia, p. 270.
102  Ibid., pp. 270–1.
103  Michael Yahuda, Sino-Japanese Relations after the Cold War: Two Tigers Sharing a Mountain, 
Abingdon: Routledge, 2014, pp. 82–98.
104  Mohan Malik, ‘China and the East Asian Summit: More Discord than Accord’, Honolulu: 
Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, February 2006.
105  Chien-Peng Chung, ‘China and Japan in “ASEAN Plus” Multilateral Arrangements: Raining 
on the Other Guy’s Parade’, Asian Survey, 53(5) 2013: 812–15.
106  Emmers, Liow and Tan, The East Asia Summit, p. 23.
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However other states were reserved about the prospect of a summit 
based solely on ASEAN Plus Three membership, since this would be 
likely to be open to a high level of influence from China. In ASEAN, 
this view was held strongly by Indonesia: President Yudhoyono in 
February 2005 expressed support for the inclusion of India, Australia 
and New Zealand.107 Indonesia’s view was supported by countries 
including Singapore and Vietnam. Japan, with the backing of these 
members of ASEAN, argued that other relevant countries, in particular 
India and Australia, should be invited to join the new forum. China 
continued to argue against this proposal into the early months of 2005, 
but most ASEAN members came to support the Japanese position. 
It was ultimately resolved at the ASEAN meeting in Cebu in April 2005 
that India, Australia and New Zealand would be invited as inaugural 
members of the Summit.108
After the issue of participation in the first East Asia Summit was 
agreed, dispute continued about the character and possible role of 
the Summit.109 China argued that the ASEAN Plus Three membership 
should be considered to be a ‘core’ group in subsequent efforts to 
develop an ultimate East Asia community and was reported to have 
gained some support for this approach from Malaysia, Thailand, 
Myanmar and South Korea. However, China’s notion of a ‘two tiered’ 
East Asia Summit, with the ASEAN Plus Three grouping as the centre 
for concerted cooperation efforts, was resisted by Japan, India and 
Australia, with support from Indonesia and Singapore.110 
Tensions between China and Japan were evident during the lead-
up to the first meeting of the Summit in Kuala Lumpur. Disharmony 
between the two countries had been increased by the visit to the 
Yasakuni shrine in Tokyo by Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro.111 
The lack of accord between the two largest East Asian nations was 
107  Severino, Southeast Asia, p. 271.
108  Malik, ‘China and the East Asian Summit’, pp. 2–4.
109  ‘Japan, China Clash Over E. Asia Summit’, Yomiuri Shimbun, 25 November 2005.
110  Richard McGregor and Anna Fifield, ‘Divisions Undermine East Asia Summit’, Financial 
Times (London), 1 December 2005.
111  The Yasakuni shrine has been a source of discord in Japan’s relations with its neighbours, 
especially China and South Korea. The shrine is a memorial to Japan’s war dead but it includes 
among those remembered 14 figures determined by the Allies after the Second World War to 
have been ‘Class A’ war criminals. Visits to the shrine by Japanese political figures, especially the 
prime minister, have aroused concern and protest by neighbouring states on several occasions, 
particularly from China; see Yahuda, Sino-Japanese Relations, pp. 44‒52.
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highlighted by the refusal of Premier Wen Jiabao to hold a bilateral 
meeting with his counterpart Prime Minister Koizumi during their 
visits to Kuala Lumpur for the ASEAN meetings and the first East Asia 
Summit.112 The new East Asia Summit had been inaugurated but the 
discord on public display between China and Japan emphasised that 
the prospects for the Summit were, from the start, uncertain. 
Australia and the first East Asia Summit: 
December 2005 
At the first East Asia Summit on 14 December 2005 the emphasis 
was on developing communication among the members. The ‘Kuala 
Lumpur Declaration on the East Asia Summit’ affirmed that the East 
Asia Summit was intended to be an ‘open, inclusive, transparent 
and outward-looking forum in which we strive to strengthen global 
norms and universally recognised values with ASEAN as the driving 
force working in partnership with other participants of the East Asia 
Summit’. The Summit would be ‘convened regularly’, would be hosted 
and chaired by an ASEAN member and would be held ‘back-to-back 
with the annual ASEAN Summit’.113
Initial reactions to the Summit were cautious. Some observers argued 
that the East Asia Summit was an important further step toward 
dialogue in a region that had strong motivations for cooperation, but 
which would not necessarily follow the type of institution-building 
models pursued by other regions (particularly Europe).114 Other 
analysts emphasised the wide differences in character and policy 
among the members and the very cautious nature of the first meeting. 
Malik commented that ‘[i]n the absence of a thaw in Sino-Japanese or 
Sino-Indian relations or great power cooperation, the EAS is unlikely 
to take off because multilateralism is a multi-player game … At best, the 
EAS will be a talk shop like the APEC or the ARF where leaders meet, 
declarations are made, but little community building is achieved.’115
112  McGregor and Fifield, ‘Divisions Undermine East Asia Summit’.
113  ASEAN, ‘Kuala Lumpur Declaration on the East Asia Summit’, Kuala Lumpur, 14 December 
2005.
114  Barry Desker, ‘Why the East Asian Summit Matters’, PacNet, No. 55B, Pacific Forum/CSIS, 
Hawaii, 19 December 2005.
115  Mohan Malik, ‘The East Asia Summit: More Discord than Accord’, YaleGlobal Online, 
20 December 2005.
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The Australian Government’s approach was positive but also cautious. 
In a speech on 1 December 2005 just before the Summit, Downer 
suggested that the character and direction of the East Asia Summit 
might take some time to become apparent but welcomed the fact that 
Australia would be an inaugural participant. Downer expected the 
Summit to develop alongside other institutions and in a pluralist 
regional environment: 
This is just the first meeting and nothing is set in stone. And if there 
is to be an emergence of an East Asian community, it will not, in 
my view, be built around one institution or meeting. An East Asian 
community will emerge for practical reasons, not for ideological 
reasons. APEC, the ASEAN Regional Forum, ASEAN plus three, and 
the East Asia Summit will all contribute to an open but increasingly 
integrated region … 
The East Asia Summit is only in its very first iteration and will take 
some time to bed down. But we can say now that we have a regional 
architecture that serves Australia’s interests well. It is open and 
inclusive. It addresses security and economic issues in a practical way. 
And Australia has a very strong voice in how it develops.116
Prime Minister Howard, in Kuala Lumpur on 14 December 2005, just 
before the Summit, stated that ‘although the meeting is a short one, 
it’s a very important one not only for its symbolism but also for its 
substance because it will bring together for the first time, 16 countries 
of the East Asian region. We will have an opportunity to talk necessarily 
in general terms about the major issues confronting the region.’ Howard 
emphasised that the Australian Government continued to see APEC as 
the single most important avenue for regional dialogue: he commented 
that APEC is ‘the premier body’ that has the ‘great advantage … that it 
does bring the United States to this region … I’ve got APEC and now 
I’ve got this, they’re all important and they all have a role to play’.117 
Gaining entry to the East Asia Summit was a high point for the 
Howard Government in foreign policy and for Australia’s multilateral 
engagements with ASEAN and East Asia. It meant that Australia had 
been able to participate in all the ASEAN-sponsored groupings in 
116  Alexander Downer, ‘Australia’s Engagement with Asia’, Speech to the Asialink Chairman’s 
Dinner, Melbourne, 1 December 2005.




which it was eligible to be a member. Australia had now entered a 
regional cooperation institution that included the three major East 
and South Asian powers (China, Japan and India), but not the US.118 
Paul Kelly observed in August 2005 that ‘the irony is stunning: the 
most pro-US government in Australia’s history has taken Australia 
into an East Asia structure that excludes the US. It is exactly what 
Paul Keating, with Clinton, fought to avoid throughout his prime 
ministership.’119 Six years later, however, the East Asia Summit was 
expanded to include the US and Russia, as ASEAN continued to seek 
to broaden and balance its dialogue forum to include all the major 
powers.
Conclusion
Australia’s ASEAN relations encountered some strains and pressures 
after 1996. Australia provided substantial support to two key ASEAN 
members, Indonesia and Thailand, during the Asian financial crisis 
after mid-1997, but for several years Australia seemed to downplay 
multilateral engagements. The crisis over East Timor in 1999 and 
the Australian-led intervention helped resolve the instability in the 
territory but it caused strains with Indonesia. At the beginning of 
the new decade, Australia’s ASEAN relations seemed to be in a period 
of some hiatus and its efforts to advance economic relations (through 
the AFTA–CER linkage proposal) and to enhance its dialogues with 
ASEAN did not succeed.
However, after 2001 the climate for relations was transformed. The 
challenge of terrorist threats internationally and in Southeast Asia 
produced substantial cooperation with ASEAN members, China’s 
rising profile encouraged a re-evaluation in ASEAN of Australia’s 
relevance as a regional partner, leadership changes in Malaysia and 
Indonesia facilitated multilateral interactions and Australia’s profile as 
a valuable economic partner was enhanced in the wake of the financial 
crisis. Important steps were possible, with agreements reached to 
pursue in earnest the AFTA–CER negotiations and then through 
ASEAN’s decision to invite Australia to take part in the new East Asia 
Summit. After hesitation about signing TAC, Australia took that step 
118  Paul Kelly, ‘The Day Foreign Policy Won Asia’, Weekend Australian, 6 August 2005.
119  Ibid.
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and became an inaugural member of the East Asia Summit. Australia 
therefore now had the potential to advance cooperation in both 





From the ‘Asia Pacific Community’ 
to the fortieth anniversary summit 
and beyond (2007‒2015)
The years after 2007 saw considerable policy continuity in Australia’s 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) relations. Australia 
concluded a multilateral free trade agreement with ASEAN and New 
Zealand and joined new ASEAN-sponsored ministerial-level dialogues 
in economic cooperation and defence and security, the Regional 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) negotiations and the 
ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM) Plus Eight. ASEAN in 
this period was moving to consolidate its own cooperation through 
the development of a new Charter as it pursued the commitments 
it had made in 2003 to develop an ‘ASEAN Community’. Australia 
strengthened its institutional linkages with ASEAN and appointed 
an ambassador to the Association in 2008. Australia, however, also 
encountered substantial discord with ASEAN over a proposal for 
a wider regional ‘Asia Pacific Community’. A key theme recurred – 
the challenges for Australia in relating to ASEAN as an institution. 
To explore these issues, this chapter discusses in turn the Kevin Rudd 
Government’s ASEAN policies with particular reference to the Asia 
Pacific Community proposal and regional responses; the Julia Gillard 
Government’s approach to ASEAN including regional economic and 
security cooperation, increasing tensions in relation to the South China 
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Sea and developments in Myanmar; and Tony Abbott’s government, 
the 2014 Commemorative Summit and the continuing challenge 
of major power competition in Southeast Asia.
The Rudd Government, Southeast Asia 
and ASEAN
From December 2007 to September 2013, Australian policies towards 
Southeast Asia and ASEAN were directed by Labor governments led 
first by Rudd and then by Gillard (from June 2010), with Rudd making 
a brief return to office as prime minister (June to September 2013). 
Rudd as Opposition spokesperson on foreign affairs and then as leader 
of the Australian Labor Party from December 2006 had advanced a 
foreign policy for Labor based on ‘three pillars’ – commitment to the US 
alliance, emphasis on engagement with the Asia-Pacific, and support 
for the United Nations (UN) and multilateral cooperation.1 This was 
effectively a restatement of long-standing Labor Party emphases in 
Australian foreign policy, rather than a new departure. Rudd was 
also highly critical of some of the John Howard Government’s foreign 
policies, especially its support for the US-led invasion of Iraq in 
2003.2 In office after the elections of 24 November 2007, the Rudd 
Government placed special emphasis on Australia’s major power 
relations. Rudd reaffirmed the primacy of the alliance with the US 
as ‘our key strategic partnership and the central pillar of Australian 
national security policy’.3 The evolution of the US role in the Asia-
Pacific and in particular its relationship with China was crucial; Rudd 
said in April 2008 of the US and China that ‘[f]or Australia, the single 
core question of whether ours will be a Pacific century rests on the 
long-term management of this most critical relationship’.4
1  See Kevin Rudd, ‘Smart Power’, The Diplomat, February–March 2007.
2  See Allan Gyngell, ‘Emerging Challenges for Australian Foreign Policy’, Australian Journal 
of International Affairs, 68(4) 2014.
3  Kevin Rudd, ‘National Security’, Ministerial Statement, in Commonwealth of Australia 
Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Official Hansard, No. 18, 4 December 2008, 
p. 12552.
4  Quoted in Allan Gyngell, ‘Ambition: The Emerging Foreign Policy of the Rudd Government’, 
Analysis, Sydney: Lowy Institute for International Policy, December 2008, p. 5. On the Rudd 
Government’s approach towards the US and China, see Alan Bloomfield, ‘To Balance or to 
Bandwagon? Adjusting to China’s Rise during Australia’s Rudd–Gillard Era’, Pacific Review, 
published online, 16 March 2015.
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A key element in the Rudd Government’s approach to regional 
security challenges was its proposal for an ‘Asia Pacific Community’ 
(see below).5 In the multilateral arena, the government sought a seat 
on the UN Security Council (ultimately secured for the 2014–2015 
term), gave special emphasis to the development of the G20 (Group of 
Twenty) grouping, and made substantial efforts through the G20 to 
coordinate approaches to the global financial crisis from late 2008 (the 
dominant concern for the government in 2008 and 2009).6 Australia 
sought to contain the dangers from nuclear weapons by supporting 
the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and 
Disarmament.7 In 2010, Australia also finally gained membership in 
the Asia–Europe Meeting (ASEM) process, as a part of the ‘Asian’ 
side of the dialogue. This brought to realisation for Australia a group 
membership – with an ‘Asian chair’ – that Australia had sought since 
Paul Keating’s government in the early 1990s, although by the time 
Australia joined the success was primarily symbolic since ASEM had 
not attained a profile among the first rank of Asian and Asia-Pacific 
regional forums.8
With ASEAN, there were substantial areas of policy continuity in 
the Rudd Government’s approach. ASEAN itself had been moving 
to enhance its corporate character by adopting a new Charter. 
The Charter reaffirmed the key bases for ASEAN’s cooperation, made 
some revisions to the Association’s institutional structure and gave 
it a formal legal identity for the first time.9 A significant outcome 
of the Charter was an increased declaratory focus for ASEAN on 
human rights. In line with Article 14 of the Charter, the ASEAN 
Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights was inaugurated in 
2009. The commission followed long-standing ASEAN practices by 
5  Facing ASEAN opposition, this proposed ‘large C’ community became a discussion about 
a ‘small c’ community.
6  Gyngell, ‘Ambition’, p. 12.
7  Ramesh Thakur, ‘Nuclear-Free Dream For Real’, Canberra Times, 8 April 2010; Graeme 
Dobell, ‘Australia–East Asia/US Relations: Australia Adjusts to New Realities’, Comparative 
Connections: A Quarterly E-Journal on East Asian Bilateral Relations, 11(3) 2009.
8  Sebastian Bersick, ‘Europe’s Role in Asia: Distant but Involved’, in David Shambaugh and 
Michael Yahuda, eds, International Relations of Asia, 2nd edn, New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 
2014, pp. 131–2; Melissa Conley Tyler and Eric Lerais, ‘Australia and ASEM: The First Two 
Years’, Working Paper 2013/1, Caulfield East, Vic.: Monash University European and EU Centre, 
May 2013.
9  Mely Caballero-Anthony, ‘The ASEAN Charter: An Opportunity Missed or One that Cannot 
be Missed’, Southeast Asian Affairs 2008, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2008. 
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not including procedures for compliance or enforcement. ASEAN also 
issued a Human Rights Declaration in 2012. These developments were 
viewed as a cautious extension of ASEAN’s ambitions for regional 
dialogue.10
After the inauguration of the Charter, ASEAN was keen for dialogue 
partners to raise the profile of their institutional links with the 
Association. On 13 June 2008, Rudd visited the ASEAN Secretariat in 
Jakarta, and was the first head of government of a dialogue partner to 
do so. During the visit he announced the inauguration of the second 
phase of the ASEAN–Australia Development Cooperation Program 
through which Australia would provide high-level policy advice, 
research and implementation support to assist ASEAN in key areas 
of its economic cooperation, including harmonisation of standards, 
elimination of tariffs and reduction of non-tariff barriers. This 
assistance was a significant support for development of the ASEAN 
Economic Community, a key goal for the Association.11 In July 2008, 
the Minister for Foreign Affairs Stephen Smith announced that 
Australia would upgrade relations by nominating an ambassador to 
ASEAN. The ambassador would be a senior, Canberra-based diplomat 
whose duties would include participating in meetings at the ASEAN 
Secretariat and in other regional ASEAN meetings.12
The Rudd Government finalised the process begun under the 
Howard Government of negotiation of a trade agreement to link the 
ASEAN Free Trade Area with the Australia–New Zealand Closer 
Economic Relations (CER) and this was announced on 28 August 
2008. The  ASEAN–Australia–New Zealand Free Trade Agreement 
(AANZFTA) was introduced with an enthusiastic statement by the 
12 trade ministers involved: ‘The Ministers noted that the Agreement 
is an important milestone in the long-standing ASEAN–CER 
comprehensive partnership. As a living document, the Agreement 
10  Kathleen G. Southwick, ‘Bumpy Road to the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration’, Asia-
Pacific Bulletin, No. 197, Washington, DC: East–West Center, 22 January 2013; Mathew Davies, 
‘The ASEAN Synthesis: Human Rights, Non-Intervention, and the ASEAN Human Rights 
Declaration’, Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, 14(2) 2013.
11  Kevin Rudd, ‘Joint Press Statement with Ausaid: ASEAN and Australian Advances 
Cooperation in Economic Integration’, media release, Jakarta, 13 June 2008.
12  Mark Dodd, ‘Canberra to Assign an Envoy to ASEAN’, The Australian, 25 July 2008. 
On  5  September, the government announced that Gillian Bird, a deputy secretary in the 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, had been appointed to the post. See Stephen Smith, 
‘Diplomatic Appointment – Ambassador to ASEAN’, media release, 5 September 2008.
149
5 . From ThE ‘ASIA PACIFIC CommuNITy’ To ThE ForTIETh ANNIvErSAry SummIT
brings to a new height the level of cooperation and relationship 
between the governments of ASEAN, Australia and New Zealand as 
well as its [sic] peoples.’13
The Australian Government saw substantial benefits for Australian 
traders, including extensive tariff reductions, regional rules of origin 
that could provide new opportunities for Australian exporters to tap 
into production networks in the region, promotion of greater certainty 
for Australian service suppliers and investors including through 
enhanced protection for Australian investors in ASEAN members, and 
additional economic cooperation and business outreach programs.14 
The AANZFTA came into force in January 2010.15 Its potential impact 
on trade varied, essentially because ASEAN had made more progress 
on liberalising trade in goods than in services. The agreement would 
also come into effect gradually, because some ASEAN members needed 
time to adjust their domestic frameworks of laws and regulations and 
because some areas of liberalisation would not be implemented fully 
until at least 2020. It was difficult to assess the likely long-term impact 
of the agreement, but it marked a major advance in the institutional 
relationship.16
Australia’s ‘Asia Pacific Community’ proposal 
Other aspects of the Rudd Government’s approach proved controversial. 
As discussed in previous chapters, Australia’s relations with ASEAN 
have had tensions stemming from Australia’s interest in cooperation 
on a broader regional basis that can involve participation by ASEAN 
and the major powers (including Australia’s ally the United States). 
13  ASEAN, ‘Joint Media Statement of the Thirteenth AEM–CER Consultations’, Singapore, 
28 August 2008.
14  Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, ‘Overview and Key Outcomes of the 
ASEAN–Australia–New Zealand Free Trade Agreement’, Department of Foreign Affairs and 
Trade Speaking Notes for Presentation at Austrade’s ASEAN Now seminars, 15–30 October 
2009; Minter Ellison Lawyers, ‘The ASEAN Australia New Zealand Free Trade Agreement: 
Our Overview and Assessment’, April 2009.
15  The parties to the AANZFTA signed a protocol in August 2014 to provide improved 
administrative efficiency for customs authorities and to encourage enhanced business 
utilisation of the agreement; see Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, ‘Signature 
of AANZFTA Protocol’, media release, 27 August 2014.
16  Ibid. See also Razeen Sally, ‘ASEAN FTAs: State of Play and Outlook for ASEAN’s Regional 
and Global Integration’, in Sanchita Basu Das et al., eds, The ASEAN Economic Community: 
A Work in Progress, Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2013, pp. 357–62.
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Some early tension was evident in 1973 and 1974 when Gough 
Whitlam’s government proposed an Asia-Pacific forum (as discussed 
in Chapter 1). ASEAN sensitivity about its identity and position were 
also issues in the negotiations that led to the advent of the Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC) grouping and the ASEAN Regional 
Forum (ARF) in the period 1989–94 (discussed in Chapter 3). In 2008, 
Australian interests in regional institutional design again produced a 
contest with ASEAN. 
Rudd had come to office with a particular interest in relations among 
the major powers, especially the US and China, and in the potential 
for multilateral cooperation to help manage and stabilise regional and 
international relationships. In 2005, Australia had gained membership 
in the new East Asia Summit with the 10 ASEAN members, plus Japan, 
China, South Korea, India and New Zealand. On 4 June 2008, Rudd 
put forward a further ambitious proposal for multilateral cooperation. 
In a speech to the Asia Society AustralAsia Centre, he argued that 
it was desirable to review the long-term vision for the ‘architecture’ 
for the Asia-Pacific region.17 Strong and effective regional institutions, 
he  suggested, were needed ‘that will underpin an open, peaceful, 
stable, prosperous and sustainable region’. Rudd said that ‘we need 
to have a vision for an Asia Pacific Community’, which he suggested 
should be achieved by 2020. This vision needed to embrace ‘[a] regional 
institution that spans the entire Asia-Pacific region – including the 
United States, Japan, China, India, Indonesia and the other states of 
the region’, and ‘[a] regional institution which is able to engage in 
the full spectrum of dialogue, cooperation and action on economic 
and political matters and future challenges related to security’. Rudd 
argued that ‘[a]t present none of our existing regional mechanisms 
as currently configured are capable of achieving these purposes’ and 
proposed ‘a regional debate about where we want to be in 2020’.18
On the sensitive issue of how such a concept might affect existing 
regional institutions, Rudd said:
Such a debate does not of itself mean the diminution of any of the 
existing regional bodies. APEC, the ASEAN Regional Forum, the East 
Asia Summit, ASEAN Plus Three and ASEAN itself will continue 
17  Kevin Rudd, ‘It’s Time to Build an Asia Pacific Community’, Address to the Asia Society 
AustralAsia Centre, Sydney, 4 June 2008.
18  Ibid.
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to play important roles, and longer-term may continue in their own 
right or embody the building blocks of an Asia Pacific Community. 
There will be wide ranging views about this across the region – some 
more supportive than others. New bodies and new ideas will continue 
to emerge.19
Rudd mentioned the example of the European Union (EU), saying that 
while it was not an ‘identikit model’, the European case showed that 
it was necessary to take the first step. ASEAN, Rudd argued, was an 
example of the benefits of a long-term vision. ‘In a diverse region, 
ASEAN has brought together a varied group and forged a common 
outlook on many questions. ASEAN has built habits of cooperation 
and dialogue. And ASEAN has played a critical role in building and 
maintaining peace in the region through its work.’20 
In this speech, Rudd had recognised and praised ASEAN. However, his 
speech could also be seen as an implicit criticism of ASEAN’s efforts 
so far in sponsoring the ARF and the East Asia Summit as useful but 
inadequate bases for longer-term institutional development.21 Rudd’s 
comment that regional groupings, including ASEAN, would ‘continue 
to play important roles’, might ‘continue in their own right’, or indeed 
even ‘embody the building blocks of an Asia Pacific Community’, 
could be seen as a surprisingly casual reference to East Asia’s leading 
regional group, whose members might well not have welcomed the 
idea of their Association being considered as a building block for 
a wider community that they had not proposed. 
Rudd announced that he had appointed Richard Woolcott 
(former  secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 
(DFAT) who had been Prime Minister Bob Hawke’s envoy during the 
development of APEC) as his special envoy to consult on the proposal. 
Woolcott later confirmed that he had less than one day’s advance 
notice about the speech and his own nomination as special envoy.22
19  Ibid.
20  Ibid.
21  See Seng Tan, Multilateral Asian Security Architecture: Non-ASEAN Stakeholders, 
Abingdon: Routledge, 2016, pp. 48‒53; See Seng Tan, ‘Hobnobbing with Giants: Australia’s 
Approach to Asian Regionalism’, in Sally Percival Wood and Baogang He, eds, The Australia–
ASEAN Dialogue: Tracing 40 Years of Partnership, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014. 
22  Richard Woolcott, interview with Graeme Dobell, Sydney, October 2010 (used with the 
permission of Mr Dobell).
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Early comments in the Australian media noted that the Asia Pacific 
Community proposal had been announced with little advanced 
preparation or consultation and at an early stage in the Rudd 
Government’s term in office. Michelle Grattan described the 
announcement as ‘breathtaking’ but added that ‘[r]egional countries 
might see Rudd’s initiative as the new boy on the block getting above 
himself. Best to wait awhile before you throw your weight around’.23 
Some initial reactions in the ASEAN region were favourable. A senior 
Indonesian analyst, Hadi Soesastro, indicated support for the 
principles and vision underlying the proposal and said that Indonesia 
should back Australia on it:
Australian critics of Prime Minister Rudd’s Asia Pacific Community 
initiative have got it wrong about the idea not being well thought 
out. Kevin Rudd’s initiative should be seen as an invitation to other 
leaders, policy makers, and thinkers in the region to join ... in a serious 
discussion about how best the Asia Pacific region could be organized. 
If Rudd had come up with a fully-baked proposal, the exercise could 
be self-defeating. Evolving regionalism in Asia Pacific requires that all 
parties concerned should have an active part in the process, especially 
in the shaping of a new vision for the region … Indonesia should 
support Rudd’s initiative and the process of deliberations that will 
follow from it.24 
In early July 2008, Thailand’s Foreign Minister Noppadon Pattama 
expressed his country’s willingness to discuss the proposal: ‘Any idea 
that brings peace and stability to the region, we can’t see any reason 
why we shouldn’t study or deliberate the issue.’25 
However, most reactions in ASEAN were critical. In July 2008, Prime 
Minister Abdullah Badawi of Malaysia suggested that it would be 
desirable to develop the existing regional institutions: ‘[w]e already 
have a forum, the ASEAN Regional Forum. We can continue with 
the existing institutions’. The Indonesian Government was also not 
supportive: Vice President Yusuf Kalla commented that ‘[f]or me, 
it’s not necessary to make a new body. We already have ASEAN and 
23  Michelle Grattan, ‘The Danger of Taking on Too Much’, The Age, 6 June 2008; see also 
Paul Kelly, ‘Time May Not Be Ripe for Brave New Forum’, The Australian, 9 July 2008. 
24  Hadi Soesastro, ‘Kevin Rudd’s Architecture for the Asia Pacific’, East Asia Forum, 
9 June 2008.
25  ABC News, ‘Thailand Shows Interest in Rudd’s Asia-Pac Community’, 4 July 2008.
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APEC. There is no need for all countries in Asia Pacific to make one 
objective.’26 Indonesia’s official attitude was clearly notable given that 
country’s central role in ASEAN and its significance for Australia 
in collaboration on regional cooperation. In the same month Barry 
Desker, a Singaporean analyst and former senior official, said about 
Rudd’s proposal that ‘I would think it is dead in the water right from 
the very beginning. It would have been much more useful if it had 
been thought through before and conceptualised with regional leaders 
before it was presented as a bright new idea from Australia.’27 
At the time of ASEAN’s ministerial meetings in Singapore in late 
July 2008, the official spokesman for the meetings, Andrew Tan, 
commented that:
On this subject of a pan-Asian regional forum, or whatever name it 
is to be called, I think ASEAN countries have said that they are still 
waiting for more details of this proposal. The region itself is already 
quite complex so if there can be another regional process that can help 
us better manage this, there is no reason why we should stop it from 
being developed, but it also has to take into account the region’s view 
as well as regional sensitivities and regional circumstance.28 
The United States’ reaction was also cool.29 John Negroponte, Deputy 
Secretary of State in the George W. Bush administration, commented 
in late June 2008 that the US did not have details of the Rudd proposal, 
but emphasised the importance to the US of its major bilateral 
relations in the Asia-Pacific region and that ‘[i]t makes sense to aspire 
towards more meaningful region-wide institutions, but I think we’re 
very much at the beginning of that process in historic terms’.30 
Diplomatic cables released by WikiLeaks in late 2010 revealed that US 
officials in Canberra had been critical about the Rudd proposal; they 
were reported to have complained that the proposal reflected Rudd’s 
tendency to be ‘obsessed with managing the media cycle rather than 
engaging in collaborative decision-making’.31
26  Angus Grigg, ‘Blow to Rudd’s Asia Plan’, Australian Financial Review, 23 July 2008.
27  Patrick Walters, ‘Rudd Asia Plan “Dead in Water”’, The Australian, 4 July 2008.
28  Katrina Nicholas, ‘Smith Still Keen on New Regional Group’, Australian Financial Review, 
24 July 2008.
29  Baogang He, ‘The Awkwardness of Australian Engagement with Asia: The Dilemmas 
of Australian Idea of Regionalism’, Japanese Journal of Political Science, 12(2) 2011: 272–3.
30  Daniel Flitton, ‘US Diplomat Wary of Rudd’s Big Idea’, The Age, 30 June 2008.
31  Philip Dorling, ‘Rudd’s Man Criticised Hasty Asia-Pacific Community Plan’, Sydney Morning 
Herald, 24 December 2010.
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In subsequent statements, Rudd continued to advance his proposal, 
but with more explicit recognition of ASEAN’s contribution to regional 
cooperation. Speaking in Singapore in August 2008, Rudd placed 
strong emphasis on the contribution that had been made towards 
regional cooperation by ASEAN, which he called ‘an outstanding 
essay in institutional success’.32 In the latter part of 2008 and in 2009, 
Woolcott conducted a series of consultations in 21 countries to explore 
attitudes towards the Asia Pacific Community (the consultations 
included all ASEAN countries except Myanmar).33 
In an address to the Shangri-la Dialogue in Singapore in May 2009, 
Rudd presented preliminary findings from Woolcott’s consultations 
and argued that there had been broad agreement on the value of a 
focused discussion about how regional architecture should develop, 
and that there was recognition that there was at present no single 
forum for leaders to discuss the full range of political, strategic and 
economic challenges for the future. However, there was ‘no appetite 
for additional institutions’. He said that he would brief leaders at the 
forthcoming East Asia Summit and APEC meetings and that Australia 
would invite ‘key government officials, academics and opinion makers 
from around the region’ to attend ‘a one and a half track conference 
to further explore the idea of an Asia-Pacific community’. The speech 
marked the moment when the government made a symbolic change 
in  the way they referred to the proposal; the ‘large C’ Community 
became a ‘small c’ community.34
At the ‘one and half track’ meeting in Sydney on 3–5 December 2009, 
Rudd said that ‘ASEAN should be at the core of any future Asia Pacific 
community’. He sought to reassure Southeast Asian leaders that 
Australia’s diplomacy was not a threat to their regional significance: 
‘Our ambition in Australia has been to open paths to dialogue rather 
than to close them off, to listen as much as to speak, to encourage 
32  Kevin Rudd, ‘The Singapore Lecture: Building on ASEAN’s Success: Towards an Asia Pacific 
Century’, Singapore, 12 August 2008.
33  Woolcott visited Brunei, Cambodia, Canada, Chile, China, India, Indonesia, Japan, Laos, 
Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Russia, Singapore, South 
Korea, Thailand, the US, and Vietnam. See John Faulkner, ‘Questions on Notice: Mr Richard 
Woolcott (Question No. 2123)’, in Commonwealth of Australia Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 
Official Hansard, No. 13, 17 November 2009, p. 8091. 
34  Kevin Rudd, ‘Address at Shangri-La Dialogue’, Singapore, 29 May 2009. The use of a capital 
‘C’ was discontinued partly because it was considered that it might produce some confusion 
between Rudd’s concept and cooperation patterns in Europe. 
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conversation rather than to dominate it.’35 One or more of the existing 
regional institutions might evolve in mission and composition to adapt 
to the needs of the region.
At the Sydney meeting, there was considerable interest in reviewing 
existing institutional arrangements and a former prime minister of 
South Korea, Han Seung-soo, proposed setting up an eminent persons’ 
group ‘capable of devising a concrete plan for the eventual creation 
of an Asia-Pacific community’.36 The meeting, however, did not arrive 
at a consensus. Controversy arose over a summing up presentation by 
Michael Wesley, the Australian co-chair, in which he referred to the 
concept of a ‘concert of powers’ as a means to manage relations in the 
Asia-Pacific. Wesley said just after the conference that ‘I believe people 
misinterpreted what I was saying. I think while the great powers in 
the region need to come together, the smaller powers also must be 
involved’.37 Some delegates, however, saw the comments as a challenge 
to ASEAN’s identity and role.38 In particular, a senior Singaporean 
figure, Professor Tommy Koh, in a critical account published shortly 
after the meeting, strongly reasserted ASEAN’s claim to a primary role 
in regional diplomacy and institutional development:
ASEAN is acceptable to all the stakeholders as the region’s convenor 
and facilitator because it is neutral, pragmatic and welcoming. We 
in ASEAN feel the grouping’s long-term goal of peace and stability 
and the dividends obtained to date should not be minimised or 
marginalised. The conference in Sydney did not provide us with the 
clarity or reassurance we had hoped for.39
35  Kevin Rudd, ‘Address to the Asia Pacific Community Conference’, Sydney, 4 December 2009.
36  Peter Hartcher, ‘Rudd Puts Lesson in Rat Cunning to Use’, Sydney Morning Herald, 
8 December 2009.
37  Paul Kelly, ‘Diplomatic Activist Reshapes Region’, The Australian, 12 December 2009; 
Michael Wesley, interview with the author, Canberra, July 2015. The term ‘concert of powers’ 
reflects assessments of the state of international relations in Europe between the Congress of 
Vienna in 1815 and the advent of the First World War in 1914. Key elements of a ‘concert of 
powers’ are a commitment by the powers involved to maintain the status quo, an agreement not 
to use war (or its threat) to solve problems (or to contain and minimise any conflict that does 
develop), and agreement that a concert is an informal arrangement based on enlightened self-
interest rather than formalised norms; see Sandy Gordon, ‘The Quest for a Concert of Powers in 
Asia’, Security Challenges, 8(4) 2012: 36.
38  Tan, Multilateral Asian Security Architecture, pp. 50‒3; see also Kelly, ‘Diplomatic Activist 
Reshapes Region’.
39  Tommy Koh, ‘Rudd’s Reckless Regional Rush’, The Australian, 18 December 2009.
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In the following months, Australia’s ideas continued to be discussed, 
but the eminent persons’ group proposal did not eventuate. It was 
notable that Indonesia continued to be unenthusiastic about the 
proposal. During a visit to Australia in March 2010, President Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono told Rudd that while the Asia Pacific community 
was ‘an intriguing idea to explore’, Jakarta’s priority was to strengthen 
ASEAN and he suggested that the matter should be discussed at foreign 
minister level.40 By June 2010, when Singapore’s Foreign Minister 
George Yeo visited Australia, Rudd said that he was now quite happy 
to leave ASEAN to discuss how the original concept should evolve.41 
ASEAN was indeed moving to consider how to associate the US and 
Russia more closely with its multilateral cooperation. Yeo said that 
while Singapore had differed with aspects of Rudd’s initial proposal, 
the two countries were now ‘almost in complete agreement’:
There was some question in the original proposal over whether 
[ASEAN] was central to [Rudd’s vision for an Asia-Pacific community] 
and we were naturally worried about that. But that was quickly 
clarified and I think Australia’s happy to leave it to ASEAN to discuss 
how that original configuration should evolve.42
Having challenged ASEAN’s role as the arbiter of regional institutional 
building, Australia had accepted the Association’s central role in this 
area. Australia had shifted from a Community concept to a community 
conversation conducted by ASEAN. 
Rudd’s proposal for a new mode of regional cooperation encountered 
problems and resistance for several reasons. Rudd and the government 
had not prepared the ground among regional governments and opinion 
leaders for the advancement of new ideas and proposals and the 
abrupt announcement left many in the region bemused and sceptical. 
The use of the term ‘community’ was problematic because there was 
no common and agreed concept of how a regional ‘community’ should 
be defined and sought, and whether it might evolve on either an East 
Asian or an Asia-Pacific basis. Sheryn Lee and Anthony Milner have 
argued that many in East Asia considered that a ‘community’ should 
be pursued more appropriately among East Asian states rather than 
40  Mark Dodd, ‘SBY Cold on Rudd’s Asia Plan’, The Australian, 10 March 2010.
41  Rowan Callick, ‘Rudd’s Asian Vision Quietly Buried’, The Australian, 21 June 2010.
42  John Kerin, ‘Singapore Backs Rudd’s Regional Vision’, Australian Financial Review, 
17 June 2010.
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in a broader Asia-Pacific grouping. It was therefore problematic for 
Rudd to have appeared to assume that a constituency already existed 
for considering development of a ‘community’ in the Asia-Pacific.43 
An additional issue was that Australia did not have collaborators 
within ASEAN willing to give diplomatic support and to join in 
advancing the proposal. Instead, Australia encountered opposition. 
Indonesia, whose support for and collaboration with Australia in 
previous regional initiatives (including the Cambodian peace process 
and the development of APEC and the ARF) had been vital, was not 
enthusiastic about the Rudd concept (as Yudhoyono had indicated). In 
public discussions on the Rudd proposal, Singapore was a prominent 
critic, possibly because it saw a wider regional grouping not clearly 
identified with and led by ASEAN as a challenge to its own influence 
in ASEAN and Southeast Asia.44 In the debate about the Asia Pacific 
community, it had been reaffirmed that ASEAN’s prime role in 
sponsoring regional dialogues and institutions had to be acknowledged 
and recognised by Australia.
ASEAN and changing US approaches to multilateral 
cooperation 
By mid-2010, it was clear that the Rudd Government’s attempted 
initiative on institutional adaptation had not been accepted by ASEAN. 
However, by that time, the context for discussions about regional 
dialogue had changed, particularly because of developments in the 
approach of the United States under Barack Obama’s administration 
to Southeast Asia and to ASEAN. These developments led to an 
important expansion of the membership of the East Asia Summit to 
include the US and Russia.
The Obama administration had come to office in January 2009 
wanting to upgrade the US’s profile in East Asia and to take a more 
active role in multilateral cooperation.45 During the period of the 
Bush administration, the US had been preoccupied heavily by 
43  See Sheryn Lee and Anthony Milner, ‘Practical vs. Identity Regionalism: Australia’s APC 
Initiative, a Case Study’, Contemporary Politics, 20(2) 2014.
44  Woolcott, interview with Dobell.
45  Jeffrey A. Bader, Obama and China’s Rise: An Insider’s Account of America’s Asia Strategy, 
Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2012, pp. 1–8.
ENgAgINg ThE NEIghBoURS
158
the impact of the terrorist attacks in September 2001 and then by 
military involvements in Afghanistan and Iraq. After 2001, the US 
had expanded its bilateral linkages and cooperation with a number 
of members of ASEAN. However the Bush administration had shown 
comparatively less interest in Asian multilateral cooperation; for 
example, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice had to miss two meetings 
of the ARF (in 2005 and 2007) because of other commitments. At the 
same time, China had been advancing its relations in Southeast Asia, 
both bilaterally and through cooperation with ASEAN, including 
through the China–ASEAN Free Trade Agreement. While the US 
was preoccupied in the Middle East, China was seen to be enhancing 
its position in Southeast Asia.46 The US accordingly pursued an 
increased diplomatic involvement in Southeast Asia, and from 2011 
announced a ‘pivot’ (subsequently termed a ‘rebalance’) towards 
the Asia-Pacific that would insulate US defence commitments to the 
region from budget cuts, increase the presence of US forces, including 
on a rotational basis, and enhance the US’s economic ties with the 
region through a multilateral economic agreement, the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (TPP).47 
These developments had important implications for US approaches 
towards multilateral cooperation and ASEAN. In February 2009, 
Hillary Clinton became the first US secretary of state to visit ASEAN 
headquarters in Jakarta. In an important step, the US acceded to the 
ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) in July 2009. This 
opened the way for US participation in the East Asia Summit, since 
ASEAN had made accession to the treaty a prerequisite for such 
membership.48 The  US’s capacity for discussions with all ASEAN 
members was facilitated by the opening of direct dialogue between 
the US Government and Myanmar, which included a visit to the 
country by US Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell in early 
November 2009.49 US presidents had previously been unwilling to 
46  Ian Storey, Southeast Asia and the Rise of China: The Search for Security, London: Routledge, 
2011, pp. 64–98.
47  Carlyle A. Thayer, ‘Deference/Defiance: Southeast Asia, China and the South China Sea’, 
Paper prepared for International Studies Association Annual Convention, Hilton San Francisco, 
Union Square, 5 April 2013, pp. 26–7.
48  Bader, Obama and China’s Rise, pp. 13–15; Sheldon Simon, ‘US–Southeast Asia Relations: 
The United States is Back!’ Comparative Connections: A Quarterly E-Journal on East Asian 
Bilateral Relations, 11(3) 2009.
49  Associated Press, ‘Top US Officials Meet Myanmar Junta, Suu Kyi’, 4 November 2009.
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meet with ASEAN leaders on a joint basis because of the unpopularity 
of the Myanmar regime, which had recently been exacerbated by 
that regime’s repression of demonstrations in 2007. During his visit to 
East Asia in November 2009, President Obama held the first summit 
meeting between the US and all ASEAN members in Singapore. In his 
speech on US regional policies in Tokyo, Obama stated that:
As an Asia-Pacific nation, the United States expects to be involved in 
the discussions that shape the future of this region, and to participate 
fully in appropriate organizations as they are established and evolve 
… And the United States looks forward to engaging with the East Asia 
Summit more formally as it plays a role in addressing the challenges 
of our time.50
Japan’s Prime Minister Hatoyama Yukio (September 2009 – June 2010) 
added to the debate about regional cooperation by raising the concept 
of an ‘East Asia Community’.51 Hatoyama suggested an informal and 
staged approach towards a regional community. He proposed to follow 
a phased path, starting with economic ties and then moving through 
issues-based cooperation towards eventual institutionalisation. 
Hatoyama did not make clear exactly what membership was envisaged: 
he initially did not appear to envisage US participation, although he 
later did assure the US that it would not be excluded.52 While Hatoyama’s 
concept did not move beyond the proposal stage before he left office, 
his suggestion added to reassessments of institutional consultation in 
East Asia and the Asia-Pacific.53
In this climate of debate and reconsideration, ASEAN began to 
consider ways of including the US and also Russia in regular 
discussions with the Association and its other dialogue partners. 
At the 16th ASEAN Summit in Hanoi in April 2010, Clinton made 
it clear that the US wanted to join the East Asia Summit. There was 
debate within ASEAN on whether it would be best to include the US 
in the Summit or whether it would be desirable to pursue a separate 
50  Barack Obama, ‘Remarks by President Barack Obama at Suntory Hall’, Tokyo, Office of the 
Press Secretary, The White House, 14 November 2009.
51  Yukio Hatoyama, ‘A New Path for Japan’, New York Times, 26 August 2009; Aurelia 
George Mulgan, ‘Is There a “Japanese” Concept of an East Asia Community?’ East Asia Forum, 
6 November 2009.
52  Rikki Kersten and William T. Tow, ‘Evolving Australian Approaches to Security Architecture 
in the Asia-Pacific’, Tokyo Foundation, 22 April 2011.
53  Ibid.; Woolcott, interview with Dobell.
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meeting with the 16 members of the Summit and the US and Russia in 
an ASEAN Plus Eight forum. This forum, it was suggested, could be 
held every two years, alongside the APEC leaders’ meeting when that 
was being held in an ASEAN country (given that the annual meetings 
of APEC alternate between ASEAN and non-ASEAN members). This 
arrangement would maximise the likelihood of regular participation 
by the US president, given that he/she would be able on the same 
visit to attend APEC and also the mooted ‘ASEAN Plus’ gathering. 
Singapore was a strong advocate of the ASEAN Plus Eight formula 
but other members (including Indonesia, Malaysia, Laos and Vietnam) 
preferred the option of inviting the US and Russia into the East Asia 
Summit. This was adopted as ASEAN’s approach and the US and 
Russia duly joined the Summit in November 2010.54 
Many questions remained on how the expanded East Asia Summit 
might develop. However, the concept of a leaders’ dialogue forum 
with a membership including ASEAN, the Northeast Asian states, 
India, the US, Russia, Australia, and New Zealand had been realised. 
Looking back on his role as special envoy, Woolcott felt that the 
changing major power environment – and particularly the interest 
of China, Russia and the US in participating in a dialogue through 
the East Asia Summit – had been relevant to Rudd’s policy goals. 
He commented in October 2010 that ‘the times have worked quite well 
for Rudd … because they are three of the major powers’ and India had 
also wanted to join the Summit.55
In a speech in December 2010, Rudd (now foreign minister in the 
Gillard Government) expressed his satisfaction at the expansion of the 
East Asia Summit. He stated that: 
This was our core objective in proposing the concept of an Asia Pacific 
community … a regional institution with sufficient membership and 
mandate, and meeting at summit level, to begin to carve out a rules-
based order for the future … [W]ith the EAS’ [East Asia Summit] 
expansion, we achieved the core of that objective. The challenge now 
is to build this emerging institution’s agenda.56
54  Kersten and Tow, ‘Evolving Australian Approaches’.
55  Woolcott, interview with Dobell.
56  Kevin Rudd, ‘Future Stability and Security in the Asia Pacific Region’, Address to the 
Brisbane Institute, 8 December 2010.
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The question remained, however, as to whether the climate of relations 
among the East Asia Summit members, particularly between the major 
powers, would enable the Summit to begin in Rudd’s words to ‘carve 
out a rules-based order’ for East Asia and the Asia-Pacific and the 
outlook for this was uncertain. 
ASEAN relations 2010–13: Consolidation 
and caution
Gillard replaced Rudd as prime minister on 24 June 2010 and led the 
government for the next three years. In a comment in early July on her 
policy approach, Gillard said that she did not envisage major changes 
in foreign relations and that her government would not be emphasising 
Rudd’s recent pursuit of an Asia Pacific community.57 The Gillard 
Government, however, continued to focus heavily on major power 
relationships and the implications of these for the Asia-Pacific and 
East Asia. The government supported strongly the US recommitment 
through its ‘rebalance’ to the Asia-Pacific and welcomed Obama’s 
announcement in November 2011 in Canberra of an increased presence 
of US forces in Australia, including the rotation of US Marines through 
Darwin. Gillard also sought to consolidate relations with China and 
achieved an annual high-level strategic and economic dialogue with 
that country (announced in April 2013).58 
In the period from 2010, the Australian Government made another 
adaptation in Australia’s approach towards defining its interest in 
relation to regions. Alongside ongoing references to the Asia-Pacific, 
there was increasing discussion of the ‘Indo-Pacific’ as a frame 
of regional reference. Reference to the Indo-Pacific reflected the 
growing profile of India both for Australia’s bilateral relationships 
and as a factor in Asia overall. Rudd, foreign minister in the Gillard 
Government from June 2010 to February 2012, noted in November 
2010 that ‘we have long looked east across the Pacific to our long-
standing allies the United States … equally now Australia must now 
look west to the great challenges and opportunities that now present 
57  Peter Hartcher, ‘Gillard Rejects Rudd’s Asia Vision’, Sydney Morning Herald, 5 July 2010.
58  Carlyle A. Thayer, ‘Australia, the ANZUS Alliance and US Rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific’, 
Keynote Paper presented to the International Conference on Australia–Asia Relations under 
Prime Minister Tony Abbott, National Cheng Chi University, Taipei, 31 March – 1 April 2015.
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themselves across the Indian Ocean region’.59 The government’s 2013 
Defence White Paper gave extensive emphasis to the Indo-Pacific as 
a regional reference, stating that:
[A] new Indo-Pacific strategic arc is beginning to emerge, connecting the 
Indian and Pacific oceans through Southeast Asia. This new strategic 
construct … is being forged by a range of factors. Notably, India is 
emerging as an important strategic, diplomatic and economic actor, 
‘looking East’, and becoming more engaged in regional frameworks. 
Growing trade, investment and energy flows across the broader region 
are strengthening economic and security interdependencies. These 
two factors combined are also increasingly attracting international 
attention to the Indian Ocean, through which some of the world’s 
busiest and most strategically significant trade routes pass.60
While the concept of ‘Indo-Pacific’ was still being debated, this 
discussion suggested that Australia’s ASEAN relations would be 
pursued alongside regional contexts that now extended to the Indian 
Ocean as well as the Western Pacific.61
Institutional relations and economic cooperation
The Gillard Government from 2010 continued to build on relationships 
with ASEAN. While Australia itself did not seek institutional 
innovation, it joined two new ASEAN-sponsored ministerial-level 
dialogues ‒ the negotiations for RCEP and the ADMM-Plus process, 
and a new dialogue at senior official level on maritime issues. Australia 
faced some significant issues in its ASEAN relations, including the 
impact of increasing major power competition, which was clearly 
evident in relation to the South China Sea, and the process of change in 
Myanmar. The dilemma of people movements and irregular migration, 
a highly contentious issue in Australian domestic politics, also saw 
some strain in key Australian bilateral relations in the ASEAN region. 
59  Quoted in David Scott, ‘Australia’s Embrace of the “Indo-Pacific”: New Term, New Region, 
New Strategy?’ International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, 13(3) 2013: 430.
60  Australian Department of Defence, 2013 Defence White Paper, Canberra: Commonwealth of 
Australia, 2013, p. 7.
61  Rory Medcalf, ‘Reimagining Asia: From Asia-Pacific to Indo-Pacific’, Asan Forum, 26 June 
2015; Trevor Wilson, ‘The “Indo-Pacific”: Absent Policy Behind Meaningless Words’, East Asia 
Forum, 19 September 2014.
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In engagement with ASEAN after 2010, another milestone in 
interactions was reached in Hanoi on 30 October 2010 with the 
holding of a further ASEAN–Australia summit at leadership level. 
This was only the third such heads of government summit between 
Australia and ASEAN, after those held in 1977 and (along with New 
Zealand) in 2004. The meeting’s joint statement expressed ASEAN’s 
appreciation for Australia’s ‘steadfast friendship’ since 1974. After 
a period of some controversy in relations, the statement affirmed 
that ‘ASEAN Leaders appreciated Australia’s continued support for 
ASEAN’s institutional strengthening’ and for ASEAN’s ‘central role 
in the regional architecture in responding to regional and global 
challenges’.62 
The meeting reviewed and reaffirmed the wide areas of ongoing 
cooperation between the parties. Prime Minister Gillard announced 
three initiatives: aid to the Greater Mekong Sub-Region ‘to assist in 
connecting the rural poor to new markets, including by upgrading, 
rehabilitating and maintaining roads, bridges and rail links in 
the region’; support for the International Labour Organization to 
protect migrant workers; and aid for the ASEAN Intergovernmental 
Commission on Human Rights that had been established the previous 
year.63 The Gillard Government made a further commitment to 
advance relations in its October 2012 White Paper, which announced 
the establishment of a position of resident Australian ambassador to 
ASEAN who would be based in Jakarta to facilitate close liaison with 
the ASEAN Secretariat.64
In a further institutional linkage, Australia joined with ASEAN in 
negotiations for a new economic cooperation enterprise, RCEP, which 
was designed to be a regional free trade agreement to include the 10 
ASEAN members along with the countries that currently had free trade 
agreements with ASEAN – Australia, China, India, Japan, South Korea 
and New Zealand. RCEP’s vision was to be a ‘high-quality’ and mutually 
beneficial economic partnership agreement that would broaden and 
deepen current free trade agreement arrangements. The RCEP concept 
grew out of two previous proposals for regional trade agreements 
62  ASEAN, ‘ASEAN and Australia: An Enduring Connection’, Joint Statement of the ASEAN–
Australia Summit, Hanoi, 30 October 2010.
63  Ibid.
64  Australian Government, Australia in the Asian Century: White Paper, Canberra: 
Commonwealth of Australia, October 2012, p. 257.
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based around the 13 ASEAN Plus Three members and also the original 
16 members of the East Asia Summit (that is, the membership before 
the US and Russia joined). As an ASEAN process, RCEP was to be 
guided by the ‘ASEAN way’ of consensus and voluntary adherence 
to agreements. It would also likely seek to accommodate the varying 
levels of economic development of the participants by avoiding 
commitments that the less-developed economies would find hard to 
meet.65 By sponsoring RCEP, ASEAN sought to bolster its centrality in 
regional economic integration although at the time of writing it was 
not clear how the negotiations would evolve and how effective the 
negotiations would be in producing significant liberalisation.66
By participating in RCEP, Australia continued its long-term support 
for  ASEAN’s economic goals. In a joint statement on 20 November 
2012  while in Phnom Penh for ASEAN-sponsored meetings, 
Prime Minister Gillard and the Minister for Trade Craig Emerson 
congratulated ASEAN on the initiative. They noted that RCEP 
participating countries include nine of Australia’s top 12 trading 
partners and account for almost 60 per cent of Australia’s two-way 
trade and 70 per cent of exports.67 
As Gillard and Emerson also noted, Australia was participating in RCEP 
alongside bilateral trade agreements and also an additional negotiation, 
the US-sponsored TPP. The TPP is a multilateral negotiation that is 
intended to achieve a process of liberalisation more ambitious in scope 
than RCEP.68 The Obama administration was an active supporter of 
the TPP, which it saw as a key part of its rebalance towards the Asia-
Pacific that could bolster US economic ties after a period when US 
trade interests had been affected adversely by the development of 
bilateral and regional free trade agreements.69 
65  Sanchita Basu Das, ‘RCEP and TPP: Comparisons and Concerns’, ISEAS Perspective, 
7 January 2013.
66  Sanchita Basu Das and Reema B. Jagtiani, ‘The Regional Comprehensive Economic 
Partnership: New Paradigm or Old Wine in a New Bottle?’ ISEAS Economics Working Paper No. 
2014‒3, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, November 2014.
67  ‘Australia Joins Launch of Massive Asian Regional Trade Agreement’, joint media release, 
Prime Minister and Minister for Trade and Competitiveness, Phnom Penh, 20 November 2012. 
68  The TPP in 2015 included Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, 
New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the United States and Vietnam. See Ian F. Fergusson, Mark A. 
McMinimy and Brock R. Williams, ‘The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP): Negotiations and Issues 
for Congress’, Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 20 March 2015.
69  Michael Wesley, ‘Trade Agreements and Strategic Rivalry in Asia’, Australian Journal 
of International Affairs, 69(5) 2015.
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The pursuit in parallel of both RCEP and the TPP was yet another 
example of the pluralism and competition in regionalism in East Asia 
and the Asia-Pacific with groupings with differing memberships 
pursuing cooperation goals in parallel.70 In this case, in 2015 RCEP 
included China but not the US (because it did not have a multilateral 
free trade agreement with ASEAN), while the TPP process included 
the US but not China (although other countries in the Asia-Pacific 
can join the process with the agreement by consensus of the 
existing participants).71 Australia was one of a number of countries 
participating in both processes, along with Japan, New Zealand and 
four ASEAN members (Brunei, Malaysia, Singapore and Vietnam). 
Gillard and Emerson suggested in November 2012 that Australia saw 
value in both parallel processes: ‘Australia’s participation in each of 
these negotiations will add momentum to the process of competitive 
trade liberalisation.’72 However, at the time of writing, neither process 
had been completed so their contribution to trade and economic 
interactions had not yet become clear.73
Security dialogue and the East Asia Summit
After 2010, ASEAN initiated a further ministerial-level cooperation 
dialogue in the area of defence and security. The ADMM-Plus process 
brought together the defence ministers of the same 18 countries who 
meet in the East Asia Summit. Australia took part in the inaugural 
meeting in Hanoi in October 2010 and took up the role of co-chair 
(with Malaysia) of the ADMM-Plus Maritime Security Experts Group 
that examined maritime cooperation and subsequently co-chaired 
(with Singapore) an Experts Working Group on counter-terrorism.74 
70  Ibid.
71  Das, ‘RCEP and TPP’.
72  ‘Australia Joins Launch’.
73  On 6 October 2015, it was announced that agreement had been reached on the terms of 
the TPP after talks in Atlanta; the TPP agreement now needed to be ratified by the participants 
in the negotiations before it could come into force and be implemented. See Malcolm Turnbull, 
‘Historic Asia-Pacific Trade Agreement Opens New Era of Opportunities’, media release, 
Canberra, 6 October 2015; Peter Drysdale and Shiro Armstrong, ‘What Comes After the Atlanta 
Deal on the Trans-Pacific Partnership?’ East Asia Forum, 19 October 2015.
74  See Stephen Smith, ‘Paper Presented by Minister for Defence Stephen Smith to the ADMM-
Plus Maritime Security Experts’ Working Group Inaugural Meeting’, Perth, 21 July 2011.
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The ADMM-Plus process was considered to be a promising new 
dialogue that could potentially foster some useful practical cooperation 
among defence ministers and senior officers.75 Australia’s ambassador 
to ASEAN, Simon Merrifield, commented that:
[w]ith disputed territories in our region giving rise to the risk of 
miscalculation, the ADMM+’s fostering of mil-mil [military-to-
military] cooperation at the operational level is of immense value – its 
efforts on building relationships and familiarity between services has 
a vital role to play in regional security, complementing both the ARF 
and the EAS.76 
The premier security dialogue continued to be the East Asia Summit, 
and its profile was enhanced when the United States and Russia 
participated for the first time in 2011. The Summit was continuing 
to develop areas of dialogue in a cautious manner. The key event 
was the annual meeting, of about three hours duration. The Summit 
was pursuing working groups and projects in six priority areas: 
regional economic and financial integration, education, regional 
disaster response, energy and environment, health, and connectivity. 
The Summit was supported in its economic and financial areas from 
2008 by the Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia, 
established with backing from Japan. However, the Summit remained 
very limited in institutional terms; it had no secretariat of its own 
and relied on assistance from ASEAN’s Secretariat, and it had no 
annual membership fees or budget to support its agenda and to ensure 
coherence and continuity. The Summit therefore remained very much 
a work in progress.77
75  Ron Huisken, ‘ADMM Plus Cooperates on Security and Defence Issues’, East Asia Forum, 
19 October 2010. 
76  Simon Merrifield, ‘Australia and ASEAN: Past, Present and Future’, Remarks by Australian 
Ambassador to ASEAN, Foreign Service Institute, Manila, 27 March 2015. A further dialogue 
was initiated at senior official level among the same 18 countries participating in the ADMM-
Plus, the Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum, to develop additional avenues for cooperation 
in areas including maritime search and rescue; the forum met for the first time in 2012, with 
Australian participation.
77  David Camroux, ‘The East Asia Summit: Pan-Asian Multilateralism Rather than Intra-Asian 
Regionalism’, in Mark Beeson and Richard Stubbs, eds, Routledge Handbook of Asian Regionalism, 
London: Routledge, 2012; Nick Bisley and Malcolm Cook, ‘How the East Asia Summit Can Achieve 
its Potential’, ISEAS Perspective, 28 October 2014; Avery Poole, ‘The East Asia Summit: Navigating 
ASEAN Multilateralism’, in Sally Percival Wood and Baogang He, eds, The Australia–ASEAN 
Dialogue: Tracing 40 Years of Partnership, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014.
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Australia made several proposals for East Asia Summit cooperation 
in ‘non-traditional security’ areas. At the sixth East Asia Summit 
on 19  November 2011, agreement was reached to endorse a joint 
proposal by Australia and Indonesia to strengthen regional responses 
to natural disasters, working with other regional groupings. Minister 
for Foreign Affairs Senator Bob Carr commented that ‘[t]his is a major 
priority for our region, as well as an important area of potential soft 
security cooperation between the emergency services and the armed 
forces of the region’.78 At the seventh East Asia Summit in Phnom 
Penh (20 November 2012), Gillard announced additional cooperative 
measures to combat trafficking in persons and a contribution to 
the Asia-Pacific Leaders’ Malaria Alliance for action to combat the 
disease.79
Carr discussed in measured terms the potential long-term value of the 
East Asia Summit in an article in July 2012: ‘The concept of common 
security is as much a habit as it is a concrete doctrine guiding specific 
actions. The habits of regular leaders-led dialogue on an agenda 
that includes security policy is [sic] itself inherently normalising.’80 
The  question remained, however, as to whether a ‘normalising’ 
process could progress very far amid continuing major power tensions 
and competition, for example in the South China Sea.
ASEAN and the South China Sea
The need for greater coordination and dialogue among the major 
powers and regional states, and also the obstacles to pursuing this 
goal, were highlighted by the increasing contestation over the South 
China Sea.
78  Bob Carr, ‘The East Asia Summit: Building our Regional Architecture for the 21st Century’, 
Strategic Review (Jakarta), July 2012. 
79  Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, ‘East Asia Summit’, 
dfat.gov.au/international-relations/regional-architecture/eas/Pages/east-asia-summit-eas.aspx 
(accessed 1 October 2015).
80  Carr, ‘The East Asia Summit’.
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The South China Sea has been a focus for close attention in ASEAN 
since the 1990s and this intensified after 2009.81 Six littoral parties 
have claims in the South China Sea: China and Taiwan and four ASEAN 
members – Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam. In 1992 
China reasserted its claim to most of the area of the sea by passing 
its ‘Law of the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone of the People’s 
Republic of China’: China‘s claims conflicted with those of the four 
ASEAN member state claimants.82 After clashes between China and 
Vietnam over disputed areas in the sea, ASEAN in the same year issued 
a ‘Declaration on the South China Sea’, which called for restraint and 
urged the parties to pursue cooperation without prejudicing matters 
of sovereignty. The declaration called on all parties to respect ASEAN’s 
TAC and to develop a ‘code of international conduct’ for the sea.83 
ASEAN’s declaration, however, did not deter China from expanding 
its presence by assuming effective control of Mischief Reef in 1995 
(in an area also claimed by the Philippines). After 1995, ASEAN’s 
capacity to maintain a unified position on the South China Sea issue 
declined after its expansion in membership (because the new members 
included Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar, who were not claimants, and 
were comparatively less concerned with South China Sea issues).84
After 1992, ASEAN tried to develop its proposal for a formal code 
of conduct but did not secure China’s participation.85 ASEAN 
was compromised by the fact that its own claimant members had 
overlapping claims in the South China Sea. In place of a formal code of 
conduct, ASEAN and China in 2002 signed a non-binding Declaration 
on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea. The declaration 
advocated the building of trust and confidence among and between 
the signatories; the parties also reaffirmed ‘that the adoption of a code 
81  On the South China Sea overall, see Leszek Buszynski and Christopher B. Roberts, eds, 
The South China Sea Maritime Dispute: Political, Legal and Regional Perspectives, Abingdon: 
Routledge, 2015; Bill Hayton, The South China Sea: The Struggle for Power in Asia, New Haven, 
CT: Yale University Press, 2014.
82  On the competing claims, see Leszek Buszynski, ‘The Origins and Development of the South 
China Sea Maritime Dispute’, in Leszek Buszynski and Christopher B. Roberts, eds, The South 
China Sea Maritime Dispute: Political, Legal and Regional Perspectives, Abingdon: Routledge, 2015.
83  Christopher B. Roberts, ‘ASEAN: The Challenge of Unity in Diversity’, in Leszek Buszynski 
and Christopher B. Roberts, eds, The South China Sea Maritime Dispute: Political, Legal and 
Regional Perspectives, Abingdon: Routledge, 2015; Ian Storey, ‘Disputes in the South China Sea: 
Southeast Asia’s Troubled Waters’, politique étrangère, 3, 2014.
84  Roberts, ‘ASEAN’, pp. 131–2.
85  Carlyle A. Thayer, ‘ASEAN, China and the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea’, 
SAIS Review of International Affairs, 33(2) 2013.
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of conduct in the South China Sea would further promote peace and 
stability in the region and agree to work, on the basis of consensus, 
towards the eventual attainment of this objective’.86 The declaration did 
not deal with sovereignty questions and did not attempt to establish 
any sanctions for breach of its terms. ASEAN subsequently had great 
difficulty in trying to move beyond this non-binding declaration. 
A key factor has been that China has consistently wished to deal with 
the issue of competing claims on a bilateral basis and as Christopher 
Roberts has written, ‘China has mustered the potential to splinter any 
sense of collective identity in ASEAN’s elite-level strategic identity’.87 
Tensions over the South China Sea were fuelled after 2009 by increasing 
attention on competing claims, rising nationalist sentiments among 
claimants, and an increase in interest in the area by major powers 
including the US and Japan. ASEAN sought support for a code of 
conduct but faced challenges stemming from the differing perceptions 
among its members, including between the claimant and non-claimant 
members. As Ian Storey argued in 2013:
Lack of progress on the South China Sea is not only due to intransigence 
on China’s part, but also the lack of consensus within ASEAN on how 
to deal with the problem. This lack of consensus stems from differing 
national interests and their varied relationships with China. The ten 
members of ASEAN have differing interests in and positions on the 
South China Sea: Vietnam and the Philippines view the problem as a 
major national security concern; fellow claimants Malaysia and Brunei 
tend to downplay tensions; Indonesia and Singapore have both called 
on China to clarify its claims; the four non-claimants in mainland 
Southeast Asia – Thailand, Myanmar, Cambodia and Laos – do not 
perceive a direct stake in the dispute and in any case wish to avoid 
jeopardizing close economic and political links with China by taking 
positions inimical to China’s interests.88 
Internal tensions within ASEAN were evident in 2012 when ASEAN 
was unable to agree on a joint communiqué after its annual meeting 
of foreign ministers in Phnom Penh in July. Cambodia, the chair of 
ASEAN for that year, prevented the explicit mention of South China 
86  Cited in ibid., p. 77.
87  Christopher B. Roberts, ASEAN Regionalism: Cooperation, Values and Institutionalization, 
Abingdon: Routledge, 2012, p. 81.
88  Ian Storey, ‘Can the South China Sea Dispute Be Resolved or Better Managed?’ Paper 
presented at 27th Asia-Pacific Roundtable, Kuala Lumpur, 3–4 June 2013, pp. 3–4.
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Sea issues in the draft communiqué and for the first time in ASEAN’s 
45-year history, no joint foreign ministers’ meeting communiqué was 
issued. Cambodia was seen to have been serving China’s preferences. 
ASEAN subsequently settled on a set of agreed principles on the 
South China Sea but continued to make no effective progress towards 
a code of conduct.89 
The Australian Government maintained a position that emphasised 
the desirability of dialogue and negotiation, supported development 
of a code of conduct and supported second track discussion on 
maritime confidence-building measures.90 However, the government 
saw little scope for further initiatives in relation to the South China 
Sea. Carr said in July 2012 that:
I don’t think it is in Australia’s interest to take on for itself a brokering 
role in territorial disputes in the South China Sea. I don’t think that 
is remotely in our interest. I think we should adhere to the policy we 
have got of not supporting any one of the nations making competing 
territorial claims and reminding them all that we want it settled, 
because we have a stake in it – 60 percent of our trade goes through 
the South China Sea.91
ASEAN and Myanmar 
Australia in this period was closely interested in another of ASEAN’s 
most important concerns: the situation in Myanmar. After joining 
ASEAN in 1997, Myanmar’s government had continued to remain 
largely aloof from the rest of Southeast Asia. The regime’s repressive 
policies had been a source of criticism among some of ASEAN’s dialogue 
partners, particularly the US and the EU, and ASEAN’s relations with 
those partners had as a result been affected adversely.92 The regime 
had repressed demonstrations in 2007 and had been reluctant to 
accept external assistance after the devastation caused by Cyclone 
89  For a detailed account of this meeting, see Carlyle A. Thayer, ‘ASEAN’s Code of Conduct in 
the South China Sea: A Litmus Test For Community Building?’ Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus, 
10(34) 20 August 2012.
90  See Australian Strategic Policy Institute, ‘Maritime Confidence Building Measures in the 
South China Sea Conference’, Special Report, Canberra: ASPI, September 2013. 
91  ABC Radio Australia, ‘Australia Should Stay out of South China Sea Dispute says Carr’, 
Transcript, 30 July 2012.
92  For a detailed discussion of Myanmar and ASEAN up to 2010, see Christopher Roberts, 
ASEAN’s Myanmar Crisis: Challenges to the Pursuit of a Security Community, Singapore: Institute 
of Southeast Asian Studies, 2010.
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Nargis in early 2008. ASEAN had subsequently played a mediating 
role in facilitating the transfer of much needed aid to the country. 
The  Myanmar Government had produced a new constitution that 
retained a strong role for the long-dominant military and announced 
elections. The elections in November 2010 resulted in a thoroughly 
predominant position for the ruling party, the military-aligned Union 
Solidarity and Development Party.93 However in the period after 
the elections a process of liberalisation developed in which political 
restrictions eased. The prominent opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi 
was released from home detention and was then able to run successfully 
for parliament in April 2012. ASEAN was keen to see the liberalisation 
proceed and for this to be recognised and supported internationally.94
In an area of significant interest to ASEAN, Australia gave 
strong support to change in Myanmar after the 2010 elections. 
The Australian Government welcomed the reforms implemented after 
the inauguration of the new Myanmar Government in March 2011. 
Carr visited Myanmar on 5–8 June 2012 to assess what more Australia 
could do. During the visit, Carr announced that Australia would lift 
its travel and financial sanctions on Myanmar (a decision that took 
effect on 3 July 2012) although an embargo on arms sales or transfers 
was maintained; he also announced a doubling of Australia’s bilateral 
aid to A$100 million.95 
Australia also supported ASEAN by pressing the EU to lift permanently 
its sanctions on Myanmar. Australia’s effort included discussions with 
the US, the UK, Canada, France, Germany and Holland. Greg Sheridan 
wrote in February 2013 that ‘Senator Carr’s activism has won strong 
support among ASEAN officials’.96 When the EU lifted its sanctions in 
April 2013, Carr noted his satisfaction, while also expressing concern 
about incidences of inter-ethnic violence involving the minority 
Rohingya people.97 
93  Amitav Acharya, ‘ASEAN and Burma/Myanmar: Past and Prologue’, Policy Brief, 
Washington, DC: Sigur Center for Asian Studies, George Washington University, April 2012.
94  Moe Thuzar, ‘Myanmar and the 2014 ASEAN Chairmanship’, ISEAS Perspective, 
18 March 2013.
95  Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, ‘Burma Country Brief’, dfat.gov.au/
geo/burma/pages/burma-country-brief.aspx (accessed 1 October 2015).
96  Greg Sheridan, ‘Carr Goes All Out to Bring Myanmar in From the Cold’, The Australian, 
7 February 2013.
97  Bob Carr, ‘European Union Lifts Myanmar Sanctions’, media release, 24 April 2013.
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In an address on Australia’s foreign policy priorities to the National 
Press Club in Canberra in June 2013, Carr commented on Australia’s 
policy on Myanmar as an illustration of the Labor Government’s 
current overall approach towards ASEAN: 
I’ve said to ASEAN foreign ministers when I’ve met them in various 
forums: that’s an example of Australia moving its policy in alignment 
with the policy struck with the ten nations of ASEAN, that’s habits 
of consultation. And it’s an ingrained habit. And it means that you 
don’t lecture them. You don’t harass them. You speak to them, taking 
account of their concern for ASEAN centrality. And we’ve been doing 
that. But it’s something that will have a cumulative effect as we go 
on. And Myanmar is a good working example of an Australian policy 
settled on after consultation, and after recognition of what the ten 
nations of ASEAN were doing.98
Carr’s comments could clearly be seen as an implicit recognition of 
criticism of some recent Australian policy emphases in regional 
relations, including the Asia Pacific community proposal.
Irregular migration and Australia’s regional relations
While Australia pursued many areas of cooperation with Southeast 
Asia and ASEAN in this period, the issue of approaches towards 
irregular migration was, under the Rudd and Gillard governments, 
a  source of both intense domestic controversy within Australia and 
of discord with some key regional states.
The Howard Government’s policies of tightening border controls and 
pursuing regional cooperation on irregular migration through the 
Bali process had by 2003 contained the flows of people to Australian 
territory by boat.99 In 2001, 5,516 people had arrived in Australia by 
boat, but in the next six years, only 288 people arrived in this way. 
However, while the Howard policies had been successful in reducing 
the numbers of arrivals by boat, aspects of the policies (including 
offshore processing of asylum-seekers) were the subject of criticism 
and controversy in Australia. When the Rudd Government came to 
office at the end of 2007, it modified and loosened the control regime 
98  Bob Carr, ‘Australia’s Foreign Policy Directions’, Address to the National Press Club, 
Canberra, 26 June 2013.
99  Andrew Carr, Winning the Peace: Australia’s Campaign to Change the Asia-Pacific, Carlton, 
Vic.: Melbourne University Press, 2015, pp. 103–23.
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of the previous government, particularly by ending the transfer 
of irregular migrants to processing centres offshore (the ‘Pacific 
Solution’) and by increasing the rights of asylum-seekers. These 
moves coincided with an upsurge in people seeking to travel by boat 
to Australia, particularly among those fleeing from Afghanistan and 
Sri Lanka (after  the traumatic end of the civil war in May 2009). 
In  2009, 2,726 people arrived by boat and from 2010 to 2013 the 
number was 48,911.100
The Rudd Government did not succeed in managing or containing the 
rise in flows of irregular arrivals by boat. The issue played a significant 
role in a loss of public support for the Rudd Government, and, as 
mentioned earlier, Rudd was replaced as prime minister by Gillard 
in June 2010.101 The Gillard Government from June 2010 sought an 
increased emphasis on regional cooperation on irregular migration, 
particularly through the Bali process (discussed in Chapter 4), which 
had been downplayed by Rudd. Progress was made in early 2011 on 
a new Regional Cooperation Framework through the Bali process 
(a grouping that included Australia and all the ASEAN members but 
whose membership and scope went well beyond ASEAN to include 
states in the South Pacific, South Asia and the Middle East, along with 
China and the US).102 The Gillard Government also renewed emphasis 
on offshore processing but it encountered major setbacks in these 
efforts. A suggestion that East Timor might accept asylum-seekers 
for processing was rejected by that government. The Australian 
Government then reached an agreement with Malaysia under which 
Malaysia would accept 800 persons who had arrived in Australia in 
return for Australia accepting from Malaysia 4,000 people who had 
been determined to be refugees. The Gillard Government considered 
that this agreement would be a valuable additional measure to deter 
boat arrivals (in that the 800 people would be seen to have been denied 
asylum in Australia) but the agreement was declared to be invalid by 
100  Ibid., pp. 124–5; Janet Phillips, ‘Boat Arrivals and Boat "Turnbacks" in Australia since 
1976: A Quick Guide to Statistics’, Parliamentary Library Research Paper Series 2015‒2016, 
Canberra: Department of Parliamentary Services, 11 September 2015.
101  Paul Kelly, Triumph and Demise: The Broken Promise of a Labor Generation, Carlton, Vic.: 
Melbourne University Press, 2014, pp. 175–88.
102  See ‘The Bali Process on People Smuggling, Trafficking in Persons and Related Transnational 
Crime’, www.baliprocess.net/ (accessed 1 October 2015).
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the Australian High Court. The incidence of arrivals by boat remained 
a highly contentious issue up until the time the Labor Government lost 
office in September 2013.103
The Australian Government in this period discussed the issue of 
irregular migration with ASEAN (for example, through dialogue with 
the heads of the ASEAN members’ departments of immigration and 
with the ASEAN Immigration Intelligence Forum), but the main avenue 
for multilateral discussion and negotiation was through the wider Bali 
process.104 While Australia had been able to cooperate with ASEAN on 
the outflows of people from Indochina in the 1970s (outflows that had 
originated within Southeast Asia), the sources of asylum-seekers after 
the late 1990s were primarily outside Southeast Asia and cooperation 
on the issues accordingly needed to encompass a wider grouping of 
countries. The discord over policies towards irregular migrants clearly 
had the potential to impact adversely on some of Australia’s relations 
with ASEAN members, for example when the proposed agreement 
with Malaysia was debated in acrimonious terms in Australia.105 
The issue was a further example of how Australian domestic political 
debates could impact on regional relations in Southeast Asia.
In overall terms, the Gillard Government had thus been less ambitious 
in approaching regional and ASEAN relations than its predecessor, the 
Rudd Government. It had not sought to initiate any new institution and 
had accepted ASEAN’s role as sponsor of institutional development. 
In line with this approach, Australia had welcomed ASEAN’s move 
to widen the membership of the East Asia Summit, had joined new 
ASEAN-sponsored dialogues in both economic and security areas 
and had supported ASEAN diplomatic goals, for example in relation 
to Myanmar.
103  Kelly, Triumph and Demise, pp. 387–402; Carr, Winning the Peace, pp. 128–36.
104  Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Inquiry into Australia’s 
Relationship with ASEAN, Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, June 2009, pp. 18–20.
105  Carr, Winning the Peace, pp. 130–1; Kelly, Triumph and Demise, pp. 390–1.
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The Abbott Government and the 2014 
Commemorative Summit 
The Labor Government (led again by Rudd from June 2013) was 
replaced in elections on 7 September 2013 by a new Liberal–National 
Party Coalition administration led by Tony Abbott. The Liberal–
National Party policy statement issued before the elections asserted the 
importance of relations with Australia’s allies, regional partners and 
major trading associates. On regional policy approaches overall, the 
Coalition document declared: ‘[t]he Coalition will work cooperatively 
within our neighbourhood to make existing institutions work better 
to serve the national interest and the interests of our region rather than 
creating new ones.’ The Coalition also reaffirmed recent Australian 
official interest in the regional concept of the ‘Indo-Pacific’ by saying 
that ‘Australia’s neighbourhood will be defined as the Asia Pacific-
Indian Ocean region. We will focus diplomatic, development, trade 
and security efforts in parts of the Indian Ocean rim that have the 
capacity to advance Australia’s interests.’106
The Abbott Government in office reaffirmed the broad directions of 
Australian foreign policy, including commitment to the US alliance 
and an endorsement of the US ‘rebalance’ towards the Asia-Pacific. 
Strong emphasis was placed on Japan, which Abbott declared early 
in his term to be Australia’s ‘best friend in Asia’ and relations were 
advanced by a visit by Prime Minister Abe Shinzo in July 2014 and 
by agreements to enhance defence cooperation.107 The government 
continued to pursue close relations with China and with the other 
key Northeast Asian states and during 2014 achieved success in 
completing negotiations on bilateral trade agreements with South 
Korea, Japan and China.108
The new government maintained emphasis on engagement with 
Southeast Asia and with ASEAN, with a focus on the lead-up to the 
fortieth anniversary of multilateral relations in 2014, to which the 
106  Australian Liberal Party and National Party, ‘The Coalition’s Policy for Foreign Affairs’, 
Canberra, September 2013, p. 3.
107  Graeme Dobell, ‘Australia–East Asia/US Relations: China Bumps, Indonesia Breach, Japan 
as Ally’, Comparative Connections: A Triannual E-Journal on East Asian Bilateral Relations, 
16(2) 2014.
108  Ibid. 
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government gave considerable attention. Minister for Foreign Affairs 
Julie Bishop affirmed the value placed on the ASEAN connection 
in comments at the time of the anniversary in April 2014 and 
pursued a commitment to visit all member states in the lead-up to 
the planned Commemorative Leaders’ Summit in November 2014.109 
The government added a new element to Australian education policies 
and to ASEAN relations with its New Colombo Plan designed to 
increase greatly the numbers of young Australians who could live 
and study in Asian countries. The program was notable as a concrete 
indication that interactions with neighbouring countries would 
involve an increased emphasis on learning by Australians about Asia. 
The program would cover many Asian countries including all the 
members of ASEAN and was expected to have a strong impact on 
enhancing personal connections between Australia and the ASEAN 
countries.110 
Progress was made in some key bilateral relations with ASEAN 
members. Australia’s relations with Malaysia were enhanced by 
the extensive role that Australia played in leading efforts to locate 
Malaysian Airlines flight MH370 after its disappearance in March 
2014.111 Australia and Vietnam reviewed and agreed to enhance 
further their relationship during the visit of Prime Minister Nguyen 
Tan Dung to Australia in March 2015.112 Relations with Singapore were 
reaffirmed and extended by an agreement in June 2015 to establish 
a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between the two countries.113 
Australia, however, experienced another phase of tension in its often 
sensitive relationship with Indonesia. Abbott in Opposition had been 
intensely critical of the former Labor Government over border control 
and the influx of irregular migrants by boat; one of his key pledges was 
to ‘stop the boats’, including by if necessary turning boats approaching 
Australia back to Indonesia. The government implemented ‘Operation 
109  Julie Bishop, ‘Australia’s Prospering Partnership with ASEAN’, op-ed article, 17 April 2014.
110  See Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, ‘New Colombo Plan’, www.dfat.
gov.au/people-to-people/new-colombo-plan/pages/new-colombo-plan.aspx (accessed 11 March 
2015).
111  Adam Davies, ‘Australia Spent $100 Million to MH 370 Search So Far’, The Northern Star, 
7 August 2015.
112  Carl Thayer, ‘Australia and Vietnam Enhance their Comprehensive Partnership’, 
The Diplomat, 17 March 2015.
113  Daniel Wei Boon Chua, ‘Fifty Years of Singapore-Australian Relations: An Enduring 
Strategic Partnership – Analysis’, Eurasia Review, 26 August 2015; Graeme Dobell, ‘Singapore 
and Oz: Mismatched Mates’, The Strategist, 24 August 2015.
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Sovereign Borders’ in late 2013 and this included a willingness to tow 
boats back to Indonesian waters, a policy that resulted in criticism 
both from UN representatives and from Indonesia.114 The government’s 
approach effectively halted the flow of vessels towards Australia, but 
the tow-back policy produced substantial criticism in Indonesia.115
An additional area of bilateral sensitivity with Indonesia was opened 
up when a major release of US intelligence material by Edward Snowden 
in late 2013 included revelations that Australian intelligence had 
sought to intercept the telephone of Indonesia’s President Yudhoyono 
in August 2009: interceptions were also pursued on the phone of the 
president’s wife.116 Abbott in Parliament refused to detail Australian 
intelligence operations or to apologise for them. In response, Indonesia 
suspended military and intelligence cooperation and withdrew its 
ambassador from Canberra. A process of negotiations followed on 
the development of a code of conduct on intelligence issues and 
agreement was reached by October 2014, before President Yudhoyono 
left office. The two sides agreed not to use surveillance capacities to 
harm the interests of either party and resolved to promote intelligence 
cooperation in accordance with their laws and regulations.117 
The  agreement appeared to resolve this issue and Abbott attended 
the inauguration of Yudhoyono’s successor, Joko Widodo, in October 
2014 (continuing the practice of his predecessors as prime minister, in 
2004 and 2009).118 The potential for discord in relations nonetheless 
persisted and was illustrated again by the disagreement between the 
two governments in early 2015 over the execution of two convicted 
Australian drug traffickers. After the executions, Australia withdrew 
its ambassador in protest for one month, but the need to maintain and 
consolidate relations was also clear.119
114  Michael Bachelard and Sarah Whyte, ‘UN Representatives Criticise Abbott Government’s 
Boat Tow-Back Policy’, Sydney Morning Herald, 23 April 2014.
115  AAP, ‘The Way Is Closed, Abbott Declares on Asylum-Seeker Boats’, The Australian, 
29 March 2014; Ken Ward, Condemned to Crisis? A Lowy Institute Paper, Melbourne: Penguin, 
2015, pp. 67‒79.
116  Cameron Stewart, ‘Why Did Australia’s Spy Agencies Listen in on the Indonesian First 
Lady?’ The Australian, 14 December 2013.
117  Dobell, ’Australia-East Asia/US Relations: China Bumps, Indonesia Breach, Japan as Ally’.
118  Dan Harrison, ‘Tony Abbott Heads to Jakarta for Inauguration of Indonesian President Joko 
Widodo’, Sydney Morning Herald, 19 October 2014.
119  Peter Jennings, ‘Australia and Indonesia: No Way Out’, The Strategist, 18 March 2015; 
Felicity Norman, ‘Looking Ahead: Australia–Indonesia Relations’, New Mandela, 15 May 2015; 
Ward, Condemned to Crisis? pp. 94‒121.
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The fortieth anniversary Commemorative Summit: 
November 2014
The celebrations of the fortieth anniversary of Australia’s multilateral 
relations with ASEAN culminated in a fortieth anniversary 
Commemorative Summit on 12 November 2014 in Nay Pyi Taw, 
Myanmar. In the joint ASEAN–Australia leaders’ statement, the two 
sides ‘agreed to elevate our comprehensive partnership to a strategic 
level, founded on common interests in regional peace and prosperity’ 
and affirmed a number of areas of common engagement and cooperation. 
Australia and ASEAN agreed to support the realisation of the ASEAN 
Community by 2015, to ‘support ASEAN’s centrality in the evolving 
regional architecture and strengthen all ASEAN-led mechanisms’ and 
to work to strengthen the East Asia Summit. The leaders endorsed other 
areas of cooperation including in counter-terrorism, good governance 
and human rights, maritime cooperation, combating transnational 
crime, promotion of economic integration through the AANZFTA and 
RCEP, and continuing efforts to support reduction of development gaps 
within ASEAN and to combat infectious diseases. These statements 
were very much an affirmation of established policies. The statement 
declared that the parties would ‘hold regular leaders summits in the 
future’ although detailed arrangements were not announced.120
In comments on 13 November 2014, the day after the summit, 
Abbott said:
Australia has been a partner to the countries of our region in every 
way. We’ve been an economic partner, obviously. We’ve been a security 
partner and we’ve been almost a spiritual partner given the increasing 
links, the increasing understanding, between the countries of our 
region and ourselves. It was interesting that in the summit I attended, 
almost every ASEAN nation mentioned the New Colombo Plan, which 
is already sending hundreds of Australians to the universities of our 
region and in the years to come we’ll be sending thousands, perhaps 
tens of thousands, of Australians into our region … I’m very proud of 
120  ASEAN, ‘Towards a Strategic Partnership for Mutual Benefit’, Joint ASEAN–Australia 
Leaders’ Statement on the 40th Anniversary of ASEAN–Australia Dialogue Relations, Nay Pyi 
Taw, Myanmar, 12 November 2014.
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this initiative, it’s very much a signature initiative of this Government 
and it was something that was very much talked about yesterday at 
the Australia ASEAN Summit.121
In the period after the Commemorative Summit, the two sides moved 
to follow through the key areas of agreement. They discussed the 
implementation of the Strategic Partnership announced at the summit, 
although this was expected to consolidate rather than substantially 
change relations. At the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference in Kuala 
Lumpur on 5 August 2015, Australia and ASEAN reaffirmed a number 
of major areas of cooperation including responding to natural disasters. 
ASEAN welcomed Australia’s continuation of support for the ASEAN 
Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance. The ministers also 
followed up on the agreement at the Commemorative Summit by 
announcing that meetings at heads of government level would now 
be held on a regular basis, every two years, with the first of the new 
series to be held in Vientiane in late 2016. This was expected to add 
further profile to the relationship overall.122
In the lead-up to ASEAN’s declaration of the inauguration of the ASEAN 
Community at the end of 2015, the Australian Government issued 
a report in August 2015 on the economic significance for Australia 
of the ASEAN economies and of the ASEAN Economic Community 
(AEC).123 The report highlighted the status of the ASEAN economies 
as collectively Australia’s second largest trading partner (15 per cent 
of trade overall), surpassed only by China (23 per cent). If economic 
growth continued to follow recent trends, the ASEAN market would 
grow substantially, and the numbers of households defined as ‘middle 
class’ (with an annual household income of over US$7,500 in 2005 
in terms of purchasing power parity) could be expected to increase 
from 80 million in 2015 to 160 million by 2030.124 The report identified 
a number of areas in which Australian business can participate in 
‘regional value chains’ involving business activities and production 
networks operating in multiple countries across ASEAN. This created 
121  Tony Abbott, ‘Doorstop Interview, Naypyidaw, Myanmar’, Transcript, 13 November 2014.
122  ASEAN, ‘Chairman’s Statement of the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference (10+1 Sessions) 
with the Dialogue Partners’, Kuala Lumpur, 5 August 2015.
123  Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and Austrade, ‘Why ASEAN and Why 
Now? Insights for Australian Business’, Canberra: Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and 
Trade and Austrade, August 2015, p. 7.
124  Ibid., p. 9.
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the potential for further Australian investment in the ASEAN region 
although the report noted that while ASEAN investment in Australia 
had reached US$111 billion in 2015, Australian investment in ASEAN 
was only US$29 billion: the report noted that ‘considering ASEAN’s 
proximity to Australia and the complementarities of our economies, 
two way investment is much lower than might be expected’.125 
The  AEC was a ‘work in progress’ that would need much further 
development after its formal inauguration in 2015 but it ‘will mean 
that Australian companies with operations in ASEAN will find it 
easier to invest, move staff within the region, and to manage and build 
regional supply chains’.126
Major power competition and the 
South China Sea
While Australia and ASEAN had reaffirmed their partnership, 
the regional and international context for their relations continued to 
be challenging. Wesley has commented that:
The rapid economic growth of China, coupled with its large investments 
in military modernisation and increasingly assertive actions around 
its maritime boundaries has triggered competitive responses from the 
United States and most of its neighbours in Asia … Clashes between 
China and its neighbours over territorial disputes in the South China 
Sea and East China Sea, not to mention bouts of hostility on the Korean 
Peninsula, have raised the prospect of conflict in Pacific Asia to its 
highest level since the end of the Vietnam war.127
The situation in the South China Sea continued to be a key concern for 
ASEAN and for Australia. A further stage in the contest for influence 
in the area developed in 2013. From September 2013, China began 
to transform seven features in the Spratlys into artificial islands and 
developed civilian and military infrastructure including harbours, 
radar and surveillance systems, buildings and airfields. China was not 
the first country to reclaim land and develop facilities in the area; 
the Philippines had pursued such activities in the 1970s, Malaysia in 
the 1980s and both Vietnam and Taiwan after 2013. However, China’s 
125  Ibid., p. 14.
126  Ibid.
127  Wesley, ‘Trade Agreements’, p. 480.
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reclamation program was by far the most extensive; by mid-2015 
it was estimated to have involved over 800 hectares of land. These 
projects were expected to assist China to enforce its South China Sea 
territorial and jurisdictional claims. China argued that it was acting 
within its sovereign rights and was merely catching up with the 
activities of other claimants.128 
The Philippines and Vietnam criticised China’s actions (with the 
former being the most vocal).129 ASEAN also expressed criticism: at 
the 26th ASEAN Summit in April 2015, the chairman’s statement 
did not refer to China specifically but expressed ‘serious concern’ 
that the land reclamations had ‘eroded trust and confidence and may 
undermine peace, security and stability in the South China Sea’. The 
pressures facing ASEAN from South China Sea issues were again 
evident at its ministerial meetings in Kuala Lumpur in August 2015. 
The release of the annual foreign ministers statement was delayed 
for two days amid reports of internal differences over the issues.130 
In the statement, the ASEAN foreign ministers said: ‘[w]e took note 
of the serious concerns expressed by some ministers on the land 
reclamations in the South China Sea, which have eroded trust and 
confidence, increased tensions, and may undermine peace, security 
and stability in the South China Sea.’131 At the meeting, China declared 
that its reclamation program had been completed but China’s position 
in the area had clearly already been enhanced.132
The Australian Government continued to express its concern about the 
tensions in the South China Sea, for example in comments in June 2015 
by the Minister for Defence, Kevin Andrews, and by Prime Minister 
Abbott.133 During ASEAN’s August 2015 ministerial meetings, Foreign 
Minister Bishop reaffirmed the government’s position: 
128  Ian Storey, ‘China’s “Terraforming” in the Spratlys: A Game Changer in the South China 
Sea?’ ISEAS Perspective, 23 June 2015.
129  Ibid.
130  AFP, ‘Beijing Dilutes ASEAN: Ministers Wrangled Over Islands Disputes’, The Australian, 
7 August 2015.
131  ASEAN, ‘Joint Communique, 48th ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting’, Kuala Lumpur, 
4 August 2015.
132  AFP, ‘Beijing Dilutes ASEAN’.
133  David Wroe and Philip Wen, ‘South China Sea Dispute: Strong Indications Australia Will 
Join Push Back On China’s Island-Building’, Sydney Morning Herald, 1 June 2015; James Massola 
and John Garnaut, ‘Australia “Deplores” Unilateral Action in South China Sea: Tony Abbott’, 
Sydney Morning Herald, 29 June 2015.
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I made it plain that Australia does not take sides in territorial claims, 
but we urge all nations to halt reclamation work … We are deeply 
concerned that there may be militarisation of artificial reefs and 
structures and we called [for] a halt to that as well … [W]e call on 
the countries of South East Asia and China to respect freedom of 
navigation, freedom of over-flight and to reject any coercive or 
unilateral behaviour that can lead to increased tensions.134
However the prospects for alleviation of tensions and for productive 
negotiations remained very uncertain and the potential for increased 
strain and clashes among contending parties continued.
The Liberal‒National Party led by Abbott had therefore reaffirmed 
established patterns of the ASEAN relationship.135 The New Colombo 
Plan had added a new element to relations by promising to contribute 
to the depth and breadth of personal interactions and knowledge in the 
Australian community about the ASEAN members. The foreshadowed 
more regular leadership meetings would help give ASEAN a greater 
profile in the Australian Government and community. Relations, 
however, were continuing to be influenced by the shadow of serious 
major power tensions.
Australia: A possible future member 
of ASEAN?
A further and speculative question that during the period after 2007 
received some discussion (in 2012) was whether Australia might at 
some future point be considered (and consider itself) as a possible 
member of ASEAN. Given the obvious differences in societies, 
economic structures and political systems between Australia and 
ASEAN members, this has not been a question that has generally 
gained much attention in discussions about the relationship. As noted 
in Chapter 3, the issue of Australian membership had been mentioned 
as a long-term possibility by President Fidel Ramos of the Philippines 
in 1994. In 1996, Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong of Singapore raised 
the issue of Australia as a possible ASEAN member during a visit to 
134  Julie Bishop, ‘Doorstop Interview: East Asia Summit, Kuala Lumpur’, Transcript, 5 August 
2015.
135  The Abbott Government’s term in office concluded with the replacement of Abbott as prime 
minister by Malcolm Turnbull on 14 September 2015.
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Singapore by Prime Minister Keating, but Goh made it clear that he 
had been thinking in a very long-term manner and that there had 
been no proposal advanced, and no discussions had been held on the 
matter.
In 2012, several figures in Australia mentioned the concept of 
Australian  membership as a possibility, including former Prime 
Minister  Keating and a former senior Australian ambassador with 
extensive regional experience, John McCarthy. Keating stated 
in November 2012 that ‘[t]his grouping represents the security 
architecture of south-east Asia, the one with which we can have 
real dialogue and add substance. In the longer run we should be 
a member of it – formalising the trade, commercial and political 
interests we already share’.136 The potential of Australia to become an 
ASEAN member was also referred to in a presentation in Australia in 
August 2012 by the senior Singaporean analyst Kishore Mahbubani, 
who argued that while membership at present seemed ‘unthinkable’ to 
Australia’s elite, in the long-term such an approach would strengthen 
Australia’s position in relation to Asia.137
Minister for Foreign Affairs Carr in late 2012 indicated that 
membership  of ASEAN was not on the agenda for Australia. In an 
interview on 25 November 2012, Carr was asked whether he endorsed 
Keating’s suggestion that Australia should seek to join ASEAN and he 
said: ‘[i]t’s fair enough as a vision’, but added:
It’s fair enough to be out there floating as an incentive but in the 
meantime the practical work is to be done on trade relations 
involving Australia, New Zealand and others with ASEAN and on the 
coordination of foreign policy … if I said today or the Prime Minister 
said we want to be in ASEAN the chances are we would be rebuffed 
and ASEAN would say ‘that doesn’t fit our vision’. The point is to work 
at it and work on trade, on foreign policy alignment, on consultation, 
so that when it happens it’s an organic thing, a natural thing.138
136  Paul Keating, ‘Forget the West, our Future is to the North’, The Age, 15 November 2012; 
John  McCarthy, ‘Let’s Aim to Be More than US Surrogate’, Australian Financial Review, 
21 November 2012.
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Carr later wrote that DFAT in a submission had made clear that they 
did not consider membership as a realistic or feasible goal for Australia. 
The department had suggested that the minister should clarify that 
‘Australia has no plans to seek or even consider membership even 
in the long term and that doing so is not necessary to pursuing 
closer engagement with the region’. DFAT argued that membership 
in ASEAN would
subordinate aspects of Australian foreign policy to ASEAN. It would 
require Australia to refrain from any real criticism of ASEAN 
governments (e.g. on human-rights issues) and from putting forward 
alternatives to ASEAN positions. It would require Australia to accept 
other ASEAN countries, notably the ASEAN Chair, representing 
Australia in discussions with external parties such as the United 
States, China and international organisations. 
The submission also warned that ASEAN members would be strongly 
opposed to Australia joining the Association.139
While the discussion in 2012 of the concept of Australian membership 
in ASEAN was interesting, it was clearly in the realm of long-term 
speculation. Since there are a number of policy areas and institutional 
means through which closer Australian interests with ASEAN can 
be and are being pursued, an ongoing process of cooperation and 
closer coordination seemed for the foreseeable future the best path for 
Australia and its ASEAN partners to pursue. 
Conclusion
Relations after 2007 illustrated that closeness can produce partnership 
but can cause discord and contest. The Rudd proposal for an Asia 
Pacific Community met substantial resistance. The concept was seen as 
a challenge to ASEAN’s corporate interests and was not supported by 
Indonesia, often a key partner for Australia in its regional engagements. 
However in a climate of increased major power competition and 
contest for influence in Southeast Asia (including in relation to the 
South China Sea), the Rudd proposal was followed from 2009 by a 
rise in interest in regional multilateral associations by the US. ASEAN 
139  Bob Carr, Diary of a Foreign Minister, Sydney: NewSouth Publishing, 2014, p. 275.
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was able to capitalise on rising interest in wider and more inclusive 
dialogues by inviting the US and Russia to join the existing East Asia 
Summit. 
With disagreement over the Asia Pacific Community proposal 
resolved by mid-2010, Australia continued to develop its multilateral 
ASEAN relations with a further leadership summit meeting in 2010 
and participation in new ASEAN-sponsored forums, the ADMM-
Plus process and the negotiations for RCEP. This phase in relations 
culminated in the 2014 Commemorative Summit that reaffirmed key 
areas of cooperation and foreshadowed more regular dialogues at 
leadership level, which were announced in August 2015. It was notable 
in the summit’s joint statement that both sides endorsed ASEAN’s 
‘centrality’ in regional architecture and committed themselves to 
‘strengthen all ASEAN-led mechanisms’. This was closeness expressed 
as agreement and partnership. A key question, however, continued to 
be whether and how ASEAN and Australia could cooperate to develop 





Australia and ASEAN: Issues, 
themes and future prospects
Over more than four decades, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) has been a substantial focus for Australia and the two sides 
have established many areas of dialogue and cooperation. Australia 
reaffirmed its commitment to ASEAN in the Commemorative Summit 
in November 2014. There are, nonetheless, significant questions about 
the character and likely future course of the relationship. This chapter 
reviews major themes and lessons that may be drawn from assessing 
the relationship since 1974, and discusses factors that are likely to be 
important for the future.
Themes and lessons 
Australia has benefited greatly from ASEAN’s contribution towards 
maintaining peace and enhancing stability in relations among its own 
members, arguably ASEAN’s single greatest achievement. Southeast 
Asia was in a highly unstable position in 1967 in the aftermath of 
Konfrontasi and with the conflicts in Indochina involving intense Cold 
War competition and massive violence. ASEAN provided a framework 
for communication and confidence-building that stabilised relations 
among the original founding members. ASEAN’s consensus-based 
style of cooperation enabled it to encompass Brunei (in 1984) and then 
four states in mainland Southeast Asia, when this became possible 
from the mid-1990s. ASEAN’s model of cooperation continues to have 
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appeal and Timor-Leste wishes to become the Association’s eleventh 
member.1 When the highly unstable environment of the mid-1960s 
is recalled, it is clear that Australia’s security has been bolstered by 
ASEAN’s confidence-building within Southeast Asia and its creation 
of diplomatic habits of mind and behaviour that have had wider Asian 
applications. 
Australia has been able to cooperate with ASEAN in areas of major 
mutual interest. Early interactions from the mid-1970s produced some 
significant disagreement over trade relations that were not at that time 
resolved to ASEAN’s satisfaction. However, dialogue on economic 
policies was increased and a challenge by ASEAN to Australia’s 
policies on civil aviation from 1978 – an early example of ASEAN’s 
capacity to bargain as a group – produced compromises that provided 
some satisfaction to the ASEAN side, particularly to Singapore. 
Further cooperation was pursued to deal with the outflows of people 
from Indochina after 1975. ASEAN’s capacity to communicate and 
coordinate responses to a major political and humanitarian challenge 
gained greater international attention and assistance, and increased 
commitments of resettlement places. Coordination between Australia 
and ASEAN played a crucial role in the development of policies to 
help Australia manage the intake of refugees and gain cooperation to 
minimise unregulated flows of people directly to Australia by boat.2
Cooperation with ASEAN, along with some policy disagreement, was 
a key part of the diplomacy pursued by Australia over Cambodia in 
the 1980s and early 1990s. Australia’s approach initially involved 
some discord with ASEAN as Malcolm Fraser’s government in 1980 
withdrew recognition from the Democratic Kampuchea (Khmer 
Rouge) regime. Bob Hawke’s government from 1983 then sought to 
explore avenues for additional dialogue at a time when ASEAN and 
the major powers were resistant to alternative approaches. However, 
from 1989, close coordination with ASEAN and with Indonesia 
in particular was integral to Australia’s capacity to help make 
1  At the time of writing, it was expected widely that Timor-Leste would be accepted as a 
member by 2017; see Termsak Chalermpalanupap, ‘Timor-Leste’s Quest to Join ASEAN: The 
Process and the Pace’, ASEAN Focus, 1/2015, August 2015.
2  As noted in Chapter 5, in the later phase of people movements from the late 1990s (where 
most of those seeking asylum came from outside Southeast Asia), the major multilateral effort at 
coordination was pursued through the Bali process rather than with ASEAN.
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a contribution to the development of a peace process that led to the 
Paris Agreements, United Nations involvement and the redevelopment 
of an internationally accepted Cambodian state. 
Australia’s interactions with ASEAN were a key issue in new avenues 
of cooperation in the wider East Asian and Asia-Pacific regions from 
the late 1980s. With the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) 
grouping, Australia, acting with Japan, was able to develop a proposal 
for dialogue after gaining ASEAN’s acceptance of the concept, albeit 
with markedly less support from Malaysia. The decline of Cold War 
tensions after the demise of the Soviet Union facilitated cooperation 
between Australia and ASEAN on the development of a new security 
dialogue. In this case, ASEAN took the lead in developing what 
became the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). Australia went on to 
become a founding member with ASEAN of the East Asia Summit, 
after formally acceding to ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation.
In considering the themes and patterns in the relationship that 
were outlined in the Introduction, four stand out. First, the climate 
of relations among the major powers in Southeast and East Asia has 
clearly and understandably been a key influence on the character 
of Australia’s interactions with ASEAN. ASEAN was established in 
1967 at a time of intense conflict in Indochina and there seemed little 
prospect of alleviation of major power confrontation. The period from 
1972, however, was one where the advent of increased communication 
between the US and China and the withdrawal of US forces from 
Vietnam stimulated reassessments about how security in Southeast 
Asia could best be enhanced and about how Australia could seek to 
support this. In this period, Australia’s greater interest in ASEAN and 
the inauguration of multilateral relations under Gough Whitlam’s 
government was a significant part of this process. The climate of 
ASEAN relations was influenced strongly by the reassertion of Cold 
War tensions in the late 1970s as intensified competition between 
the Soviet Union and China ushered in 15 years of regional and 
international confrontation over Cambodia. Southeast Asia was again 
affected profoundly by the decline of Cold War tensions at the end of 
the 1980s, which opened up new opportunities for détente between the 
states of Indochina and ASEAN and between China and the members 
of ASEAN. The changed and comparatively more cooperative state 
of major power relations then facilitated initiatives by Australia with 
ASEAN over Cambodia and in the development of APEC and the ARF. 
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The climate of major power competition has continued to be a central 
issue and challenge for Australia–ASEAN relations as the discussion 
below suggests. 
A second long-term theme in Australia’s approaches towards ASEAN 
since the 1970s has been an interest by successive Australian 
governments in fostering cooperation and reconciliation among all 
the states of the Southeast Asian region and in particular between 
the founding members and the states of Indochina, which could both 
enhance the security environment of Southeast Asia and reduce the 
avenues for major power interference and competition. In the early 
phase of its multilateral association with ASEAN, Australia from 1975 
expressed interest in the potential for détente between the original 
ASEAN five and the regimes in Indochina. This interest was expressed 
by both the Whitlam and Fraser governments up to 1978, and was 
a significant motivation for the approaches towards the Cambodian 
conflict advanced by the Hawke Government after 1983. A further 
instance of this strand in Australia’s interactions with ASEAN 
can be seen in the case of ASEAN’s policies of encouraging wider 
international relationships for Myanmar after the 2010 elections and 
for the phasing down of the sanctions previously pursued by many 
Western governments: Australia supported ASEAN by using its 
diplomatic capacities to help advance ASEAN’s policies of supporting 
wider relationships for Myanmar both regionally and internationally.
A third long-term theme has been the diversity, pluralism and at 
times competition, in both Australia and Southeast Asia, in relation 
to conceptions of ‘region’ in which to pursue cooperation. Successive 
Australian governments have expressed strong interest in Southeast 
Asia, and since the 1970s ASEAN has been an obvious focus for this 
interest. However Australia has wanted to define other ‘regions’ as 
being of relevance and concern. The major wider focus pursued has 
been the conception of the ‘Asia-Pacific’, extending beyond Southeast 
Asia to encompass Northeast Asia and Australia’s ally, the United 
States (and potentially other parties in the Americas): APEC was a 
notable reflection of this focus. In the years since 2010, Australian 
policymakers have also discussed an additional regional identity, 
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the ‘Indo-Pacific’, a conception that seeks to take account of the rising 
prominence of India and the Indian Ocean, although the coherence and 
relevance of this ‘region’ is still in the process of being established.3
Pluralism in defining regions appropriate for cooperation has also been 
evident in ASEAN and East Asia. ASEAN’s initial and principal focus 
has by design been Southeast Asia. ASEAN, however, has wanted to 
bolster its economic and security interests by engaging major external 
powers in dialogue. In the early 1990s, ASEAN sponsored the ARF 
whose regional scope included a wide range of nations across the 
Asia-Pacific, including the United States and India. ASEAN however 
has also at times pursued additional and different conceptions of 
‘region’ for the purposes of cooperation. Many in ASEAN have 
supported a conception of ‘East Asia’ as a basis for cooperation and 
community-building; this concept was associated particularly with 
Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad from the early 1990s 
and was expressed after 1997 in the advent of the ASEAN Plus Three 
group, joining ASEAN with China, Japan and South Korea. The East 
Asia Summit was a proposal that emerged from the ASEAN Plus 
Three grouping and this initially also reflected an East Asia-focused 
conception of ‘region’. However, in the process of developing the 
East Asia Summit, amid contestation for influence between China and 
Japan, a majority of ASEAN members supported a wider membership 
than ASEAN Plus Three, to include India, Australia and New Zealand 
in 2005, and then in 2011 to include also the US and Russia. 
This pluralism in conceptions of ‘region’ reflects the challenges of an 
environment of overlapping and competitive interests and at times 
of severe tensions among the major powers. In this environment, no 
individual major power would be acceptable to others as a sponsor or 
leader in regional institutions, especially in relation to security issues. 
Indeed, regional states and major powers have been prepared to see 
different groups with differing memberships operating in parallel, 
in patterns of ‘competitive regionalism’. This institutional pluralism 
has reflected the diversity of states and interests in East Asia and 
3  Rory Medcalf, ‘Reimagining Asia: From Asia-Pacific to Indo-Pacific’, Asan Forum, 26 June 
2015; Trevor Wilson, ‘The “Indo-Pacific”: Absent Policy Behind Meaningless Words’, East Asia 
Forum, 19 September 2014.
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the Asia-Pacific and has been a long-standing feature of regional 
cooperation, even if these arrangements can sometimes look ‘messy’ 
to other observers.4
The pursuit of differing conceptions of region has at times caused 
debate and tension in Australia–ASEAN relations. Australia has been 
closely interested in cooperation with ASEAN but has approached 
this both as an ally of the United States and as a country with deep 
economic and strategic interests in Northeast Asia, a perspective 
encouraging an orientation towards an ‘Asia-Pacific’ focus. Australia’s 
interests in Asia-Pacific cooperation have, however, sometimes not 
been welcomed by ASEAN members, sensitive about their hard-
won regional identity being challenged or even supplanted by wider 
groupings. When Prime Minister Whitlam advanced his concept 
of an ‘Asia-Pacific forum’ in 1973, ASEAN responses were cool and 
Indonesian President Suharto was quick to indicate opposition to it 
in talks with Whitlam in February 1973. Even before Australia had a 
formal multilateral linkage with ASEAN, the Association was able to 
exercise an effective veto over an Australian policy initiative. When 
Australia was interested in advancing proposals for wider groupings at 
the end of the 1980s, ASEAN’s sensitivity about its corporate identity 
was again a significant issue and ASEAN exerted a major influence 
on how the new institutions developed. ASEAN’s concurrence and 
participation were vital to the successful inauguration of APEC and 
ASEAN itself assumed the leadership role for the ARF. In 2008, Prime 
Minister Kevin Rudd’s proposal for discussion about an ‘Asia Pacific 
Community’ was seen widely as a challenge to ASEAN’s profile and 
position. It was the East Asia Summit, an ASEAN-initiated grouping, 
which became the vehicle for bringing the US and Russia into an 
institutional leadership dialogue with ASEAN and Asian states. 
ASEAN has therefore been active in asserting and protecting its 
identity and Australia has needed to recognise this.
A fourth long-term theme in Australia’s ASEAN relations is that 
cooperation has worked best when Australia has been able to 
operate in collaboration with key members of ASEAN in developing 
policy initiatives. This has been understandably and particularly 
4  William T. Tow and Brendan Taylor, ‘Emerging Regional Security Architecture: An Australian 
Perspective’, in William T. Tow and Chin Kin Wah, eds, ASEAN India Australia: Towards Closer 
Engagement in a New Asia, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009.
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important in relation to Indonesia. Because of its size and capacity 
for influence and leadership in Southeast Asia, Indonesia is an 
essential partner for Australia. Cooperation with Indonesia was at the 
centre of the Cambodian peace process diplomacy in 1989 and 1990. 
Indonesia played a major role with Australia in the advent and initial 
development of APEC and the ARF. Indonesia was a key supporter 
for Australia in gaining membership in the East Asia Summit. 
By contrast, when Australia has sought to pursue regional initiatives 
without Indonesia’s collaboration, or at least its acceptance, as in the 
case of Whitlam’s Asia-Pacific forum concept and Rudd’s Asia Pacific 
Community proposal, success has been less likely. The viability and 
health of the Indonesian relationship and Indonesia’s preparedness to 
collaborate with Australia have thus been vital for Australia’s capacity 
for multilateral access and cooperation. 
In reviewing the pattern of Australia’s ASEAN relations since 1974, 
a further issue should be noted. Since the 1970s while there has been a 
change in the relative economic size and weight of Australia vis-à-vis 
the ASEAN members there has also been a very great broadening of 
Australia’s interactions with those members. In 1974, when multilateral 
relations were inaugurated, Australia’s economy was clearly larger 
than the aggregate of the then five members of ASEAN: Australia’s 
gross national product was assessed by the World Bank at around 
US$71 billion and the ASEAN aggregate was estimated at around US$61 
billion.5 In 2014, ASEAN’s combined gross domestic product was 
significantly greater than that of Australia’s (Australian Government 
figures for 2014 were approximately US$1.5 trillion for Australia 
and US$2.5 trillion for ASEAN).6 While ASEAN’s membership has 
increased since the 1970s, this relative change is primarily a reflection 
of the successful advance of economic growth in the ASEAN region, 
a development that has been very much in Australia’s interests. 
At the same time, the scale and breadth of interactions have expanded 
greatly. While relations were ushered in on a government-to-
government level in 1974 by a small number of political leaders and 
5  Figures on gross national product at market prices from World Bank, World Bank Atlas: 
Population, Per Capita Product, and Growth Rates, Washington, DC: World Bank, 1976, pp. 26‒8. 
6  Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and Austrade, ‘Why ASEAN and Why 
Now? Insights for Australian Business’, Canberra: Australian Department of Foreign Affairs 
and Trade and Austrade, August 2015, p. 7; ‘The G20 Economies Explained in 12 Charts’, 
The Conversation, 12 November 2014.
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officials, interactions are now very wide. Immigration has brought 
large communities of peoples to Australia from Southeast Asia, with the 
2011 census indicating that over 650,000 people claim Southeast Asian 
heritage. Links in education have meant there are deep connections 
across many sectors. Merchandise trade has increased 107 times since 
1973–74 to reach a level of over A$100 billion in 2013–14 and trade 
with the ASEAN members has increased in relative significance for 
Australia.7 Relations that were initiated by a small number of officials 
and political leaders have also been advanced by non-governmental 
actors including academics, business groups and ‘second track’ 
dialogues such as those sponsored by the Council for Security and 
Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) and Asialink (University of 
Melbourne).8 Thus, while Australia’s relative economic size in relation 
to ASEAN has declined since the 1970s, interlinkages with ASEAN 
are far wider and deeper and the relationship matters more than ever.
Future issues and prospects
ASEAN, as we have argued, has been valuable to Australia for its 
contribution to stability in Southeast Asia, as a partner in areas of 
common interest and as a convenor of forums that have provided regular 
dialogues for Australia with both regional states and major powers that 
it would not otherwise have. Australia at the Commemorative Summit 
in November 2014 reaffirmed its commitment to the relationship 
and its support for ASEAN’s ‘centrality’ in regional dialogues and 
7  In the period 1976–77, ASEAN members took 6.6 per cent of Australia’s exports and were 
the source of 4.1 per cent of imports, while in 2014, the figures were 11.4 per cent of Australia’s 
exports and 19.2 per cent of imports; see Clive T. Edwards, ‘Current Issues in Australian–
ASEAN Trade Relations’, Southeast Asian Affairs 1979, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies, 1979, pp. 30–1; and Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, ‘Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)’, dfat.gov.au/international-relations/regional-architecture/
asean/Pages/association-of-southeast-asian-nations-asean.aspx (accessed 1 October 2015).
8  Since 2008, Asialink has collaborated with the Institute for Strategic and International 
Studies Malaysia (ISIS-Malaysia) and the Asia New Zealand Foundation to organise the annual 
ASEAN–Australia–New Zealand Dialogue. The Dialogue provides a ‘second track’ discussion and 
review of the ASEAN–Australia and ASEAN–New Zealand relationships by participants from the 
12 countries; see Asialink, ‘ASEAN–Australia–New Zealand Dialogue’, asialink.unimelb.edu.au/
asialink_diplomacy/dialogues/asean-australia-new_zealand_dialogue (accessed 14 January 2016). 
Asialink also sponsors discussions between ASEAN and Australian representatives on specific 
economic, social and political areas of common interest and concern in the Asialink Conversations. 
See Asialink, ‘Asialink Conversations’, asialink.unimelb.edu.au/asialink_diplomacy/dialogues/
asialink_conversations2 (accessed 14 January 2016).
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institutional development. However, ASEAN’s ongoing success – and 
the potential for Australia’s relations with it – should not be taken 
for granted. In the future development of Australia’s relations with 
ASEAN, five factors are likely to be of particular significance. 
First, ASEAN’s progress towards its declared goals for economic 
integration and security cooperation will be crucial. As noted in 
Chapter 4, the Association has committed itself to developing an 
ASEAN Community, which was inaugurated formally at the end of 
2015, but whose goals are expected widely to need to be pursued well 
beyond that date. Considerable progress has been made in economic 
cooperation through the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) project. 
Tariff barriers among members have been reduced substantially, 
customs procedures have been streamlined, cross-border flows of 
skilled labour in some sectors have been facilitated, the Master Plan on 
ASEAN Connectivity is in place and should help improve infrastructure 
and reduce business transaction costs, and disparities in income levels 
between richer and poorer members have been reduced. A number of 
businesses increasingly look at the ASEAN area as a regional market. 
However, the AEC project faces the persistence of many non-tariff 
barriers and of obstacles to services and investment liberalisation. 
While it was clear at the time of writing that all the goals of the AEC 
could not be met by the end of 2015, ASEAN would be able to declare 
that significant progress had been achieved and efforts at economic 
integration were set to continue beyond 2015.9
ASEAN’s Political-Security and Socio-Cultural Communities will be 
even longer-term endeavours. The Socio-Cultural Community can 
broaden and deepen interconnections across the immensely diverse 
ASEAN societies, but its goals cannot be realised rapidly.10 In the realm 
of security, ASEAN has been crucial in advancing communication 
and accord among its members and overt sustained conflict has never 
occurred. The Political-Security Community seeks to extend this 
9  See Siow Yue Chia, ‘The ASEAN Economic Community: Progress, Challenges, and Prospects’, 
ADBI Working Paper 440, Tokyo: Asian Development Bank Institute, October 2013; Jayant 
Menon and Anna Cassandra Melendez, ‘Realizing an ASEAN Economic Community: Progress and 
Remaining Challenges’, ADB Economics Working Paper 432, Metro Manila: Asian Development 
Bank, May 2015; Stephen Groff, ‘Overcoming Southeast Asia’s Barriers to Trade’, Wall Street 
Journal Asia, 30 June 2015; Tham Siew Yean and Sanchita Basu Das, ‘Domestic Consensus Vital 
for ASEAN Economic Integration Beyond 2015’, ISEAS Perspective, 24 September 2015.
10  Julio S. Amador III, ‘ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community: An Assessment of its Institutional 
Prospects’, Foreign Service Institute, Pasay City, The Philippines, 28 February 2011.
ENgAgINg ThE NEIghBoURS
196
process, but ASEAN members will continue to face challenges in 
maintaining regional order. Insurgent and separatist conflicts confront 
Myanmar, Thailand and the Philippines, despite efforts towards 
resolution. There has been sensitivity and tension in some inter-
state relations (for example, between Thailand and Cambodia, and 
Cambodia and Vietnam). ASEAN’s desire for a stable and manageable 
regional order will also be challenged by major power competition, for 
example in relation to activities in the South China Sea.11 The pursuit 
of a political and security community will thus need to extend well 
into the future.12
The ASEAN Community project is significant for Australia, which 
has benefited greatly from ASEAN’s success in dampening the bases 
for inter-state conflict. Further political and security cooperation in 
ASEAN would consolidate these benefits. Economic integration can 
enhance ASEAN’s value as a trade partner by making the market 
across the 10 countries both larger and easier to relate to. ASEAN’s 
claims to maintain ‘centrality’ in regional dialogue will be stronger 
if its progress towards its goals of integration is seen to be effective 
and this will be important for all its dialogue partners, including 
Australia.13
A second and related issue for the future of Australia–ASEAN relations 
will be the climate and evolution of interactions among the major 
powers. ASEAN was established at a time of Cold War-era competition 
in Southeast Asia; the pattern of major power relations has been a key 
factor for ASEAN’s subsequent development and continues to exert 
pressure on the Association. This has been evident in relations among 
the three most important of these powers in East Asia ‒ the US, China 
and Japan ‒ where there has been both great economic cooperation 
and significant strategic tensions, especially between the US and 
China, and between China and Japan. These tensions deepened from 
2009, and by 2015 pressures were if anything intensifying. China was 
11  Christopher B. Roberts, ASEAN Regionalism: Cooperation, Values and Institutionalization, 
Abingdon: Routledge, 2012, pp. 147–87; Donald E. Weatherbee, Indonesia in ASEAN: Vision and 
Reality, Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2013, pp. 59–82.
12  Roberts, ASEAN Regionalism, pp. 174‒87.
13  Mely Caballero-Anthony, ‘Understanding ASEAN’s Centrality: Bases and Prospects in an 
Evolving Regional Architecture’, Pacific Review, 27(4), 2014. See also the valuable discussion 
of ‘ASEAN centrality’ in See Seng Tan, Multilateral Asian Security Architecture: Non-ASEAN 
Stakeholders, Abingdon: Routledge, 2016, pp. 18‒40.
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continuing its military modernisation and assertiveness on territorial 
issues while the US was pursuing its rebalance towards East Asia. 
Relations between Japan and China, a long-term focus for competition 
in East Asia and in regional cooperative efforts, continued to involve 
discord over the unresolved legacies of the Second World War and 
more recent strategic confrontation, notably in the East China Sea.14
Major power competition has also contributed to tensions in the 
South China Sea, where, as noted in Chapter 5, the pattern of disputes 
intensified after 2009. ASEAN has had great difficulty in responding. 
The open divisions at the Phnom Penh foreign ministers’ meeting in 
July 2012 illustrated the pressures ASEAN has faced. ASEAN in 2015 
was continuing to pursue multilateral discussions with China about a 
possible code of conduct, but it was not clear if any progress could be 
made. The South China Sea issue has challenged ASEAN as a political 
community, given the differing strategic interests of members. 
Claimant states (particularly the Philippines and Vietnam) were much 
more affected by, and involved in, the issue than the non-claimants.15 
Increasing major power competition could undermine ASEAN’s 
capacity as a diplomatic actor. ASEAN has been able to claim a central 
place in regional dialogue and cooperation because no one major 
power has been in a position to lead and the competitive climate of 
major power relations has enabled ASEAN to operate and be accepted 
as sponsor and convenor of East Asian and Asia Pacific security 
dialogues.16 However, heightened major power competition could 
damage ASEAN’s cohesion and reduce its room for manoeuvre. In 
particular, rivalry between the  US and China will exert continuing 
14  International Crisis Group, ‘Old Scores and New Grudges: Evolving Sino-Japanese Tensions’, 
Asia Report No. 258, Brussels: International Crisis Group, 24 July 2014; Ron Huisken, ‘Security 
in the Asia Pacific: Growing Turbulence or a Gathering Storm?’ CSCAP Regional Security Outlook 
2015, Canberra: Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific, 2015. See also Michael 
Wesley, Restless Continent: Wealth, Rivalry and Asia’s New Geopolitics, Collingwood, Vic.: Black 
Inc., 2015, pp. 93‒174.
15  Ian Storey, ‘Disputes in the South China Sea: Southeast Asia’s Troubled Waters’, politique 
étrangère, 3, 2014; International Crisis Group, ‘Stirring up the South China Sea (III): A Fleeting 
Opportunity for Calm’, Asia Report No. 267, Brussels: International Crisis Group, 7 May 2015; 
Ian Storey, ‘ASEAN’s Failing Grade in the South China Sea’, Asan Forum, 31 July 2015.
16  Caballero-Anthony, ‘Understanding ASEAN’s Centrality’.
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pressure on the states of  Southeast Asia and could circumscribe 
ASEAN’s capacity to maintain an effective common strategic outlook 
and to operate independently between these powers.17 
A third and related key issue for Australia and ASEAN will be the 
prospects for wider multilateral dialogues to make substantive 
contributions to cooperation and security in East Asia. States in 
Southeast and East Asia have pursued cooperation through multiple 
groupings and this pluralism seems set to continue, as will contest 
between different conceptions of regional dialogues. ASEAN Plus 
Three, for example, is likely to continue to operate alongside the 
East Asia Summit. Economic and trade negotiations, as outlined in 
Chapter 5, have been conducted by different groups with differing 
memberships, notably through the ASEAN-sponsored Regional 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and through the Trans-
Pacific Partnership (TPP). China has, in addition, contributed to the 
array of multilateral cooperation avenues. In 2015, China established a 
new regional economic institution, the Asian Infrastructure Investment 
Bank, which will operate alongside the Asian Development Bank.18 
While pluralism in the range of institutions and cooperation dialogues 
seems set to continue, there may be potential for rationalisation among 
some of the major regional dialogues.19 A key issue is the character and 
role of the East Asia Summit and its relationships with other major 
dialogues. Australia for the past two decades has been involved in 
the development of ASEAN-sponsored forums beginning with the 
ARF and extending most recently to the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ 
Meeting (ADMM) Plus process. Australia has been a strong proponent 
of the highest profile of these groupings, the East Asia Summit, which 
has proceeded cautiously since its inauguration in 2005 and has 
operated with its expanded membership (with the US and Russia) only 
17  Donald K. Emmerson, ‘Challenging ASEAN: The American Pivot in Southeast Asia’, 
East Asia Forum, 13 January 2013; Huisken, ‘Security in the Asia Pacific’; Amitav Acharya, 
‘Is ASEAN Losing its Way?’ YaleGlobal online, 24 September 2015.
18  See David Arase, ‘What to Make of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank’, Asan Forum, 
26 June 2015.
19  See Nick Bisley and Malcolm Cook, ‘How the East Asia Summit Can Achieve its Potential’, 
ISEAS Perspective, 28 October 2014.
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since 2011.20 A significant question for both ASEAN and Australia 
is whether the East Asia Summit may be able to develop a more 
substantive role in promoting cooperation and security. 
There are inter-related political and institutional questions about the 
East Asia Summit. As noted in Chapter 5, the Summit has begun to 
develop an identity and has pursued a range of cooperative projects, 
but the annual leaders’ meeting – the keystone of the Summit – 
is short and has had little organised institutional backup to support it 
or to help it pursue follow-up activities. The Australian Government 
has hoped to see the East Asia Summit advance its identity and role 
as a leaders’ meeting. Ideas for enhancing the role and capacity of 
the East Asia Summit have been proposed, notably in a memorandum 
issued by CSCAP in June 2014. 
The CSCAP report (which was endorsed by a multinational panel of 
experts) advocated both strengthening the East Asia Summit and 
rationalising its roles, along with those of the ARF and ADMM-Plus. 
CSCAP suggested that the Summit could expand from its current 
limited duration (about three hours) to a full day. ASEAN  could 
consider joint chairmanship of the Summit with non-ASEAN 
members, which would help give those members an increased sense 
of involvement in the Summit. Additional support could be provided 
to the Summit by an expanded ASEAN Secretariat. Communication 
and connectivity among the dialogues, CSCAP argued, could be 
improved, so that the Summit could focus on strategic direction, 
the ARF on structured security dialogue and the ADMM-Plus on 
practical security cooperation.21 The CSCAP proposals were a valuable 
contribution to the debate on regional institutions, especially given 
their endorsement by representatives from the Council’s membership 
across the Asia-Pacific region. At the time of writing, the proposals 
were being considered within ASEAN under Malaysia’s chairmanship 
in 2015 and were another notable example of the contribution to 
regional cooperation that have been made by non-official individuals 
and groups and in which Australians have been able to take part.22 
20  Ibid.
21  CSCAP, ‘Towards an Effective Regional Security Architecture for the Asia Pacific’, CSCAP 
Memorandum No. 26, June 2014.
22  Ron Huisken and Anthony Milner, ‘On a Track to Regional Peace with CSCAP’, 
The Australian, 2 July 2014.
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The East Asia Summit could be better organised and supported. 
However its viability will still depend on the commitment of the 
participating states to help make it work. A further and highly 
significant issue for the Summit therefore is that its potential will be 
affected and constrained by the state of major power relations. In 2015, 
interactions among the major power members of the East Asia Summit 
were not propitious for the development of common endeavours. 
Relationships among the US and China and China and Japan were 
uneasy and levels of strategic communication and trust were not high. 
Relations between the US and Russia had also deteriorated in the wake 
of the political crisis in Ukraine from the first part of 2014 and by 
Russia’s annexation of the territory of Crimea, a step criticised sharply 
by the US.23 These issues posed major questions about the potential for 
the effective advancement of the East Asia Summit. Multilateral forums 
can provide valuable venues for building additional communication, 
alongside bilateral relations. However, without a greater degree of 
strategic accord among the major powers, the potential for substantive 
cooperation in multilateral forums like the Summit is likely to remain 
limited.24 As a founding member of the East Asia Summit, Australia 
has a strong interest in how the debates about the Summit develop and 
whether a consensus can emerge for adaptation and change.
A fourth key issue for the future of Australia–ASEAN relations is 
the character and evolution of Australia’s interactions with ASEAN 
as an institution. Australia is pursuing its ASEAN relations in an 
environment where other dialogue partners are active in their own 
multilateral relations with the Association, including China, Japan, 
South Korea and India. In this context it is important that Australia 
should maximise its efforts to bolster the profile of its engagement both 
within Australia and in ASEAN. By 2015, Australia was interacting 
regularly with ASEAN in many venues, headed by the annual Post-
Ministerial Conference of foreign ministers. At heads of government 
level, ASEAN’s profile for Australia has been less prominent. The two 
sides up to 2015 held four leaders’ summit meetings (1977, 2004, 
23  Huisken, ‘Security in the Asia Pacific’; See Seng Tan and Oleg Korovin, ‘Seeking Stability 
in Turbulent Times: Southeast Asia’s New Normal?’ in Daljit Singh, ed., Southeast Asian Affairs 
2015, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2015.
24  William T. Tow, ‘Great Powers and Multilateralism: The Politics of Security Architectures in 
Southeast Asia’, in Ralf Emmers, ed., ASEAN and the Institutionalization of East Asia, London: 
Routledge, 2012; Evelyn Goh, ‘ASEAN-led Multilateralism and Regional Order: The Great Power 
Bargain Deficit’, Asan Forum, May‒June 2014.
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2010  and 2014). The holding of more frequent leaders’ meeting 
(every two years), which was foreshadowed at the 2014 Commemorative 
Summit, was agreed upon in August 2015, with the first of the regular 
meetings to be held in Vientiane in late 2016. This should advance the 
profile of relations on both sides and be a significant way of visibly 
increasing cooperation. 
Australia’s relationship with ASEAN’s institutional structures is also 
important. A centrepiece of the institutional relationship, as noted in 
Chapter 5, is Australia’s multilateral assistance program with ASEAN 
(the Australia–ASEAN Development Cooperation Program), which 
is focused on the ASEAN Secretariat and has a particular emphasis 
on supporting the Association’s capacities for economic integration. 
This aspect of the Australia–ASEAN relationship is appreciated and 
valued by the ASEAN side. This is particularly the case because the 
Secretariat in Jakarta has operated with a limited funding base in which 
individual ASEAN members have paid the same annual contribution 
(towards the annual budget that in 2014 was under US$20 million) 
despite the obvious differences in wealth among them. The relatively 
small Secretariat has to manage hundreds of meetings annually and 
many complex cooperative programs. It has been argued that ASEAN 
will need considerably expanded resources for the Secretariat if it is to 
pursue its ASEAN Community cooperative plans effectively.25 ASEAN 
has been considering its own structures and how they may be enhanced 
through a high-level task force. A significant question will be whether 
a consensus will develop to give the Secretariat more resources, when 
there has been a long-standing tendency within ASEAN to maintain 
the Secretariat at a relatively modest size and to retain the principle of 
equality of the size of contributions. Australia can continue to develop 
ways of enhancing its assistance to the ASEAN Secretariat and to the 
Association’s integration projects and this can provide further relevant 
support to ASEAN when its administrative resources are stretched 
and add further depth to the Australian relationship. 
There are additional steps that Australia could take to maximise the 
potential for the ASEAN relationship. The New Colombo Plan is a 
positive addition to Australia’s basis for interaction with ASEAN and 
25  Chia, ‘The ASEAN Economic Community’; Asian Development Bank Institute, ASEAN 




with Asia overall. The long-term benefits of this plan can be enhanced 
by further support in Australia to the education sector to encourage 
language and non-language studies of the ASEAN members.26 
Australia could also raise its own profile in the ASEAN region through 
expanded use of the Special Overseas Visitors Program to increase 
dialogue between public and private sector policymakers from 
ASEAN and relevant sectors in Australia. In addition, Australia could 
make a more concerted effort to raise the attention given to ASEAN in 
Australia; the Australia–ASEAN Council, which was inaugurated on 
8 September 2015 with the goal of initiating and supporting activities 
designed to enhance awareness, understanding and links between 
people and institutions in Australia and the 10 ASEAN countries, can 
make a valuable contribution to this process.27 
A fifth key issue is Australia’s relationship with Indonesia. While 
all of the bilateral relationships support the multilateral association, 
the Indonesia connection has been integral to Australia’s interactions 
with ASEAN. Indonesia’s support has been crucial on a number 
of occasions in assisting Australia to gain acceptance in regional 
dialogues and to facilitate Australian policy initiatives, including the 
particularly close cooperation during the Cambodian peace process, 
and the development of APEC, the ARF and the East Asia Summit. 
It  was noted in Chapter  4 that the improved climate in bilateral 
relations after 2002 (in which cooperation on counter-terrorism issues 
was a central element) played a major role in the revival of progress in 
Australia’s multilateral relations with ASEAN. 
While relations developed substantially in the decade of the Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono administration (2004–14), the potential for 
discord continues.28 There are ongoing problems of comparative 
lack of trust on both sides and the efforts made in advancing official 
dialogues has not been matched by the development of accord at the 
26  Anthony Milner and Sally Percival Wood, eds, ‘Our Place in the Asian Century: Southeast 
Asia as “The Third Way”’, Melbourne: Asialink, University of Melbourne, 2012, pp. 20–4.
27  Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, ‘The Australia–ASEAN Council’, 
17 July 2015, dfat.gov.au/people-to-people/foundations-councils-institutes/Pages/the-australia-
asean-council.aspx (accessed 1 October 2015).
28  See Ken Ward, Condemned to Crisis? A Lowy Institute Paper, Melbourne: Penguin, 2015.
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level of popular opinion.29 The health and viability of this bilateral 
relationship will remain crucial for productive Australian interactions 
with ASEAN.30 
Since the 1970s Australia has gained great benefits from ASEAN’s 
contribution to stability in Southeast Asia. Australia and ASEAN have 
been able to work together on many problems of common concern to 
advance security. Australia has supported strongly ASEAN’s dialogue 
processes involving the major powers in East Asia and its associated 
groups including the ARF and the East Asia Summit. Economic 
growth has broadened the basis for Australia’s engagement with the 
ASEAN region. ASEAN’s programs for deeper integration can add to 
the basis for Australia’s regional political and economic involvements. 
Australia therefore has a major stake in ASEAN’s capacity to achieve 
its declared goals and in the contribution that the relationship can 
make to enhancing prosperity and security for all.
29  See Peter Varghese, ’The 50th Anniversary of the Indonesia Project’, Speech, Canberra, 
30 July 2015, dfat.gov.au/news/speeches/Pages/50th-anniversary-dinner-indonesia-project.aspx 
(accessed 1 October 2015).
30  Christopher B. Roberts and Ahmad D. Habir, ‘Indonesia–Australia Relations: Progress, 
Challenges and Potential’, in Christopher B. Roberts, Ahmad D. Habir and Leonard C. Sebastian, 
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